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There is a growing need to understand and identify overarching organizational 
requirements for cybersecurity defense in large organizations. Applying proper 
cybersecurity defense will ensure that the right capabilities are fielded at the right 
locations to safeguard critical assets while minimizing duplication of effort and taking 
advantage of efficiencies. Exercising cybersecurity defense without an understanding of 
comprehensive foundational requirements instills an ad hoc and in many cases 
conservative approach to network security. Organizations must be synchronized across 
federal and civil agencies to achieve adequate cybersecurity defense. Understanding what 
constitutes comprehensive cybersecurity defense will ensure organizations are better 
protected and more efficient. 
  
This work, represented through design science research, developed a model to understand 
comprehensive cybersecurity defense, addressing the lack of standard requirements in 
large organizations. A systemic literature review and content analysis was conducted to 
form seven criteria statements for understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense. 
The seven criteria statements were then validated by a panel of expert cyber defenders 
utilizing the Delphi consensus process. Based on the approved criteria, the team of cyber 
defenders facilitated development of a Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense 
Framework prototype for understanding cybersecurity defense. Through the Delphi 
process, the team of cyber defense experts ensured the framework matched the seven 
criteria statements. An additional and separate panel of stakeholders conducted the  
Delphi consensus process to ensure a non-biased evaluation of the framework.  
 
The comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework is developed through the data 
collected from two distinct and separate Delphi panels. The framework maps risk 
management, behavioral, and defense in depth frameworks with cyber defense roles to 
offer a comprehensive approach to cyber defense in large companies, agencies, or 
organizations. By defining the cyber defense tasks, what those tasks are trying to achieve 
and where best to accomplish those tasks on the network, a comprehensive approach is 
reached. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Introduction 
 
     Large organizations have struggled to secure networks through a growing dependency 
to conduct operations on them. Kiper (2008) describes “a Company, Agency, or Large 
Organization” as CALO. CALOs are comprised of thousands or tens of thousands of 
personnel in its workforce. CALOs incur diverse cybersecurity defensive operational 
needs for several reasons. CALOs rely heavily on outside associated or international 
agencies as well as the Internet, which introduces security risks. Additionally, the scope 
of “mega” organizations size incurs trusts and interdependency with similar and smaller 
organizations, introducing even more security risks (Kiper, 2008) 
     Asti (2017) argued that small and medium-sized organizations face different 
challenges than CALOs. He explained that merely due to the size and scope of CALOs 
cybersecurity defense is more critical to stakeholders. Kiper (2013) contended CALOs 
conduct hundreds of more business processes in comparison to smaller organizations 
which is also salient to cybersecurity defense criticality. CALOs often manage smaller 
organizations that may have different operational functions. Challenges often arise when 
CALO statues, regulatory guidelines, and operation procedures do not capture 
comprehensive cybersecurity defense requirements for subordinate organizations (Kiper, 
2013). Also, CALOs consist of a diverse workforce that may include a multitude of job 
families, various levels of experience, and globally located offices. Factors that make 
2 
 
 
 
 
cybersecurity defense more challenging compared to a smaller organization (Kiper, 2008, 
2013).  
     CALOs lack of understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense not only affects 
operations but acquisitions of cyber defense technologies. CALOs often unnecessarily 
compartmentalize cyber defense along operational funding lines, resulting in overlapping 
defense methodologies. This type of organizational patchwork incurs millions and in 
some cases billions of wasted funding (S. J. Shackelford, Proia, Martell, & Craig, 2015).  
The global financial crisis of 2007 caused many nations to look at how, why, and where 
they spend funds across federal agencies. The complacency and overspending previously 
seen in many civil and government organizations have resulted in gross wastes of 
resources, negligent acquisition practices, and a culture of overcompensation that can no 
longer be accepted. CALO accountability is driving organizations to look at efficient 
means to defend networks. Although some CALOs are profit-driven organizations, some 
government agencies are driven primarily by public interests to include national security.  
     The Department of Defense (DOD) is a prime example of a government CALO that 
struggles with understanding what comprehensive cybersecurity defense is. The DOD 
remains in a constant battle to protect information, military maneuvers, equipment, and 
personnel that rely heavily on cyber systems. The operational implications of an 
inadequately defended network in the DOD could impact the safety of soldiers, sailors, 
and marines on the battlefield. In some cases, a poorly protected system could mean the 
difference between life and death (LTG A. Crutchfield, PACOM Deputy Commander, 
personal communications, May 10, 2016; Kim, Trimi, & Chung, 2014). 
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     Government CALOs are also challenged with budget constraints, leaving Information 
Technology Acquisitions (ITA) heavily scrutinized (Manifesto, 2013). Senior 
government leaders are aggressively attempting to streamline programs, create 
efficiencies, and forego unnecessary costs for cyber defense. Saving the needed resources 
and ultimately balancing those resources with the associated operational security 
requirements is difficult to manage if stakeholders are not fully cognizant of the 
comprehensive cybersecurity defense requirements (Hua & Bapna, 2013).       
     Threats are also a significant factor in cyber defense. To understand how to defend 
CALO networks, adequate threat analysis of what to defend is salient to understanding a 
comprehensive approach. Cyber threat information includes indicators of compromise 
such as tactics, techniques, and procedures used by threat actors as well as suggested 
actions to detect, contain, or prevent attacks, and the findings from the analyses of 
incidents (Johnson, Badger, Waltermire, Snyder, & Skorupka, 2016). By exchanging 
cyber threat information within a sharing community, CALOs can leverage the collective 
knowledge, experience, and capabilities to gain a complete understanding of the threats 
the organization may face. With a comprehensive understanding of cyber defense, 
organizations can make threat-informed decisions regarding defensive capabilities, threat 
detection techniques, and mitigation strategies. By correlating and analyzing cyber threat 
information from multiple sources, an organization can also enrich existing information 
and make it more actionable. Threat information can also be improved by independently 
confirming the observations of other community members through the reduction of 
ambiguity and errors. Organizations that receive threat information and subsequently use 
this information to remediate a threat confer a degree of protection to other organizations 
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by impeding the threat’s ability to spread (Burger, Goodman, Kampanakis, & Zhu, 2014; 
Johnson et al., 2016). Additionally, sharing of cyber threat information allows 
organizations to detect campaigns that target particular industry sectors, business entities, 
or institutions. CALOs that share cyber threat information can improve their security 
postures as well as those of other organizations (Johnson et al., 2016).   
     Research suggests a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity that considers CALO 
business or mission objectives, psychological and social factors, governance, economics, 
risk management, and technology is needed to capture comprehensive cybersecurity 
requirements (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Donaldson, Siegel, Williams, & Aslam, 2015b; 
Tisdale, 2015).  To achieve a comprehensive approach to CALO cybersecurity defense, 
an understanding of what is comprehensive cyber defense is required. 
 
Problem Statement 
     There is no common framework for clearly understanding what constitutes 
comprehensive cybersecurity defense for CALOs. This lack of understanding causes an 
inability of current cybersecurity frameworks to capture comprehensive organizational 
security requirements sufficiently. Cybersecurity frameworks are fragmented, vary in 
effectiveness, and a comprehensive approach is needed (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Atoum, 
Otoom, & Abu Ali, 2014; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Donaldson, Siegel, Williams, & 
Aslam, 2015a; Tatar, Çalik, Çelik, & Karabacak, 2014; Tisdale, 2015). Frameworks 
created for specific functions often utilize generalized frameworks such as NIST and 
ISO/IEC 2700 to ensure more effective cybersecurity, but optimal cyber defense is 
difficult to achieve without a clear understanding of what comprehensive cybersecurity 
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defense is (Vijayan, 2017). Most technical cybersecurity solutions fail to consider cost, 
operational tradeoffs, and the ability of adversaries to adapt to vulnerabilities.  
     Currently, no comprehensive cybersecurity requirements are imposed on the entire US 
critical infrastructure. Cybersecurity regulations do exist for specific sectors, leaving the 
status quo a complicated patchwork of often ambiguous state and federal regulations 
overlaying applicable common doctrines (S. J. Shackelford et al., 2015). This study did 
not intend to solve obligatory cybersecurity for the entire US but rather to improve 
understanding of the multi-varied cybersecurity defense requirements for civil and 
government CALOs.  
     In the effort to achieve cybersecurity objectives, organizations often develop 
reactionary cyber defense methodologies. The personnel trained, tools used, and methods 
adopted by many CALOs are based on a “buy first ask questions later” culture. Along 
with politics driving federal agencies towards a leaner, more agile common off the shelf 
(COTS) development practices, a comprehensive framework that matches strategic 
objectives to detailed requirements is needed (Karyda, Mitrou, & Quirchmayr, 2006; 
Lachow, 2016; Manifesto, 2013). 
     There are many information technologies (IT) and frameworks used for general 
process improvement and network security. Although most are beneficial in deriving, 
common best practices developed over time, few captures a comprehensive approach that 
can be tailored to meet objectives on a CALO operational level (Atoum & Otoom, 2016).  
     Frameworks developed over the years by popular commercial and government 
organizations help identify cybersecurity requirements.  Many of these frameworks have 
compliance application concepts that are not comprehensive enough to derive specific 
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cyber defense requirements for CALOs (Acuña, 2016; Atoum et al., 2014; Donaldson et 
al., 2015a; Tisdale, 2015). Donaldson, Siegel, Williams, and Aslam (2015b) argued that 
frameworks such as ISO 2700/27002, NISP-SP800-53, NIST Cybersecurity Framework, 
PCI DSS, HIPPA Security Rule, HITRUST Security Rule, and NERC CIP provide 
segmented approaches to cybersecurity. Donaldson et al. (2015b) proposed that mapping 
different cybersecurity frameworks could result in significant improvements for more 
practical operational applications. He further argued that many of the cybersecurity 
frameworks established over the past two decades provided only compartmentalized 
security approaches, making them difficult to achieve full spectrum cyber defense in 
CALOs. Atoum (2014) and (2016) also contended the need for a more comprehensive 
approach to cybersecurity. 
     Cybersecurity challenges in CALOs have been compounded by poor acquisitions 
practices over the years, creating stove-piped security architectures with standard security 
requirements. Donaldson (2015b) and Vijayan (2017) both argued that many of the 
popular security frameworks have overlapping security approaches and guidelines. The 
variation of security practices by separate organizations with common mission objectives 
creates unknown vulnerabilities, security risks and implies the need for understanding 
what exactly is considered comprehensive. A comprehensive, requirements driven 
framework is needed to understand CALO common security objectives and to identify 
security gaps (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Donaldson et al., 2015a; Vijayan, 2017). Many of 
CALO’s incur security risks due to segregated acquisitions, organizational structures, 
policies, and poor change management practices. The scope of this work addresses 
cybersecurity defensive measures explicitly. 
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Dissertation Goal  
    The goal of this work was to conduct design research towards the development of a 
Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF) artifact to address the lack of 
understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense for CALOs. To approach the 
research problem, a systemic literature review of current cybersecurity frameworks was 
conducted to outline the gaps in a comprehensive approach to cyber defense. A 
comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework to facilitate understanding of CALO 
cybersecurity was developed through design science and iterative evaluations of various 
frameworks. The CCDF identifies gaps in cybersecurity, risk management, and 
cybersecurity defense acquisitions. The CCDF captures operational cyber defense 
requirements based on CALO stakeholder needs towards the more practical use of 
security controls and compliance, ultimately providing better defense against cyber-
attacks. 
     The CCDF leverages current de facto and de jure frameworks or standards to offer a 
comprehensive approach to driving cybersecurity defense requirements in large 
companies, agencies, or organizations. By defining the tasks, what those tasks are trying 
to achieve and where best to accomplish those tasks on the network, a comprehensive 
approach may be reached (Lt Col Perez, Willarvis Smith, DISA Pacific Operations 
Division, personal communications, August 1, 2016).        
     Frameworks developed over the years by popular commercial and government 
organizations help identify cybersecurity requirements.  Traditional frameworks such as 
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, ISO 2700 and NIST SP 800-53 provide a general 
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approach to cybersecurity but are not comprehensive enough to derive requirements for 
use throughout CALOs (Atoum et al., 2014; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Donaldson et 
al., 2015a; Tatar et al., 2014; Tisdale, 2015).  
 
Research Questions 
 
1. What Criterion does the CCDF artifact have to meet to be considered a comprehensive 
defensive cybersecurity framework for CALOs?  
2. In what ways does the CCDF meet the established criteria for a comprehensive 
defensive cybersecurity framework for CALOs?  
3. What future areas of research may be explored in understanding a more comprehensive 
approach to cybersecurity defense? 
   
Relevance and Significance 
      
     There are many general frameworks and security processes in use to date. Although 
beneficial, they do not address what constitutes comprehensive organizational 
cybersecurity defense based on CALO strategic objectives. Most frameworks address 
general control and compliance for organizations without consideration to the scope, size 
and operational context of cybersecurity defense (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Atoum et al., 
2014; Donaldson et al., 2015a).  This work studied understanding what is considered 
comprehensive cybersecurity defense for CALOs and how to meet the goals of 
optimizing the organizational cyber defense environment. 
         Understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense is essential to identify the 
specific requirements of organizations based on mission objectives and to ensure those 
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requirements are meeting cybersecurity needs. Development of a CCDF based on 
understanding cyber defense objectives not only examines security gaps but identifies 
interdependencies and overlapping requirements driven from traditional stove-piped 
security architectures (Kelic et al., 2013; Tisdale, 2015). 
     Atoum et al. (2014) contended that current cybersecurity frameworks defending 
against cyber-attacks are fragmented and vary widely in effectiveness. A holistic 
implementation framework synonymous with a comprehensive approach was presented 
although untested and did not map organizational strategy to cyber defense capabilities 
and tools. Atoum et al. (2014) were based on practical experience, not industry best 
practices, and national standards. Information security enforcement on the national level 
inherently affects security implementation from a global point of view and is salient for 
several reasons. First, to ensure early detection of likely threats and mitigate risks related 
to government information systems and critical infrastructures of the commercial 
connections tied to those systems must be considered. Also, decision-makers must be 
enabled to take necessary actions when needed. With an understanding of comprehensive 
oversight, decisions become more explicit and interdependent stakeholders are aware of 
what is happening during an attack. Lastly, organizations must be able to implement 
security solutions that involve vast numbers of stakeholders, including private entities, 
government, and civilian. Atoum (2014) and (2016) failed to define constructs and 
criteria for a holistic or comprehensive cybersecurity approach. Research established that 
comprehensive approaches to cybersecurity are highly problematic (Donaldson et al., 
2015a; Oltramari, Ben-Asher, Cranor, Bauer, & Christin, 2014)).    
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     Oltramari et al. (2014) described cybersecurity as a complicated, multi-layered 
security challenge for all entities which includes digital information and humans that 
operate in cyberspace. Cybersecurity has become a problem that increasingly demands 
scientific understanding in theoretical and empirically validated models (Oltramari et al., 
2014). This report addressed cybersecurity from a defensive approach and explored the 
construction of a CCDF artifact to understand what is intended by “comprehensive” 
cyber defense and the criteria for the said artifact. The CCDF facilitated the research gap 
based on clearly defined criteria of cyber defense and provided opportunities for future 
work towards cyber offense, cyber response and other disciplines defined in cyberspace 
(Acuña, 2016; Donaldson et al., 2015a; Matania, Yoffe, & Mashkautsan, 2016). 
     A significant implication of relevancy for this research is the emergence of cyber 
warfare on the national level and the establishment of CYBERCOM as a combatant 
command in 2017 (Clark, 2018). Action officers, Senior Executives, and General 
Officers have taken steps to support a comprehensive requirements framework by 
funding several conferences of global DOD partners at Fort Meade Maryland and Scott 
Air Force Base Illinois to support a comprehensive approach that will have enforceable 
authorities to implement (Clark, 2018). Federal and civil CALOs are attempting to 
integrate cyber defense infrastructures to create security and monetary efficiencies. To 
achieve this, the DOD and other CALOs must understand what comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense entails.   
     Understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense is not exclusively a federal issue 
as civil CALO’s struggle with defining a comprehensive approach. Donaldson et al. 
(2015b) argued that many of the commercial cybersecurity frameworks developed over 
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the past 20 years only provide a compartmentalized approach to cybersecurity and 
suggested research towards mapping security frameworks for a comprehensive approach. 
Donaldson (2015b) argued frameworks used for controls or compliance purposes are 
especially suited for that purpose and not adequate for a comprehensive cybersecurity 
program.    
     Comprehensive security requirements prepare CALOs against Advanced Persistent 
Threats (APT). APT actors continually demonstrate the capability to compromise 
systems by using advanced tools, customized malware and zero-day exploits that anti-
virus, defense signatures, and patching cannot detect or mitigate (Hutchins, Cloppert, & 
Amin, 2011). APT represents well-resourced and trained adversaries that conduct multi-
year intrusion campaigns targeting highly sensitive economic, proprietary, or national 
security information (Hutchens et al., 2011). Through intelligence-driven response, 
network defenders can achieve an advantage over the aggressor for APT caliber 
adversaries. Responses to APT intrusions require an evolution in analysis, process, and 
technology. It is possible to anticipate and mitigate future intrusions based on knowledge 
of the threat (Hutchens et al., 2011). Modern APT actors require CALO’s cyber defense 
requirements to be met to avoid loss of credibility, money or in some cases, life (Atoum 
et al., 2014; Tisdale, 2015). 
     Government and many other CALO projects fail in part due to constant re-work as 
security, technology, and general lack of understanding causes IT projects to go far 
beyond their expected end date (Manifesto, 2013). Stakeholders lack an understanding of 
complex systems including security requirements often causes extended contract times. 
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Security is often re-worked or incorporated into a project later than required, sometimes 
at the cost of the overall project (Charette, 2013; Manifesto, 2013). 
    A CALO example is the Defense Information Systems Organization (DISA). DISA has 
more than 3800 sites facilitating more than 1700 circuits. DISA's user base includes 1.97 
million DOD personnel with 1.3 million collaborative users which include international, 
civilian organizations, and other federal agencies (Montemarano, 2014). 
     The motivation for this work considers factors of existing and potential growth of 
"mega-organizations" such as DISA. For an effective cyber defense, the CCDF should 
capture overlapping requirements and provide a comprehensive approach to achieve 
strategic objectives. The CYBERCOM Director, charged with defending the DOD’s 
networks claimed that in its current posture, the DOD has a global network that is un-
defendable (Clark, 2018). This problem is not exclusive to the DOD organizations but the 
industry as well. In 2009 it was reported that losses due to cyber-crime reached 560 
million according to the Department of Homeland Security (Goel, 2011; Kiper, 2013). 
 
Barriers and Issues 
      One major obstacle was creating a comprehensive approach to the many internal and 
external cyber security domain interdependencies. As previously mentioned in the 
introduction, CALOs often manage smaller organizations that may have different 
operational functions. Aligning stakeholder cyber defense to a CCDF model was 
challenging.  National governments and commercial sector leaders have struggled to 
understand and adequately scope cyber requirements due to CALOs size (Clark, 2018; 
Matania et al., 2016; Vijayan, 2017). 
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     Another barrier in this was the releasable information to the academic public. 
Studying CALOs becomes problematic as some of the information in cyber defense may 
be confidential. CALOs may be reluctant to release information due to privacy, security, 
or embarrassment.  This research was open source, and DISA is one CALO that has 
cooperated with this work for academic research. 
     This work was based on defensive cybersecurity. A common pitfall in research 
specific to cybersecurity is to properly scope the work (Donaldson et al., 2015a; Hiller & 
Russell, 2013). Offensive friendly or malicious hacking, network operations in general 
and other areas of security are beyond the scope of this work. This researcher must define 
terms and the scope of this work to address the defensive cybersecurity framework 
requirements problem adequately.  
     Finally, it was challenging to conduct the gap analysis between existing and required 
cyber defense capabilities. Many cyber defense tools have multiple functions so getting 
reliable subject matter experts (SME) who understand cyber defense methodologies and 
security frameworks well enough to provide adequate criteria for a comprehensive 
framework was challenging. Also, as this process created efficiencies, subject matter 
expert panelist may have been compelled to defend traditional practices based on 
personal experience and job security. 
     One major problem in design science is the evaluation process. Henver, March, Park 
and Ram (2004) argued that rigorous evaluation methods are complicated to apply in 
design science research. The use of a design artifact on a single research project may not 
generalize to different environments. Petter and Vaishnavi (2008) contended challenges 
in the evaluation process and proposed an assessment framework for patterns in any 
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domain where the design artifact is created. For this reason, new approaches are regularly 
utilized in combination with IS design science.  
 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
 
Assumptions    
 
     It was assumed that CALO’s had members in their organization conducting cyber 
defense. To ascertain the criteria for the CCDF, an expert panel was used. It was also 
assumed that personnel selected to this panel would be experts in the cybersecurity field 
and have a working knowledge of security frameworks. Experts from the federal and civil 
workforce were gleaned to comprise the scope of this work (Ellis & Levy, 2010). 
Participants of the study included federal and civil CALO stakeholders to measure 
artifact effectiveness.  It was assumed that stakeholders were sincere in their efforts to 
complete assigned tasks honestly and were familiar with at least one security framework 
in frequent use. Furthermore, it was assumed that based on the defined terms provided by 
the researcher, participants understood the scope of this work to address the defensive 
cybersecurity requirements problem. Finally, it was assumed that CALOs shared 
pertinent information to support this work in achieving a more comprehensive approach 
to defensive cybersecurity.   
Limitations 
 
     Specific internal and external factors beyond the researcher’s control could have 
possibly impacted the validity of this study. The requirements collected by the expert 
panel to establish the CCDF criteria were based on the opinions of the members of the 
panel. Expert members were drawn from industry and government, cybersecurity Chief 
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Information Security Officers (CISO), Network Defenders with more than ten years of 
experience, Chief Information Officers (CIO), Military Commanders, Federal Senior 
Executive Service Members (SES), and Senior Military Officers. Expert panel opinions 
may not have been universally representative of all CALO experts, therefore, may not 
represent optimal requirements or criteria for the artifact. Volunteers for this study could 
have withdrawn at any time negatively impacting test results. The product testing may 
not truly reflect the effectiveness of the artifact in meeting the established criteria (Ellis & 
Levy, 2010). 
     To minimize limitations for this work and ensure the reliability and validity of 
employed methodologies, the Delphi process was utilized as an accepted consensus-
building process. Approved instruments of the Nova Southeastern University Internal 
Review Board (IRB) was used to evaluate the criteria (Ellis & Levy, 2010). 
Delineations  
 
     Ellis and Levy (2010) contended that environmental factors inherently impacted 
design and developmental research studies. Design research is volatile due to the rapid 
changes in technology. As recently as December 2017, the NIST cybersecurity 
framework was updated, providing more insight towards a comprehensive approach to 
cybersecurity.  The scope of this work was limited to defensive measures of 
cybersecurity, towards understanding a comprehensive approach. Defensive measures 
include those actions to defend CALOs from internal and external malicious or 
unintentional cyber events. This work was not intended to address aggressive measures in 
cybersecurity or network attacks. Furthermore, this work was not intended to address 
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how CALOs employ the artifact independently. Future studies may involve work 
between CALO’s. 
 
Definition of Terms 
Artifact: An artifact is a construct, model, method or instantiation built to address 
unsolved problems in information systems research. Artifacts are built and evaluated 
through the design-science research methodology (Hevner et al., 2004). 
Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF):  for this work, A CCDF is 
defined as a security model that addresses a CALO’s stakeholders specific defensive 
cybersecurity needs according to operational requirements. 
Cyber or Cyberspace: Cyber entails all of the globally interconnected information 
systems tied into the global information grid we know as the Internet. The cyber domain 
encompasses the global information economy, the international exponential growth of 
social networking, National Defense Systems (NDS), the entire civil telecommunications 
infrastructure, all bands of wireless networks, electronic health systems, and critical 
infrastructure systems such as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems 
just to name a few (Dukes, 2015; Ericsson, 2010; House, 2009). 
Cyber Defense: Cyber defense focuses on preventing, detecting and providing timely 
responses to attacks or threats so that no infrastructure or information is altered. With the 
growth in volume as well as the complexity of cyber-attacks, cyber defense is essential 
for most entities in order to protect sensitive information as well as to safeguard assets 
(Dukes, 2015; Tirenin & Faatz, 1999). 
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Cybersecurity: Cybersecurity or digital security entails the security of digital information 
which includes the entire digital wired and wireless infrastructure of a country, CALO, or 
smaller organization. The infrastructure includes power grids, water and sewage, 
government networks, financial systems, educational systems, and personal Internet end-
users. The purpose of cybersecurity is to contribute to preserving the organizational, 
human, economic, technological, and informational resources in which a nation is 
equipped in order to achieve its objectives (House, 2009). Cybersecurity encompasses the 
protection of information technology through the application of technical and social 
competencies (Dukes, 2015; Safa, Von Solms, & Furnell, 2016).  
Design Science: Design science research methodology produces a new artifact that 
provides a technology-based solution to a relevant problem with significant impact and 
research contribution (Hevner et al., 2004). The design process is a sequence of activities 
by experts which produces the innovative product or artifact. The evaluation of the 
artifact then provides feedback information and a better understanding of the problem to 
improve the quality of the artifact and design process (Henver et al., 2004) 
Security Framework: A security framework is defined as a model of how to make logical 
sense of relationships among several factors that have been identified as salient to the 
problem (Sekaran & Bougie, 2003).  
Information Security Framework:  For this work, an Information Security Framework is a 
series of documented processes that are used to define policies and procedures around the 
implementation and ongoing management of information security controls in an 
enterprise environment (Granneman, 2013). 
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Requirements:  The term requirements for this work references the tools and capabilities 
to perform CALO defensive cybersecurity according to stakeholders’ organizational 
needs (Luiijf, Besseling, & De Graaf, 2013). 
Stakeholders:  Stakeholders are defined as Chief Executive Officers, Chief Information 
Systems Security Officers or CALO designated information owners for this work (Luiijf 
et al., 2013). 
Summary 
      
     This report addresses the lack of understanding CALOs cybersecurity defense to 
capture comprehensive organizational security requirements. Current cybersecurity 
frameworks are fragmented, vary in effectiveness, and a comprehensive approach is 
needed (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Atoum et al., 2014; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; 
Donaldson et al., 2015a, 2015c; Tatar et al., 2014; Tisdale, 2015). 
     Cybersecurity frameworks exist for specific sectors, resulting in a complex patchwork 
of often ambiguous state and federal regulations overlaying applicable common doctrines 
(S. J. Shackelford et al., 2015). The report is targeted at improving understanding 
comprehensive cybersecurity defense for civil and government CALOs. 
     The goal of the current study was to conduct design research towards the development 
of a CCDF artifact to understand a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity defense 
better. Through design science and iterative evaluation of various frameworks, this 
research developed a comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework for CALOs that 
identified gaps in cybersecurity, risk management, and cyber security tools acquisitions. 
     The remaining chapters of this report will cover a systematic review of the literature 
the methodology used to conduct the study, and the results of the study. Lastly, the 
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conclusion, implications, recommendations, and the summary will be presented. Chapter 
two provides a review of the cyber domain, cyber defense challenges in CALOs, cyber 
construct challenges, and federal and commercial security frameworks. The frameworks 
are compared and analyzed to explain contributing factors to the problem. Practical 
relevance is included to describe frameworks in existence to date and how they work 
along with how this work will contribute to the body of knowledge. Chapter three 
outlines the methodology in the study which includes the research questions, expert 
panel, other participants and how the research will be conducted. The results of the study 
are presented in chapter 4 and the conclusions, implications, recommendations, and 
summary are provided in chapter 5. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of Literature 
 
Introduction  
      
     Security frameworks developed by reputable commercial and government 
organizations provide guidance to help implement cybersecurity.  Many of these 
frameworks have general applications but are not comprehensive enough to derive clear 
requirements for organizational needs (Atoum et al., 2014; Donaldson et al., 2015b; 
Koong & Yunis, 2015; Lorhmann, 2014; Oltramari et al., 2014; Wiander, 2007). This 
literature review explores security frameworks and their use in government and industry 
to understand their benefits and limitations. A review of CALOs and the challenges of 
understanding context to achieve optimal cybersecurity is also explored to ascertain what 
exactly is comprehensive cybersecurity defense.   
     Cybersecurity is a dynamic field with many research challenges. A systemic literature 
review was required for a clear understanding of known pitfalls in information systems 
(IS) research. A systematic approach is utilized based primarily on the work of Levy and 
Ellis (2006). The authors provide researchers clear guidance on how to conduct doctoral 
level work, where to find adequate peer-reviewed journals, and how to synthesize and 
analyze data for publication.          
     Researchers argue that organizations require a more comprehensive approach to 
cybersecurity defense (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Atoum et al., 2014; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 
2006; Donaldson et al., 2015a; Tatar et al., 2014; Tisdale, 2015) but this problem is 
unattainable without  a clear context and criteria of what is considered comprehensive. A 
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common problem in cyber or IT security related research is defining the taxonomy 
(Kolini & Janczewski, 2015). Defined terms based on sound peer-reviewed literature is 
critical in conducting research (Dr. Jay Nunamaker, HICSS Doctoral Consortium Mentor, 
personal communications, January 2, 2018). For this work, a security framework is 
defined as a model of how to make logical sense of relationships among several factors 
that have been identified as salient to the problem (Sekaran & Bougie, 2003). The term 
requirements for this work references the tools and capabilities to perform CALO 
defensive cybersecurity according to stakeholders’ organizational needs. Stakeholders are 
defined as Chief Executive Officers or designated information owners. Comprehensive 
Cybersecurity Defense Framework for this work is defined as a security model that 
addresses CALO’s stakeholder's specific defensive cybersecurity needs according to 
operational requirements. 
     Federal or international organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) are seminal 
in standardized framework development (Hammond, Curran, & Leithauser, 2013; S. J. 
Shackelford et al., 2015; Shen, 2014). Additional frameworks are created by large 
commercial IT organizations such as Microsoft, Oracle, Lockheed Martin, Cisco, and 
others. Although beneficial, no one framework addresses comprehensive organizational 
requirements based on strategic guidelines. Most frameworks explain best practices on 
how to conduct cybersecurity but fail to capture an understanding of comprehensive 
cyber defense (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Atoum et al., 2014; Donaldson et al., 2015c; 
Lorhmann, 2014; Wiander, 2007). 
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     When organizations have a comprehensive oversight, decisions become clearer and 
interdependent stakeholders are aware of what is happening during an attack. For some 
CALO’s, decision-making is a matter of life and death. Organizations must be able to 
implement security solutions that involve vast numbers of stakeholders, including 
internal and external government and commercial entities (Atoum et al., 2014; Center for 
History and New Media, n.d.; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Fukushima & Sasaki, 2016; 
Tatar et al., 2014; Tisdale, 2015)      
     This literature review encompasses four major areas regarding the problem of 
understanding what constitutes a comprehensive approach towards a CALO 
cybersecurity defense framework. The first section outlines the cyber domain. An 
understanding of what to defend is salient as understanding the deliberation of 
comprehensive cybersecurity defense. The cyber domain includes all the information 
instruments of national power. The second section outlines the unique challenges of 
cyber defense in Companies, Agencies or Large Organizations (CALO).  CALO’s 
internal and external interdependencies, size and scope challenges and diversity are 
salient to the need for a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity defense. The third 
section is a review of the literature that describes the varying cyber domain constructs, 
taxonomies and terminology that impedes not only CALOs but also smaller organizations 
from achieving optimal cyber defense. Common language challenges between CALOs 
combined with the need to share cyber defense responsibilities create gaps in cyber 
defense. Finally, the fourth section reviews the literature of significant security 
frameworks and their use in government and industry to understand their benefits, 
limitations, and gaps. The four major topics constitutes a foundation for the proposed 
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research addressing the problem and culminate multiple domains necessary to ensure 
depth of the literature review. 
 
The Cyber Domain 
      
     The cyber domain encompasses the global information economy, the international 
exponential growth of social networking, National Defense Systems (NDS), the entire 
civil telecommunications infrastructure, all bands of wireless networks, electronic health 
systems, and critical infrastructure systems such as supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems just to name a few. In short, cyber entails all of the 
interconnected information systems tied into the global information grid we know as the 
Internet (Andrews, Lipson, & Fisher, 2011; Ericsson, 2010; House, 2009; Huang, Craig, 
Lin, & Yan, 2016; Luo, 2016). 
     The purpose of cybersecurity is to contribute to preserving the organizational, human, 
financial, technological, and informational resources in which a nation is equipped in 
order to achieve its objectives (Dukes, 2015). The government, working with CALO’s 
must take an active role in operating cybersecurity policy and infrastructure to facilitate 
standardized requirements. It must balance an active role with a concerted campaign to 
protect industry's ability to innovate in the creation of new platforms and applications 
while ensuring cybersecurity. It must do this while preserving citizens' confidence that 
cyber security policy will protect their civil liberties as well as the cyber infrastructure. 
Government and civic leaders must form internal and international partnerships with 
other nations, and technical standards bodies to efficiently secure cyberspace (Andrews et 
al., 2011; DSS, 2016; Luo, 2016). Information in the cyber domain is one of the most 
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critical assets of a society, and the protection and defense of information is a crucial 
consideration in national security strategy. Whatever the name is given, information 
technologies security (ICT security), cybersecurity or digital security entails the security 
of digital information in an interconnected world. Initiatives to secure the cyber domain 
could mean the difference in the safety and sovereignty of a state, the security of critical 
infrastructures, public safety, economic security, and even protection of human life 
(Haggard & Lindsay, 2015; House, 2009; Sadhukhan, Mallari, & Yadav, 2015). To 
proactively achieve this goal, security in a country or organization must reduce 
vulnerability and threats, limit damages or dysfunctions that might be induced by a 
security breach, and be robust enough for a nation to go back to normal state after a 
cyber-attack (Koong & Yunis, 2015). To optimize national security objectives, cyber 
security must have comprehensive cyber requirements, policy, infrastructure, education, 
and be able to meet the international challenges of the global information grid. 
     Cyber includes the entire digital wired and wireless infrastructure of the US such as; 
power grids, water and sewage, government networks, financial systems, educational 
systems, and personal Internet end-users. Government and organizations are 
overwhelmed in creating an all-encompassing cyber policy baseline (White House, 
2009). The compartmentalized nature of US policy between federal, state, and local 
organizations creates an atmosphere of cyber vulnerability, facilitating latent decision-
making and isolated cyber defense postures (Ericsson, 2010; S. Shackelford & Bohm, 
2015). There are salient concerns about the ineffectiveness of current US approaches to 
protect cyberspace. In a December 2008 report, it was argued that America’s failure to 
protect cyberspace is one of the most urgent national security problems facing the Obama 
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administration (Fielder, Li, & Hankin, 2016). This problem is compounded by various 
organizational requirements to protect interdependent information sharing between 
CALO’s.  
     Monetary and intellectual property loss from having no comprehensive approach to 
protecting cyberspace results in devastating losses versus the costs of implementing and 
enforcing standards and policy (House, 2009). Initial systems and equipment on the 
Internet were designed for efficiency and not security, and many legacy systems are now 
connected to the modern information grid. The results of not modernizing current 
equipment for security can be catastrophic. For example, the Electrical Grid Delayed 
Hacker Insertion in 2010 was suspected during the 2011 Honolulu major power outage 
costing millions. Security experts noted that Oahu’s power grid system did not have 
adequate fail-safe information protection to avert hacker ownership of the power grid, 
which made it not only difficult to identify the culprit, but made them helpless during the 
event, and post investigation (Haggard & Lindsay, 2015). Upgraded systems with an 
integrated security baseline policy could keep critical assets secure and maintain 
efficiencies between cyber partners. 
     The President of the United States (POTUS) along with Congress both agree that 
cyber warfare is at the forefront of the US as an instrument of national power. 
CYBERCOM has been named a combatant command as of August 18, 2017.  This 
elevation takes CYBERCOM from under the purview of US Strategic Command, making 
it a fully unified combatant command (Clark, 2018). In the finalized National Defense 
Authorization Act that passed House and Senate conference committees, the legislation 
authorizes the Secretary of Defense to establish a unified combatant command for cyber 
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operations forces. What this designation means in practical terms is greater scope in 
global campaign planning, funding, authorities, personnel, and policy (C4ISR, 2016; 
Clark, 2018). 
     To fully benefit from consolidated cyberspace, all parties must understand that making 
progress on cyber security requires that we address a myriad of both technical and 
nontechnical factors that work to prevent governments, corporations, and even 
individuals from securing their systems (Henver et al., 2004). Oltramari et al. (2014) 
argued the cyber domain creates unique challenges to organizations due to its 
combination of human and machine elements whose complex interactions occur in a 
global communications network. Oltramari et al. (2014) conducted developmental 
research and proposed an ontology to improve the situational awareness of cyber 
defenders and facilitate operational decision-making. Oltramari et al. (2014) theorized 
with regard to human and human computer interaction the most important step in 
understanding a complex new domain such as cyber is terminological definitions, 
classification entities, and phenomena. The authors further argued that terms are often 
misused and mischaracterized. Oltramari et al. (2014) conducted an ontological analysis 
of several well-known ontologies through peer-reviewed research and produced a 
descriptive ontology for linguistic and cognitive engineering model to be further tested.   
     The variation of security practices by separate organizations with common mission 
objectives creates unknown vulnerabilities and security risks. Although cybersecurity 
regulatory and acquisitions between CALO’s may not be feasible, independent CALO 
cybersecurity requirements based on organizational stakeholders’ needs may be achieved 
for a more comprehensive approach to cybersecurity. A comprehensive, requirement-
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driven framework is needed to understand CALO’s common security objectives and to 
identify security gaps (Charette, 2013; Donaldson et al., 2015c; Manifesto, 2013). This 
section explained the complexity of the cyber domain and puts into perspective the scope 
of the problem of understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense in CALOs.   
 
Cyber defense in Large Organizations 
      CALOs incur considerable challenges, as they are comprised of thousands or tens of 
thousands of personnel. Additionally, the scope of CALOs requires trusts and 
interdependency with similar and smaller organizations, introducing significant security 
risks (Kiper, 2008). Challenges in cybersecurity are not simply technical but social as 
well. Safa et al. (2016) conducted a novel approach to understand employee compliance 
with information security policies though Social Bond Theory (SBT). SBT describes how 
individuals, who have stronger ties to organizations, engage in less deviant behavior. This 
is salient to CALOs as the larger the organization the more challenging to scope 
organizational involvement, commitment and personal norms (Safa et al., 2016). Safa et 
al. (2016) argues involvement theory requires the effective sharing of information 
security knowledge to increase information security awareness. Safa et al. (2016) 
developmental research resulted in an information security compliance with 
organizational policies model. The data collected was by means of Liker scale and 
questionnaires from four different CALOs who had established information security 
policies. A total of 416 questionnaires were emailed to participants yielding 302 
responses. Safa et al. (2016) used a diverse demographic distribution methodology to 
capture adequate social norms found in CALOs. The results of Safa et al. (2016) revealed 
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that information security knowledge sharing has strong effects on one’s attitude towards 
compliance with information security policies. The Safa et al. (2016) findings further 
showed significant positive relationships between information security collaboration in 
CALOs with a positive attitude towards compliance with security policies. Safa et al. 
(2016) research implies a behavioral aspect of cybersecurity should be considered in 
constructing a model of understanding what comprehensive cyber defense means.       
     Asti (2017) argued that small and medium-sized organizations face different 
challenges than CALOs. He explained that merely due to the size and scope of CALOs 
cyber defense is more critical to stakeholders. Kiper (2013) contended CALOs conduct 
hundreds of more business processes in comparison to smaller organizations. This is also 
salient to cyber defense criticality. CALOs often manage smaller organizations that may 
have different operational functions. Challenges often arise when CALO statues, 
regulatory guidelines, and operation procedures do not capture comprehensive cyber 
defense requirements for subordinate organizations (Kiper, 2013). Also, CALOs consist 
of a diverse workforce that may include a multitude of job families, various levels of 
experience and globally located offices,  factors that make cyber defense more 
challenging compared to a smaller organization (Kiper, 2008, 2013).  
     Asti (2017) conducted a survey to identify cybersecurity challenges in small and 
medium sized businesses (SMBs). To determine the scope of SMBs Asti (2017) 
conducted a survey of 31 participating enterprises. Respondents to the survey who 
belonged to a business of more than 500 employees were removed from the sample size, 
which left 22 respondents. Asti (2017) then administered an online survey with the final 
sample size of 22 SMBs. The survey showed that the top challenges were finances to pay 
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talent, regulatory compliance and professionally available talent. As a result, inadequate 
information technology (IT) and cybersecurity staffing, 64% of respondents were 
unaware if a successful cyber-attack had taken place. The significant challenge SMBs 
face is their security posture and knowing if they have been targeted against a cyber-
attack. Asti (2017 p.4) data corroborated with the Ponemon Institute Research Report 
which asked “What challenges keep your IS security posture from being fully effective?” 
and 67% of respondents reported insufficient personnel. The data from the survey further 
identified 55% of respondents have only one IT employee dedicated to cybersecurity. 
About 40% of SMBs report security events verbally, 30% report events through 
scheduled meetings, and 30% do not report events at all. Asti (2017) research on SMBs 
provided salient background and survey information to adequately scope CALOs and 
address expert panel inquiries.  
     Contrary to Asti (2017), Kemper (2017) research contended IT decision-makers invest 
heavily in cybersecurity to combat current and future threats in large organizations. 
Kemper (2017) examined the state of cybersecurity among CALOs and how they address 
internal and external security risks. Kemper (2017) interviewed 304 IT decision-makers 
at companies with more than 500 employees, 77% of the respondents worked in 
companies with over 1,000 employees, and 70% of the respondents held positions above 
the manger level. The survey found required security software and how data was backed 
up to be the most important elements of cybersecurity policies. The survey also 
concluded that large organizations experience phishing attacks 57% more than any other 
forms of cyber-attacks, Trojans and Malware followed with 47%, password attacks were 
37%, denial of service attacks were 29%, and finally unpatched software exploits were 
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25%. Additionally, the survey found 52% of IT decision-makers view security policy 
enforcement as “moderate” opposed to “strict” (47%). Kemper (2017) further concluded 
94% of most large organizations have security policies in place but 36% implemented 
policies as recent as three to five years, 27% from six to nine years, and 24% had 
cybersecurity policies in place more than ten years.  As more CALOs invest in 
cybersecurity and communicate policy to employees and customers, simplifying cyber 
defense through common constructs may close the gap between CALOs and partnering 
medium and smaller organizations. 
   
Cyber Doman Construct Challenges  
 
     There are many challenges with understanding common language in the cyber 
domain. Varying cyber domain constructs, taxonomies and terminologies impede optimal 
cyber defense. The Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Working Group 
utilized authoritative sources to resolve US national differences between constructs used 
by the DoD, Intelligence Community (IC), and Civil Agencies (e.g. NIST), enabling all 
three to use the same glossary. The CNSS glossary allows consistent terminology in 
documentation, policy, and processes across the aforementioned communities. The 
glossary began in 2010 with 29 references and has grown to 150 in the current 2017 
version (Dukes, 2015). To study criteria for a comprehensive cyber defense approach, 
understanding national and international CALO cyber construct challenges is salient to 
CCDF developmental research.   
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     Manjikian (2017) argued there was a lack of clarity regarding cyberwarfare 
terminology. The exploratory research presented six reasons for the development of 
competing terms and concepts. Manjikian (2017) contended obstacles to the development 
of a universal lexicon for cyberwarfare included cyber terminology confusion between 
legal, academia, defense, intelligence, and social sciences.  The study found terms such as 
cyber deterrence, cyber threat, and cyber deception all had different meanings. The 
variations of cyber constructs may create jurisdictional challenges. Additionally, the 
study found varying definitions of the same terms between agencies within the US 
government. The Department of Homeland Security, US CERT and, National Cyber 
Security Strategy defined the term “cyber threat” differently. Manjikian (2017) further 
argued varying international constructs further complicate cyberwarfare. Russia’s and 
China’s view of cyber threat and cybersecurity included a much broader psychological 
definition of the terms that included information warfare compared to the US approach. 
     Giles and Hagestad (2013) argued the failure to reach agreement on fundamental 
principles affecting cyberspace was indicative of the fact that despite increased 
willingness during 2012 by the USA, UK, and other nations to engage with Russia and 
China on cybersecurity issues, engagement remains difficult in the absence of commonly 
agreed upon concepts of what constitutes cybersecurity. Giles and Hagestad (2013) 
substantiated Manjikian (2017) argument of Russia’s and China’s more psychological 
approach to cybersecurity compared to western democracies. Giles and Hagestad (2013) 
contended definitions of such terms as cyber conflict, cyber war, cyber-attack, and cyber 
weapon used by the US, UK, Russia, and China do not coincide, even where official or 
generally recognized definitions exist in each respective language.  
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     Giles and Hagestad (2013) conducted a case study to illustrate fundamental 
incompatibility between terms and concepts between the US, UK, Russia, and China.  
The study found that translated common terms such as information space, information 
warfare, information weapon, information security, cyber warfare, cyberspace, 
cybersecurity, and network warfare varied widely. While western definitions were based 
primarily on national interest, Chinese and Russian terms included “the world’s 
population”, a global definition.  The Chinese view “information space” as a domain, or 
landscape for communicating with the world’s population. The Russian definition of 
“information space” corresponds with China and includes human information processing 
or cognitive space. Giles and Hagestad (2013) concluded Russia and China pose 
considerable cyber threats to western countries and allies. Understanding Russian and 
Chinese cyber terminology is salient to understanding what exactly comprehensive cyber 
defense is and building adequate cyber defense frameworks to protect CALOs.  
       Jarvis and Macdonald (2014) conducted exploratory research on how terrorism 
researchers use and view cyber lexicon. Jarvis and Macdonald (2014) conducted a survey 
on the concept of cyberterrorism from researchers working in 24 countries across six 
continents. The research focused on how cyberterrorism related to adjacent concepts such 
as hacktivism, cybercrime, and cyberwar. Additionally, how familiar, frequently used, 
and useful were the aforementioned concepts among the global research community. The 
survey was distributed to over 600 terrorism researchers based on a sample of individuals 
who published within the four most prominent cyberterrorism journals between January 
2009 and January 2013.  
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     The survey listed 12 cyber-related terms. Respondents were asked if they were 
familiar with certain cyber terms, were certain terms useful, would they avoid certain 
terms and if certain terms overlapped. The findings showed that cyberwarfare, 
information warfare and cybercrime were the most familiar terms. By contrast, 30% of 
respondents were unfamiliar with the terms, cyber militarism, and cyber dissidence. 
Cyber militarism and cracktivism was a rarely used term and least likely of all 12 to be 
employed by those familiar with the term. Cracktivism is a combination of crack and 
activism. “Cracking” is in relation to breaking into a computer by manipulating the 
security code and activism would be for means of political gain. Twenty-two percent of 
respondents familiar with the term cracktivism reported using it and 5% reported using 
cyber militarism. This work is salient because it addressed specifically cyberterrorism 
demographics and favored constructs relational to cyberterrorism. Understanding cyber 
lexicons may be based on SME’s discipline and scope of knowledge. Understanding of a 
comprehensive approach will require a broad demographic across civil and federal 
organizations.      
  
Security Frameworks  
Brief History of Security Frameworks 
 
     Backhouse, Hsu and Silva (2006) adopted the circuits of power theoretical framework 
taken from social sciences developed by Clegg (1989) and applied it to understanding the 
creation and development of the first standard and framework in information security 
management. Backhouse et al. (2006) theorized the alliances developed between industry 
and government resulted in a de jure international standard. An informal group of UK 
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security chiefs sparked the process which led to BS7799, the British standard that later 
became the international standard 17799. Backhouse et al. (2006) contended the 
influence of power and politics in setting and shaping the evolution of de jure standards. 
The authors further argued decisions on design and implementation of security standards 
were reached based on political influence and power mechanisms instead of a more 
objective, economical means.  De jure standards are recognized by authoritative national 
or international bodies such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
or the International Standards Organization (ISO).  Standards approved by the said 
authorities, while non-regulatory, hold important objective and economic powers within 
their realm, although social relationships and the factors which lead to decisions to 
implement these standards are ignored (Backhouse et al., 2006). 
     Backhouse et al. (2006) conducted a case study on the Department of Trade and 
Industry in the United Kingdom based on the BS7799 standard. Backhouse et al. (2006) 
findings concluded that the creation of standards requires alliances between government 
and industry to be fully adopted. The research also found that authors of standards must 
be recognized by their organizational field as legitimate and should be able to relate to 
those organizational members in power positions. Finally, institutionalization of the 
standard was strengthened if compliance was required in additional pieces of legislation. 
Expensive certifications were regarded without value simply for social integration but 
reinforced during bilateral relations in which one group has to comply with a second 
group in order to conduct business. Backhouse et al. (2006) study is salient to 
understanding the dynamics which influence how CALOs approach consensus at various 
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levels and the internal and external influencing factors that drives decisions and 
consensus building. 
ISO/IEC 17799/2700 
 
      Saint-Germain (2005) argued that ISO/IEC 17799 provided a framework for ensuring 
business continuity, maintaining legal compliance and achieving a competitive edge. The 
author argued ISO/IEC 17799 as the most comprehensive framework of the time 
compared to frameworks with no path to industry and federal certification. Certifications 
enable organizations to comply with increasing demands from financial institutions and 
insurance companies for security audits. Organizations often struggle with security issues 
as part of their efforts to comply with a variety of regulatory requirements, such as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA). 
     Figure 1 depicts the ten domains of the BS17799 framework along with the 
organizational and operational alignment (Weldon, 2015). Competitive frameworks such 
as, Control Objectives for Information and (Related) Technology (COBIT), Guidelines 
for the Management of IT Security (GMITS) (ISO 13335), Information Technology 
Infrastructure Library (ITIL), Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability 
Evaluation (OCTAVE) and System Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model 
(SSE-CMM) offered no certification. The Common criteria for IT Security Evaluation 
(ISO 15408) did offer an in-industry certification. ISO 15408 focuses on the technical 
aspects of information systems (IS), and ISO/IEC 17799 focuses on the organizational 
and administrative aspects of security. ISO 15408 and 17799 are complementary  (Koong 
& Yunis, 2015; Saint-Germain, 2005).  
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 Wiander (2007) argued that although the ISO/IEC 17799 standard was commonly 
viewed as a necessary element in IS management, there was no empirical evidence of its 
usefulness in practice. The author studied analysis and implementation experiences of 
four organizations that implemented the framework. Wiander (2007) conducted semi-
structured interviews resulting in some positive and negative findings. Competitive 
advantage was one of the positive findings along with an increased understanding of 
information security in all personnel groups and a broader scope from the technical to 
Figure 1. Ten Domains of ISO/IEC 17799 (Weldon, 2015). 
  
corporate aspects of security. Negatively, the costs and increased amount of work to 
implement the framework were mentioned. Also, difficulties deploying the standard and 
readability were criticized. It was also argued by participants of the study that the 
standard did not directly affect the quality of the end product of service (Wiander, 2007).   
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          ISO/IEC 17799 continued to develop to include risk management and incident 
management additions in 2005 (Agrawal, 2017; Nowak, 2015). The standard was 
renamed ISO/IEC 27002 and subsequently revised seven times with the current version 
ISO 27016 (Nowak, 2015). The revisions included British standards 7799-1, guidance for 
the implementation of IS management, metrics, accreditation for organizations, 
internal/external audits, security controls, international standard and general guidelines 
(Nowak, 2015).  
     The ISO 2700 series primary application is based on certification which brings salient 
benefits beyond simple compliance. In 2006 there were 6,000 certifications globally, and 
the number was predicted to increase to 20,000 in 2017 (Nowak, 2015). Nowak (2015) 
concluded empirical research conducted by the Rotterdam School of Management, 
Erasmus University, analyzed 12 companies in China and Europe surveyed 645 responses 
from businesses worldwide that ISO 2700 had a significant positive effect on increasing 
information security in an organization. Eighty-seven percent of respondents concluded 
that ISO 27001 had a “positive” or “very positive” outcome on their information security 
and 78% reported an increased ability to meet compliance requirements (Nowak, 2015). 
Although certification brings rigor and formality to the implementation process to 
improve security, smaller organizations fail to invest in the costly certification process 
(Agrawal, 2017). Agrawal (2017) and Asti (2017) concluded that smaller organizations 
tend not to invest heavily in cybersecurity where Nowak (2015) and Kemper (2017) 
contend that CALOs invest heavily.   
     Although there are relevant benefits to certifications and compliance standards, none 
of the ISO 2700 updates addresses organizational size, scope, and applicability for 
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operational stakeholders needs for cyber defense. General best practices and compliance 
standards constitute conservative approaches that will continually change as cyber 
defense continues to evolve to more advanced attacks (Acuña, 2016; Donaldson et al., 
2015b).   More importantly, it remains difficult to apply certification or control 
cybersecurity frameworks in CALOs without the proper context of terms to address a 
comprehensive approach to cyber defense. A clearer understanding of comprehensive 
cyber defense based empirical research may bring behavioral and social variables to 
improve CALO security postures not seen in traditional frameworks.  
Defense in Depth and Defense in Breath 
 
     One of the fundamental philosophies of security is the defense in depth model; 
overlapping systems designed to provide security even if one of them fails (Chandra, 
Challa, & Pasupuletti, 2017; Fielder et al., 2016; Luo, 2016). An example is a firewall 
coupled with an intrusion-detection system (IDS). Defense in depth provides security 
because there's no single point of failure and no single assumed vector for attacks. Also 
known as the Castle Approach, security controls are placed throughout an information 
technology (IT) system. The idea behind the defense in depth approach is to defend a 
system against any particular attack using several physical and virtual independent 
methods. This tactic was conceived by the National Security Agency (NSA) as a 
comprehensive approach to information and electronic security (Schneier, 2015). Defense 
in depth does not address the operational level found in the ISO framework as well as 
social and behavioral aspects of cybersecurity.   
    Defense in depth was derived originally from a military strategy that sought to delay 
rather than prevent the advance of an attacker by yielding space to buy time. The 
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placement of protection mechanisms, procedures and policies are intended to increase the 
dependability of an IT system where multiple layers of defense prevent espionage and 
direct attacks against critical systems (Kewley & Lowry, 2001; Kuipers & Fabro, 2006; 
Lippmann et al., 2006). In terms of computer network defense, defense in depth measures 
should not only prevent security breaches but buy an organization time to detect and 
respond to an attack to reduce and mitigate the consequences of a breach (Cleghorn, 
2013; Corrin, 2015).          
    Corrin (2015) theorized the federal government’s job of securing, and defending 
networks have gotten more complex, so officials are looking for increasingly high-tech 
tools to carry out the mission. The integration of cloud, mobility and a vast number of 
sensors producing volumes of data all make for an intricate and complicated operational 
picture of government and civic organizations’ cyber defense. That means taking a 
defense in depth strategy to network security, layering methods from the network 
perimeter to the access points where the network touches the public Internet or the 
commercial cloud to the devices used to connect. Traditional cyber security is directed 
towards device protection and perimeter defenses relying on threat signatures, but that is 
no longer sufficient against adversaries that can evade signature-based detection 
(Hutchens et al, 2011). For example, the DOD connects to industry and the world through 
Internet access points (IAP). Thus a more comprehensive approach is needed to protect 
the DOD (Acuña, 2016). Other CALO’s connect to the internet through demilitarization 
nodes, proxies or other avenues which filter external information between the Internet 
and internal CALO traffic (Panda, Abraham, & Patra, 2012). 
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     There are several variations of the defense in depth framework, but the concept is the 
same, to win the cyber battle by attrition. The attacker may overcome some barriers but is 
unable to sustain the attack for an extended period of time. The Oracle Corporation 
established a popular seven-layer version which includes the Data, Application, Host, 
Internal Network, Perimeter, Physical and Policies, Procedures, and Awareness displayed 
in figure 2 (Chappelle, 2011).  
Figure 2. Defense in Depth Layers (Schreier, 2011). 
   
     The data layer entails database, content, information rights and message security. 
Application layer contains federation or trust management, Authentication, Authorization 
Auditing (AAA) and coding practices. The host layer defines the operating systems, 
desktop protection, and patching. The internal network and perimeter layer share 
transport layer security firewalls, network address translation, denial of service, 
messaging parsing and validation. Aggregate protection and enterprise network defense is 
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primarily conducted at this layer. The physical layer is not traditionally an IS function as 
fences, walls, guards, locks, and facility access control fall under facility management 
and physical security. Finally, policies, procedures, and security awareness encompass 
data classification, password management, software review, and policies (Chappelle, 
2011; Corrin, 2015). One disadvantage of layering many heterogeneous networks is the 
large administrative overhead resulting in administrators becoming overwhelmed; this 
could potentially allow security responsibilities to slip, opening the door to security 
threats. Also, defense in depth must be appropriately deployed to be useful. Improperly 
deployed defense in depth architecture weakens the human components and makes the 
system difficult to maintain (Cleghorn, 2013; Corrin, 2015). Defense in depth provides 
CALO’s a guide on where to conduct cybersecurity but fails to deliver the expected 
attack approaches by the attacker. A more useful framework should provide common 
attack behaviors for a more predictive cybersecurity defense model. 
     The defense in breath methodology attempts to overcome defense in depth 
shortcomings. The founding principle of defense in breath is layering various security 
technologies in common attack vectors to ensure attacks missed by one technology are 
caught by another. In practice, defense in breadth is comparable to installing several 
variations of virus protection software on a single computer (Cleghorn, 2013). Cleghorn 
(2013) empirical research contended that defense in breath creates more problems than it 
solves by adding different applications in single layers and adds to the administrative 
overhead problem already found in defense in depth. Ultimately, applying defense in 
depth correctly in heterogeneous networks provides considerable defense against 
modern-day zero attacks and Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) (Cleghorn, 2013; 
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Corrin, 2015; Lippmann et al., 2006). Cleghorn (2013) concluded through comparative 
analysis that defense in depth is more utilized due to its time and tested competencies in 
CALO networks. The study further concludes depth is to be more scalable, adaptable and 
heterogeneous. Defense in breath’s main attribute was redundancy and layered approach 
which in CALO networks makes it costly.  
     Fielder et al. (2016) proposed a simulation of defense in depth comprising attackers 
and defenders with minimal resources. The objective of the simulation was identifying 
appropriate deployment of specific defensive strategies such as defense in depth and 
critical component defense. Fielder et al. (2016) argued that through the development of 
optimal defense strategies, it is possible to identify when specific defensive strategies are 
most appropriate; where optimal defensive strategy depends on the kind of attacker the 
system is expecting and the structure of the network.  
     Fielder et al.’s (2016) simulation involved an Industrial Control System (ICS), a 
standard architecture that utilizes the defense in depth model. An ICS plays a crucial role 
in supervising industrial processes and production. Disruption of an ICS could lead to 
disastrous damage to water, electrical, environmental and human health systems. The ICS 
was traditionally a self-contained system, which has evolved to become increasingly 
interconnected with IT systems and other complex networks. Felder et al. (2016) argued 
that APT account for 55% of attacks against ICSs, thus the need to have an optimal 
defensive strategy. The most well-known example of an ICS APT attack is Stuxnet in 
2010. The Stuxnet attack was introduced by a removable flash drive that eventually 
infected 100,000 hosts across 155 countries (Fielder et al., 2016).   
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     Fielder et al. (2016) utilized a case study to demonstrate the effectiveness of the ICS 
security management. The case study involved attacks on one target, multiple targets, 
greedy attack versus defense in depth and systematic attack versus component defense. 
Fielder et al.’s (2016) work shows through the use of Particle Swarm Optimization that 
more effective deployment and use of cyber defense tools could be achieved. Fielder et 
al. (2016) argued that system-wide defense in depth is viable in protecting the system 
from greedy attackers, where lower-level common attacks are generally used. However, 
defense in depth is less capable of defending against more sophisticated attacks.  
     Defense in depth can be more effective when utilized with other frameworks to 
capture stakeholder operational critical assets and security controls. Chandra et al. (2017) 
contended the combination of multiple security mechanisms, technologies, security 
procedures, and policies should be used with defense in depth for adequate cyber defense. 
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
      
     The National Institute of Standards and Technology presented a US government-
ordered, cybersecurity framework. This framework provides a structure for the nation's 
financial, energy, healthcare and other critical systems to better protect their information 
and physical assets from cyber-attack. NIST provides a common language for industry 
and government to address and manage cyber risk based on business needs, without 
placing additional regulatory requirements (Lorhmann, 2014; Scofield, 2016). Scofield 
(2016) contended that NIST adaptability makes it applicable to a broad range of 
operating environments and potentially the de facto industry standard to manage 
cybersecurity risks. In 2013 President Obama issued order 13636 that directed NIST to 
work with government and private industry representatives to create guidelines to help 
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critical infrastructure organizations keep their online platforms safe. The NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework was developed in 2014 to answer order 13636 (Keller, 2013; 
Lorhmann, 2014; Scofield, 2016). 
     To develop the framework and gain a clear understanding of the current cybersecurity 
landscape, NIST consulted hundreds of security professionals in the government and 
industry. Several workshops were attended including more than 3000 individuals, and 
organizations contributed to the framework (Scofield, 2016; S. J. Shackelford et al., 
2015; Shen, 2014). The NIST framework references several specified compliance and 
certification frameworks to include, NIST 800-53 Security and Privacy Controls for 
Information Systems and Organizations, COBIT (Control Objectives for Information and 
Related Technologies, ISO/IEC 2700 versions, and CIS CSC (Computer Information 
System, Critical Security Controls) (Vijayan, 2017). 
      NIST provides serval ways to use the framework. The NIST framework includes a 
basic review of cybersecurity practices, improvement of existing security, 
communicating cybersecurity requirements and revising cybersecurity practices (Shen, 
2014).  
      The framework begins by utilizing the five core NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
functions; Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover.  Identify: This function 
develops the organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, 
assets, data, and capabilities. This step is not solely cyber defense-driven but necessary to 
understanding the scope of the network in question. Critical assets are identified and 
prioritized according to strategic objectives. Identifying what you are going to protect 
must be known to protect it. This function includes asset management, strategy, business 
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environment, governance, risk assessment and risk management.  Protect: This function 
develops and implements the appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical 
infrastructure services. The protect function supports the ability to limit or contain the 
impact of a potential cybersecurity event. Examples include access control, awareness 
and training, data security, information protection processes and procedures, maintenance 
and protective technology. Detect: This function develops and implements the 
appropriate activities to timely identify the occurrence of a cybersecurity event. Examples 
of this function include anomalies and events, security continuous monitoring and 
detection processes. Respond: This function develops and implements the appropriate 
activities to take action regarding a detected cybersecurity event. Examples include 
response planning, communications, analysis, mitigation, and improvements. Recover: 
This function develops and implements the appropriate activities to maintain plans for 
resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a 
cybersecurity event. Examples include recovery planning, improvements, and 
communications (Scofield, 2016; Shen, 2014). 
    Along with a rigorous risk management approach to tiers in Cybersecurity, NIST 
offers a continuous improvement process. Cybersecurity is evolving, and it is not a one-
time destination. The NIST mapping describes the roles of various decisions required 
from the organization at different levels. This Framework offers an excellent guide to 
begin to understand cybersecurity complexity and ongoing challenges (Lorhmann, 2014; 
Scofield, 2016).  In December 2015, NIST issued a request for information (RFI) asking 
for public feedback on a possible update to the framework and what topics it might need 
to include. NIST also asked questions on the future governance of the framework, 
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including what is the right balance between industry and government ownership of the 
framework going forward to ensure maximum positive effect (Scofield, 2016).   
     NIST provides a general and regulator guide for CALO’s to manage risks although 
admits to requiring tailoring to meet organizational needs (Vijayan, 2017). Further 
research is needed to operationalize NIST guidance to apply risk management to 
cybersecurity requirements practice.  
     Shackelford and Bohm (2015) explored the NIST framework in comparison with 
ongoing Canadian efforts to secure vulnerable critical infrastructure against cyber threats. 
Shackelford and Bohn’s (2015) comparative research analyzed regulatory approaches 
between United Kingdom, Italy, the European Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and 
Australia. Shackelford and Bohn (2015) noted the Canadian government reported a 
cyber-attack in 2011 that forced the Finance Department and Treasury Board, Canada’s 
leading financial agencies to disconnect from the Internet. In total, more than 40 million 
global cyber-attacks were reported in 2014, representing a nearly 50% increase over the 
previous year. Shackelford and Bohm (2015) contended an increasing interdependency of 
cybersecurity policy between neighboring nation states, specifically Canada and the 
United States. In response to the increased number of cyber-attacks, the U.S. and 
Canadian government have created a number of national and bilateral initiatives to 
enhance North American cybersecurity. In 2012 the Cybersecurity Action Plan between 
Public Safety Canada and the Department of Homeland Security reflected electrical 
exports from Canada to the U.S. totaled nearly 60 million megawatt-hours or roughly 2% 
of total U.S. consumption. Shackelford and Bohm (2015) further argued 75% of surveyed 
IT executives in 27 countries stated that they detected one or more attacks and 41% 
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characterized such attacks as “somewhat highly effective”. Understanding the 
interdependencies and the criteria for a comprehensive approach to cyber defense and 
partnerships between organizations of different countries would be beneficial (Donaldson 
et al., 2015a; Shackelford & Bohm, 2015).  
      Shackelford and Bohm (2015) argued that attacks are not exclusive to critical 
government infrastructures but private sectors. A 2012 Verizon data breach investigation 
report found that 174 million records were compromised in 2011, the second highest 
since the company began tracking breaches in 2004.  
     The NIST Framework does not create any binding obligations for the private sector 
and has no means of enforcing those who adopt it. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
widespread adoption has begun to impact civil CALOs. In 2015, the Whitehouse 
announced that Itel, Apple, Walgreens, and Bank of America had incorporated the NIST 
Framework into their cybersecurity efforts (Shackelford & Bohm, 2015). 
The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain 
 
    The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain is a model for incident response teams, digital 
forensic investigators and malware analysts to work in a chained manner. This 
framework is heavily used by the federal government and industry (Burger et al., 2014; 
Hutchins et al., 2011; Yadav & Rao, 2015). The Cyber Kill Chain is designed to provide 
network defenders a means of modeling and analyzing the offensive actions of a cyber-
attacker.  Understanding the Cyber Kill Chain is essential for cybersecurity analysts and 
is the framework utilized by most of the federal government (Hutchins et al., 2011; 
Yadav & Rao, 2015). Cyber Kill Chain knowledge can help one think along the same 
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lines of that of an attacker. Each phase of kill chain in itself is a vast research area to 
tackle and analyze (Burger et al., 2014; Yadav & Rao, 2015). 
     The Cyber Kill Chain provides a framework to break down the complicated attack into 
mutually non-exclusive stages or layers. Such a layered approach enables the analysts to 
tackle smaller and more manageable problems at the same time, and it also helps the 
defenders to subvert each phase by developing defenses and mitigation for each of the 
phases (Yadav & Rao, 2015).     
     The Cyber Kill Chain breaks down a cyber-attack into the following seven stages; 
Reconnaissance, Weaponization, Delivery, Exploitation, Installation, Command and 
Control, and Actions on Objective (Yadav & Rao, 2015).  Reconnaissance: Research, 
identification, and selection of targets, often represented as crawling Internet websites 
such as conference proceedings and mailing lists for email addresses, social relationships, 
or information on specific technologies. Weaponization: The tailoring of malware, such 
as a virus or worm, to one or more vulnerabilities identified by reconnaissance. Targeting 
of public hosted web applications or the social engineering of users via emails with 
malicious links or files, coupled with an exploit using an automated tool (weaponizer) 
may also be included. Increasingly, client application data files such as Adobe Portable 
Document Format (PDF) or Microsoft Office documents serve as the weaponized 
deliverable. Delivery: Transmission of the weapon to the targeted environment. The three 
most prevalent delivery vectors for weaponized payloads by APT actors, as observed by 
the Lockheed Martin Computer Incident Response Team (LM-CIRT) for the years 2004-
2010, are email attachments, websites, and USB removable media (Yadav & Rao, 2015). 
Exploitation:  After the weapon is delivered to victim host, exploitation triggers intruders' 
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code.  Most often, exploitation targets an application or operating system vulnerability, 
but it could also more directly exploit the users themselves or leverage an operating 
system feature that auto-executes code. Installation: Installation of a remote access Trojan 
or backdoor on the victim system allows the adversary to maintain persistence inside the 
environment. Command and Control (C2): Typically, compromised hosts must beacon 
outbound packets to an Internet controller server to establish a C2 channel. APT malware 
primarily requires manual interaction rather than conduct activity automatically. Once the 
C2 channel establishes access inside the target environment, the attacker has obtained 
control of the targeted keyboard. Actions on Objectives: Only now, after progressing 
through the first six phases, can intruders take measures to achieve their original 
objectives. Typically, this objective is data exfiltration which involves collecting, 
encrypting and extracting information from the victim environment; violations of data 
integrity or availability are potential objectives as well. Alternatively, the intruders may 
only desire access to the original victim box for use as a hop point to compromise 
additional systems and move laterally inside the network (Yadav & Rao, 2015). 
    The Cyber Kill Chain facilitates the fusion of intelligence-based cybersecurity. 
Currently, reactionary based network defenses coupled with organizational complexities 
cause preventable attacks to propagate.  Customary signature-based defense is no longer 
adequate against APT. APT actors continually demonstrate the capability to compromise 
systems by using advanced tools, customized malware and zero-day exploits that anti-
virus, defense signatures, and patching cannot detect or mitigate (Hutchins et al., 2011).  
APT represents well-resourced and trained adversaries that conduct multi-year intrusion 
campaigns targeting highly sensitive economic, proprietary, or national security 
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information (Hutchens et al., 2011). Conventional incident response methods fail to 
mitigate risks posed by APT actors because they make the assumption that responses 
should happen after the point of a compromise and the compromise was the result of a 
fixable flaw in the system. Through Intelligence driven response, network defenders can 
achieve an advantage over the aggressor for APT caliber adversaries. Responses to APT 
intrusions require an evolution in analysis, process, and technology. It is possible to 
anticipate and mitigate future intrusions based on knowledge of the threat (Hutchens et 
al., 2011).  
     Hutchens et al. (2011) conducted a case study illustrating the benefits of the Cyber 
Kill Chain. Through analysis of the Kill Chain and robust indicator maturity, network 
defenders successfully detected and mitigated an intrusion leveraging a zero day 
vulnerability. All three intrusions leveraged a common APT Targeted Malicious Email 
(TME) delivered to a limited set of individuals. The Email contained a backdoor, which 
potentially initiated outbound communications to a C2 server. Hutchens et al . (2011) 
case study identified specific command lines in computer lab experiments depicting the 
TME through each phase of the Cyber Kill Chain for all three TME events.  
     Kim et al. (2014) conducted comparative analysis research on big data from Japan, 
South Korea, the U.K., and the US. The research compared two sectors in terms of goals, 
missions, decision-making, decision-making processes, decision actors, organizational 
structure, and strategies.   Kim et al. (2014) analysis revealed roughly 91% of intrusions 
are the result of insider’s intentional or unintentional negligence, which is an inherit 
cybersecurity responsibility. With an overwhelming amount of cyber-attacks going 
undetected until the event happens, a comprehensive approach is needed to address 
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today’s dependency on the Internet and underlining security issues. Current networks are 
overwhelmed with more than 200 million viruses a year. The commercial sector has a 
considerable risk of monetary loss, production shut down and embarrassment. 
Government organizations may be driven by different motivations that are non-profit but 
in some cases, a matter of life and death. Cyber-attacks may be non-kinetic (non-violent) 
or kinetic, causing direct or indirect physical damage as seen in the Stuxnet case 
involving overheating of Iranian nuclear centrifuges  (House, 2009). The Cyber Kill 
Chain explains the behaviors of an attack or attackers movement from the beginning to 
end of the event but fails to identify where to conduct cybersecurity.  
      Sadhukhan, Mallari and Yadav (2015) contended there are many research articles that 
describe the cyber kill chain in detail but argued there is work needed to provide a 
common process model with the capability to map attack methodologies as well as 
security defenses. Sadhukhan et al. (2015) argued work is needed to provide defense 
practitioners more practical procedures to determine where attackers are at each stage. 
Sadhukhan et al. (2015) provided a model which mapped technical aspects of a cyber-
attack thread and similar defenses to each phase of the cyber kill chain. Technical 
components of cyber defense tools were identified in each thread depicting where 
defenders should find an attacker to understand how far along the kill chain the attack 
was. Although the cyber kill chain depicts the actions and behavior for better 
understanding attackers, additional frameworks such as NIST and other compliance 
frameworks are needed to establish trusts to employ operational use between commercial 
and government CALOs (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Atoum et al., 2014; Donaldson et al., 
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2015b). Even through combined frameworks, network defenders cannot achieve 
comprehensive cyber defense without understanding then clearly defined constructs.   
Specified Frameworks 
     Certain cybersecurity frameworks are designed to address specific security needs of 
industry, such as PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard), HIPPA 
(Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996), HITRUST (Health 
Information Trust Alliance), and NERC CIP (North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation critical infrastructure protection). 
     PCI DSS is a set of security controls that are required to be employed by all certified 
entities that utilize credit cards (Donaldson, 2015b). PCI certified parties must recertify 
annually by independent assessors to continue to process credit card transitions 
internationally. PCI DSS controls do not address overall cyber defense but more 
specifically defenses that are applicable to credit card transactions. Some examples of 
PCI DSS controls are: maintain a firewall to protect cardholder data, encrypt credit card 
transitions, restrict access to cardholder data, and regularly test security systems and 
processes (Donaldson, 2015b). Donaldson (2015b) theorized while PCI DSS ensures 
some level of control over CALOs ability to ensure secure transactions, sustaining an 
overall effective cyber defense requires a far more comprehensive approach.  
     HIPPA and HITRUST are frameworks pertaining to health care security. HIPPA 
established national standards for the use and protection of electronic health records. 
HIPPA safeguards include administrative, physical, technical, organizational and policies 
to ensure the protection of healthcare providers, insurance plans, patients, and drug 
dispensers. HITRUST is the standard security framework which certifies all 
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organizations that create, access, store, or exchanges personal health and financial 
information. HITRUST was informed by other significant frameworks such as HIPPA, 
PCA, and NIST (Donaldson, 2015b). Like the traditional categorical frameworks, 
HITRUS and HIPPA lack overall cyber defense to adequately prevent cyber-attacks 
(Donaldson, 2015b).  
     NERC-CIP is a non-for-profit regulatory authority with the mission of ensuring 
reliable bulk power system in North America. NERC is a federally designated Electric 
Reliability Organization that develops and enforces reliability standards and requirements 
for planning and operating the collective bulk power system. NERC standards have been 
accredited by the American National Standards Institute and cover elements such as 
resource and demand balance, transmission, personnel and training, emergency 
preparedness and the design and maintenance of facilities, including nuclear power 
facilities (Donaldson et al., 2015b). 
     The Department of Homeland Security Resilience Review (CRR) Framework is no-
cost, voluntary, non-technical assessment to self-evaluate operational resilience and 
cybersecurity capabilities within an organization's critical infrastructure (Donaldson, 
2015b). The CRR focuses on enterprise assets and understanding how resources are 
allocated to ten domains identified by the framework. The ten domains include asset 
management, controls management, change management, incident management and risk 
management just to name a few. The CRR is referenced in the NIST Cybersecurity 
framework just as 800-53 although there is no detailed guidance on how these 
frameworks work in concert (Donaldson, 2015b; Vijayan, 2017). 
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     Donaldson (2015b) argued frameworks created for specific functions often utilize 
generalized frameworks such as NIST and ISO/IEC 2700 to ensure more effective cyber 
security but optimal cyber defense is difficult to achieve without a clear understanding of 
what comprehensive cyber defense is. Donaldson (2015b) further theorized that CALOs 
which use multiple frameworks for cyber defense often have overlapping security 
guidelines which may be beneficial in some cases but problematic when weighing costs 
and compatibility (Donaldson et al., 2015b; Scofield, 2016).     
Cybersecurity Framework Pros, Cons, and Comparisons  
      
     Atouum et al. (2014) conducted developmental research to propose a holistic 
cybersecurity framework.  Atoum et al. (2014) contended cybersecurity frameworks 
defending cyber-attacks are fragmented, vary widely in effectiveness and do not achieve 
optimal cybersecurity. The authors theorized a combination of the best qualities from 
general framework is beneficial in achieving broad comprehensive cybersecurity. 
Enforcing information security on the national level inherently affects security 
implementation from a global point of view, which is salient for several reasons. First, to 
ensure early detection of likely threats and mitigate risks related to government 
information systems, critical commercial infrastructures tied to those systems must be 
considered. Secondly, to enable decision-makers to take necessary actions when needed, 
a comprehensive understanding of organizational requirements based on strategic or 
mission objectives is needed. Atoum et al. (2014) argued most countries defend their 
cyberspace by first formulating a cybersecurity strategy (CSS). The CSS has three 
continuous processes: strategy formulation, strategy implementation, and strategy 
evaluation. Atoum et al. (2014) proposed a holistic national cybersecurity implementation 
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framework (HCS-IF) that fits into the strategy implementation process.   The HCS-IF 
suggested a set of adaptable security controls, solution, entities, tools, techniques, and 
mechanisms to oversee CSS implementation. The HCS-IF framework for security 
requirements elicitation and analysis was based upon the construction of a context for the 
system and satisfaction arguments for the security of the system. One starts with an 
enumeration of security goals based on assets in the system. These goals are used to 
derive security requirements in the form of constraints. The system background is 
described using a problem-centered classification; this context is then validated against 
the security requirements through the construction of a satisfaction argument. The 
satisfaction argument is in two parts: A formal argument that the system can meet its 
security requirements and a structured informal argument supporting the assumptions 
expressed in the formal argument. The construction of the satisfaction argument may fail, 
revealing either that the security requirement cannot be satisfied in the context, or that the 
context does not contain sufficient information to develop the argument. In this case, 
designers and architects are asked to provide additional design information to resolve the 
problems (Atoum et al., 2014). Atoum et al. (2014) contended the approach was 
problematic in nature and may not provide a complete comprehensive solution to CSS 
due to the complexity of generalizing cybersecurity at the national level. The HCS-IF 
design was mainly based on literature review and practical experience. 
     Atoum (2014) outlined the core components of the framework as the  
CSS, requirements solicitation, strategic moves, controls, security objectives, and 
implementation repository. The HCS-IF essentially facilitates transforming the cyber-
security level from the current state to the future state. Atoum (2014) validated the HCS-
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IF through a comparison of six other national level frameworks through the systems 
security engineering model. Although specific frameworks were not addressed, Atoum 
(2014) argued achievement over general management security frameworks.  
     The HCS-IF model converts organizations CSS goals into detailed security 
requirements but does not delineate the scope between CALO’s or smaller organizations 
with different cyber defense challenges. Kiper (2008) argued the scope and size of 
organizations directly impacts its business processes, which challenges HCS-IF use on a 
national level as contended by Atoum (2014).  Additionally, Atoum (2014) does not 
address criteria of a comprehensive national approach but contends the need for the CSS 
to be part of a comprehensive solution in developing a cybersecurity framework at the 
national level. The comparison of HCS-IF to general management security frameworks 
based on practical experience requires further study of the most prudent frameworks. 
     Table 1 depicts nine major frameworks comparisons. The table explains the type of 
framework, a brief description, pros and cons of use, article findings, and contributing 
details. 
Table 1. Major Frameworks Comparisons 
Security 
Framework 
(FW) 
Type  
of FM Brief description Pros Cons Articles 
Main 
Contributions 
ISO 
27001/27002 
thru 27016 
version  
Cert/Comp 
Framework 
Provides a 
general model to 
following setting 
up and operating 
an Information 
Security 
Management 
System (ISMS).  
International, 
widely used 
for general 
ISMS 
requirements 
1. Consistently 
changes to 
adapt to 
international 
standards and 
security 
challenges.  
(Agrawal, 
2017; 
Nowak, 
2015; 
Sussy et 
al., 2015; 
Wainder, 
2007, 
Wainder, 
2008) 
1. Requires 
more study in 
use with 
complimentary 
frameworks. 2. 
Requires better 
understanding 
of 
effectiveness 
based on 
organizational 
size and scope. 
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Table 1. Major Frameworks Comparisons (continued). 
 
NIST SP800-
53 revision  
Privacy 
Controls 
Provide a 
catalog of 
security and 
privacy 
controls for 
federal 
information 
systems to 
protect 
organizational 
operations, 
assets and 
individuals 
from threats.  
Mandated 
controls for 
the U.S. 
federal 
government 
1. Does not 
cover 
international 
controls (Safe 
Harbor ect.). 
2. Overlaps 
with NIST 
Cybersecurity 
Framework  
(Donaldson
, 2015a; 
Vijayan, 
2017)  
1. Requires 
more study in 
use with 
complimentary 
frameworks. 2. 
Requires better 
understanding 
of  
effectiveness 
based on 
organizational 
size and scope. 
Defense in 
Depth 
Control 
Frame 
work 
One of the 
basic 
philosophies of 
security is 
defense in 
depth; 
overlapping 
systems 
designed to 
provide 
security even if 
one of them 
fails. 
Provide 
layered 
defense 
outside 
IT/Cyber 
norms. 
Widely used 
by 
commercial 
and 
government 
1. Costly to 
implement.  
2. Can be 
redundant 
with other 
control 
frameworks 
(Chandra et 
al., 2017; 
Chappelle, 
2011; Luo, 
2016) 
1. Requires 
more study in 
use with 
complimentary 
frameworks. 2. 
Requires better 
understanding 
of 
effectiveness 
based on 
organizational 
size and scope. 
Cyber Kill 
Chain 
Procedural 
Frame 
work 
Breaks down 
complicated 
attacks into 
mutually non-
exclusive 
stages or 
layers.  
1. Enables the 
defenders to 
tackle smaller 
and easier 
problems at 
the same 
time. 2. helps 
the defenders 
to subvert 
each phase by 
developing 
defenses and 
mitigation for 
each of the 
phases  
Difficulty to 
apply and 
understand 
depending on 
CALO 
organizational 
structure 
(Burger et 
al., 2014; 
Hutchins et 
al., 2011; 
Yadav & 
Rao, 2015) 
1. Requires 
more study in 
use with 
complimentary 
frameworks. 2. 
Requires better 
understanding 
of 
effectiveness 
based on 
organizational 
size and scope. 
NIST 
Cybersecurity 
Framework 
2014 
Risk Mgt 
Frame 
work 
Provides a 
prioritized, 
flexible, 
repeatable, 
performance-
based approach 
to enterprise 
security.  
1. Heavily 
vetted by 
federal and 
commercial 
organizations. 
2. Adaptable.  
1. Does not 
cover 
international 
controls. 2. 
Overlaps with 
NIST 800-53, 
COBIT, 
ISO/IEC 2700 
versions, and 
CIS CSC.  
(Donaldson
, 2015a; 
Vijayan, 
2017)  
1. Requires 
more study in 
use with 
complimentary 
frameworks. 2. 
Requires better 
understanding 
of 
effectiveness 
based on 
organizational 
size and scope. 
3. Mandated by 
presidential 
order for 
federal use.  
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Table 1. Major Frameworks Comparisons (continued). 
 
Department 
of Homeland 
Security 
Cyber 
Resilience 
Review 
(DHS CRR) 
Self- 
assessment 
Framework 
Focuses on 
enterprise 
assets and 
understanding 
how resources 
are allocated to 
ten domains of 
identified by 
the framework.  
1. No costs. 2. 
Can be 
independently 
conducted or 
DHS support.  
1. Overlaps 
with NIST and 
800-53, and  
ISO/IEC 2700 
versions. 2. 
Does not entail 
guidance on 
how to use 
with 
complimentary 
frameworks. 
(Donaldson
, 2015a)  
1. Requires 
more study in 
use with 
complimentary 
frameworks. 2. 
Requires better 
understanding 
of 
effectiveness 
based on 
organizational 
size and scope. 
3. Mandated by 
presidential 
order for 
federal use.  
Counsel on 
CyberSec 
Critical 
Security 
Controls 
(SANS 20) 
Control 
Framework 
The council is 
an 
independent, 
expert, not-for-
profit 
organization 
with a global 
scope 
committed to 
security of the 
Internet.  
Provides 
international 
control 
framework.   
1. Overlaps 
with NIST 
800-53 and 
Cybersecurity 
Frameworks 
and IISO/IEC 
2700 versions.  
(Donaldson
, 2015a)  
1. Requires 
more study in 
use with 
complimentary 
frameworks. 2. 
Requires better 
understanding 
of 
effectiveness 
based on 
organizational 
size and scope.  
Payment 
Card 
Industry 
Data 
Security 
Standard 
PCI DSS 
version 3.0 
Req and 
Cert 
Framework 
Provides a 
minimum set 
of 
requirements 
for protecting 
cardholder 
data.  
Provides 
international 
requirements. 
Does not 
provide 
enterprise 
security 
(Donaldson
, 2015a)  
1. Requires 
more study in 
use with 
complimentary 
frameworks.  
HIPPA 
Security 
Rule 
Req, 
standards 
and control 
Framework 
Establishes 
national 
security 
standars for the 
use and 
protection of 
electronic 
health records.  
Provides 
national 
requirements 
Does not 
provide 
enterprise 
security 
(Donaldson
, 2015a)  
1. Requires 
more study in 
use with 
complimentary 
frameworks.  
HITRUST 
Common 
Security 
Framework 
Control 
Framework 
Established a 
Common 
Security 
Framework 
(CSF) that can 
be used by all 
organizations 
that create, 
access, store or 
exchange 
sensitive 
and/or 
regulated data.  
Provides 
national 
requirements 
Does not 
provide 
enterprise 
security 
(Donaldson
, 2015b)  
1. Requires 
more study in 
use with 
complimentary 
frameworks.  
59 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Major Frameworks Comparisons (continued). 
 
NERC CIP 
version 5 
Regulatory 
Framework 
Non-for-profit 
international 
authority that 
ensures the 
reliability of 
the bulk power 
system in 
North America. 
Provides 
international 
regulations.  
Does not 
provide 
enterprise 
security 
(Donaldson
, 2015b)  
1. Requires 
more study in 
use with 
complimentary 
frameworks.  
 
     Donaldson (2015b) hypothesized mapping cybersecurity frameworks at the enterprise 
or CALO level is an important part of making an organization’s cybersecurity complete 
and demonstrating that completeness to outside observers. Donaldson (2015b) argued 
that specialized frameworks who crosswalk their cybersecurity program against an 
external framework may generate ideas for strengthening CALOs cybersecurity posture. 
The author further argued specialized frameworks designed security controls or 
compliance are not generally designed for running a comprehensive cybersecurity 
program.  
     Donaldson (2015b) conducted comparative analysis of 13 major commercial and 
government frameworks based on 11 organizational functional areas: Cybersecurity 
policy, staffing and expertise, budgeting, resource allocations, technology, capabilities, 
controls, processes, operations, auditing, and reporting. Based simply on the research and 
Donaldson’s (2015b) proposed framework, there was confusion over exactly what the 
term “IT security control” meant.  Donaldson (2015b) contended further investigation is 
required in clearly defining enterprise constructs for effective use of cybersecurity 
frameworks for CALOs and global enterprises.  
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Summary 
      
     The cyber domain is a complex myriad of interconnected networks with human and 
technological risk factors (Oltramari et al., 2014). A comprehensive approach is needed 
to effectively defend the cyber domain (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Atoum et al., 2014; 
Tisdale, 2015). As Oltramari et al. (2014) study indicated, understanding the human and 
computer interaction is salient in understanding cyber terminological definitions, 
classification entities, and phenomena. The authors further argued that cyber terms are 
often misused and mischaracterized. There has been little work in understanding the 
scope of cyber and terms that appear casual yet weigh heavily on building a credible 
cyber defense strategy.   
     Defending cyber in large organizations or CALOs is relevant towards a CCDF as 
indicated by the motivating factors and investments placed on CALOs comparative to 
smaller organizations (Asti, 2017; Kemper, 2017). Safa et al. (2016) generally argued 
while Oltramari et al. (2014) more specifically contended in CALOs, social interaction 
plays a significant role in sharing, communicating, and implementing sound security 
practices. Manjikian (2017) and Oltramari et al. (2014) research argued contending 
obstacles to the development of a universal cyber lexicon and both works presented the 
case for future opportunities in developments to solidify constructs and clarify confusion. 
Giles and Hagestad (2013) argued the lack of agreements internationally creates further 
challenges from the language barriers indicated between the western countries, Russia, 
and China. The authors further argued the difference of a more in-depth psychological 
aspect to cyber in China and Russia, although from research of western countries none of 
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the existing frameworks addressed psychological warfare (Donaldson et al., 2015a; 
Scofield, 2016; Shen, 2014).  
     There are many information technologies (IT) and cybersecurity frameworks in 
existence for general process improvement and network security. Although most are 
beneficial in deriving general best practices developed over time, few capture a 
comprehensive approach that can be tailored to meet objectives on an operational level. 
Understanding a comprehensive functional approach that drives requirements-based 
methodology to ensure proper acquisition practices, tool efficiency, effectiveness, and 
training to meet specific cybersecurity organizational goals is needed (Atoum et al., 2014; 
Tisdale, 2015). Additional work is also needed close the gap between cybersecurity 
frameworks and applicability at the organizational level. Traditional frameworks do not 
address the interdependency of external organizations, psychological, social, and 
associated risks. A better understanding of what is a comprehensive cyber defense is 
needed. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
     This chapter describes the methodology used to address the following research 
questions:  
1. What criteria does the CCDF artifact have to meet to be considered a comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense framework for CALOs?  
2. In what ways does the CCDF meet the criteria established for a comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense framework for CALOs? 
3. What future areas of research may be explored in understanding a more comprehensive 
approach to cyber defense for CALOs? 
     The subsequent sections of this chapter explain design science research and why it 
was appropriate to address the research questions in this study. The approach section will 
provide a detailed step-by-step description of how the study was conducted which 
included the establishment of the CCDF criteria, artifact development, evaluation, and 
communication of the artifact. The hardware, software, and personnel resources used to 
complete the report will be presented. Finally, a summery for the chapter will be 
presented.  
     An IS design science research study was conducted to address the research questions. 
Design science supports a problem-solving approach that shifts perspective between the 
design processes and artifacts to address a complex problem. The design process is a 
sequence of activities by experts, which produces an innovative product or artifact. The 
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evaluation of the artifact then provided feedback information and a better understanding 
of the problem to improve the quality of the artifact and design process  (Henver et al., 
2004; Kurtz, 2015; Peffers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger, & Chatterjee, 2007). Henver et al. 
(2004) argued that communications of the artifact must be presented for technical and 
managerial audiences. The primary steps in design science were derived from Peffers et 
al. (2007) and Ellis and Levy (2010). Peffers et al. (2007) developed an all-encompassing 
design science approach that could be commonly accepted in the IS community. The 
methodology for this work was derived from synthesizing several respected IS design 
science authors. Of particular note, the Henver et al. (2004) work has been seminal in the 
development of design science IS research and heavily cited in modern design science IS 
research work (March & Storey, 2008; Peffers et al., 2007; Venable, Pries-heje, & 
Baskerville, 2016; Winter, 2008). Peffers et al. (2007) and Ellis and Levy (2010) 
provided a consensus approach which was essential to ensure a standard design science 
research methodology. This work addressed the research questions as displayed in figure 
3 utilizing the design science approach. The approach section and following subsections 
will explain the design science process and research questions relationships in details. 
 
Figure 3. Design Science and Research Questions relationships 
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Approach 
     The following approach encompasses the detailed required steps used to complete the 
study. The goal of this work was to conduct design research towards the development of 
a Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF) artifact to address the lack 
of understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense for CALOs. To approach the 
research problem and motivation for this work, a systemic literature review was 
conducted as outlined in Chapter 2 to identify the gaps in a comprehensive approach to 
cybersecurity defense. A content analysis was conducted to analyze the existence and 
frequency of concepts in the literature review and construct the foundational 
recommended activities and questions to serve as the starting point for the expert panel. 
The content analysis provided objective development to baseline the CCDF criteria based 
on the literature review (Coakes & Coakes, 2009). The content analysis further allowed 
the researcher to put cyber defense criteria into meaningful categories, which were 
further validated by cyber defense experts.  The research was comprised of two Delph 
Panels. The first team of cyber defense experts completed two Delph processes, the first 
process to refine the criteria for the CCDF based on the literature review and content 
analysis, and the second process to ensure the prototype met the established criteria. The 
second team was comprised of cybersecurity stakeholders to evaluate the CCDF 
developed by the cyber defense expert panel. The cyber defense expert panel conducted 
several rounds to develop a criterion and facilitate the development of the artifact for a 
comprehensive cybersecurity defense model (Yousuf, 2007). Based on the information 
derived from the expert panel during criterion development, the researcher developed the 
artifact through a systems development prototyping methodology. Evaluation of the 
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CCDF prototype was conducted through several rounds of evaluation from the cyber 
defense expert panel and a separate stakeholder panel to avoid bias of the criterion 
(Yousuf, 2007).  Through design science, the proposed research developed a 
comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework to facilitate understanding of CALO 
cybersecurity. Figure 4 outlines the general approach used and includes the research 
approach, desired products from the approach, design science steps, and the associated 
research questions used in this study. The following subsections describe the design 
science approach and address one or more of the three research questions in each of the 
design sciences steps.  
 
Figure 4. Research Process 
 
Problem Identification and Motivation  
 
     The first step in design science is to identify the problem and motivation for the work. 
The problem of no standard framework for clearly understanding comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense for CALOs was substantiated through rigorous research. The 
motivation for the work as identified in chapter one argued that understanding 
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comprehensive cybersecurity defense is essential to identify the specific requirements of 
organizations based on mission objectives and to ensure those requirements are meeting 
cybersecurity defense needs. Development of a CCDF based on particular mission 
objectives not only examined security gaps but identified interdependencies and 
overlapping requirements driven from traditional stove-piped security architectures 
(Kelic et al., 2013; Tisdale, 2015). 
     Atoum et al. (2014) contended that current cybersecurity frameworks defending 
against cyber-attacks are fragmented and vary widely in effectiveness. Atoum et al. 
(2014) presented a holistic implementation framework, synonymous with a 
comprehensive approach, but did not test nor map organizational strategy to capabilities 
and tools. To address the problem, the research question of what criteria does the CCDF 
artifact have to meet to be considered a comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework 
for CALOs was explored. Ellis and Levy (2010) contended that the lack of a product or 
tool that could potentially alleviate a troublesome situation constitutes a research-worthy 
problem applicable to design and development research.  
     Developmental problem solving through IS design science was the methodology for 
this work. This work complements adequate research contributions to the body of 
knowledge.  Henver et al. (2004) argued that proper design research is based on the 
novelty, generality, and significance of the designed artifact. The artifact may enable the 
solution of an unsolved problem by either extending the knowledge base or applying 
existing knowledge in new innovative ways. The development of the CCDF artifact 
through the evaluation of existing frameworks, literature review, and content analysis 
facilitates growth in cyber defense. Also, as IS design science being relatively new, 
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creative development and use of new evaluation methods provide contributions to design 
science. Proper design science research produces interests in both technology and 
management focused audiences (Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010).   
     As previously indicated in figure 4, the literature review represented the foundation of 
the problem and was seminal in addressing research question one, “What criteria does the 
CCDF artifact have to meet to be considered a comprehensive cybersecurity defense 
framework for CALOs?” The literature review was an iterative process, and research was 
included throughout the design science steps. Based on the cyber domain, CALOs, 
construct challenges, and security frameworks identified in the literature review, a 
content analysis was conducted to analyze and synthesize the research to provide the 
initial questions and pilot artifact for phase I of the first expert panel.  
Define Objectives for a Solution 
 
    The second step in design science is to define the objectives for a solution. Henver et 
al. (2004) argued that the development of technological-based solutions to significant and 
relevant business problems is a critical step in design science research, achieved by 
pioneering artifacts aimed at solving complex problems. Ellis and Levy (2010) argued 
that the objectives for any research effort are captured in the research questions 
underlining the study. The objectives of this study were anchored to research question 
one, “What criteria does the CCDF artifact have to meet to be considered a 
comprehensive defensive cybersecurity requirements framework for CALOs?”. To 
address all concurrent research questions, criteria had to be set for the cyber defense 
expert panel. This section addresses the criteria for expert panel members, recruitment of 
the panel members, what was  provided to start the Delphi processes, what was expected 
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from panel members for each round, what was done with the returned data from panel 
members, and how consensus was reached (Yousuf, 2007). 
     Skulmoski, Hartman and Krahn (2007) argued four requirements considerations for an 
expert participant. First, knowledge and experience with the issue under investigation. 
For the study of cybersecurity, members of the panel had at least ten years of experience 
in the cybersecurity field and more specifically experience with cybersecurity 
frameworks. A second requirement was the capacity and willingness to participate in the 
study. Members also had sufficient time to participate in the Delphi process. Finally, all 
experts were required to have effective communications skills (Skulmoski et al., 2007). 
Rayens and Hahn (2000) argued that a typical Delphi sample size may range from 10 to 
30 participants based on the complexity of the study. The more complex the study, the 
more challenging to reach a consensus which requires more experienced, qualified and 
fewer panel participants.  
     The researcher for this study utilized a panel of 10 participants. A systematic review 
of the literature continued throughout the dissertation process and supported the panel 
rounds. The requirements collected by the expert panel to establish the CCDF criteria 
were based on the opinions of the members of the panel, foundational research, and 
content analysis. Expert members were drawn from industry, government, and academia. 
Professional and academic cybersecurity experts included Chief Information Security 
Officers (CISO), Network Defenders, Security Officers, and Analysts. Panel members 
were recruited through networked affiliations of LinkedIn, Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) Doctoral Consortium, Association for 
Information Systems (AIS), National Defense University (NDU), the Department of 
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Defense (DOD), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), National Security Agency (NSA), ManTech International, Lockheed 
Martin, and other affiliations known by the researcher. Stakeholder panel members were 
screened based on Skulmoski et al. (2007) criteria stated above and required to concur to 
the informed consent agreement in Appendix A. 
     Recruitment of panel members was in the form of email and Facebook Messenger 
(Appendix B) to each prospective participant. A total of 50 emails to cyber professionals 
yielded two 10-member teams (20 total), the first to build the criteria and develop the 
artifact and the second to test and evaluate the artifact. The initial recruitment email went 
out to 25 cyber experts and entailed a one-page description of the research, anonymity 
details, the team process, the time required for the study (1 hour per week and research 
dates), and motivation for the work. Once the panels were full, the remaining participants 
were notified and requested to be back-up for any panel member shortfall contingencies. 
The motivation of the work was vital for the recruitment process. Articulating the 
importance of the problem and panel members contribution to solve the problem yielded 
positive results for recruitment (Yousuf, 2007).  
     Once the first ten panel members were selected, a description of the research 
(Appendix C), the problem statement, and goals, were provided to the panel participants 
before providing the process steps for starting the Delphi rounds. Pertinent questions 
were allowed and responded to in the form of emails and Facebook Messenger, 
whichever preferred by individual participants.  The anonymity of panel members was 
strictly adhered to by identifying participants in code names (Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, etc.) 
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and centralizing communications through the research Principle Investigator (D. S. 
McKay & Ellis, 2014). 
     The Delphi team process (Appendix D) entailed an overview of what was provided to 
team members and what was expected in return. Development of a criterion was based on 
the literature review and content analysis (Appendix E and F). An explanation of what 
was expected for each round after Round 1 included a matrix (Appendix G) for responses 
to the initial questions to panel members and the development of the artifact. The 
comment response matrix (Appendix H) facilitated by the researcher included the 
returned comments from panel members with analysis, similarities, and responses based 
on the cumulative results of comments (D. S. McKay & Ellis, 2014). The documents 
provided to panel members were explained in practical terms versus academic to ensure a 
clear understanding of what was expected between all parties. Panel members were given 
“cyber” code names. A few of the participants chose their cyber suffix, but all 
participants remained anonymous. 
Design and Develop the Artifact 
 
     The third step was to design and develop the artifact which answered research 
question two, “In what ways does the CCDF meet the criteria established for a 
comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework for CALOs?”.  Henver et al. (2004) 
contended design is a process. IS design science was derived from engineering research 
and descriptive of the rigorous approach to the design process. The iterative loop of 
continually building to achieve optimal results is critical to the design process. The 
Delphi method used throughout this research was inherently iterative (Skulmoski et al., 
2007; Yousuf, 2007). Heuristic strategies produce functional designs that can be 
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implemented in organizations on a broad spectrum. Ensuring a process and evaluation of 
each phase in the process provided a context for additional research aimed at fully 
exploring and improving the phenomena (Henver et al., 2004).  For this reason, a systems 
development approach was utilized to develop a CCDF prototype.  
     Nunamaker, Chen and Purdin (1990) described that building a prototype model must 
be based on meaningful research conducted in the literature review, functionalities of 
system components, and defined interrelationships. The CCDF prototype sampled in 
Appendix I was based on the researcher’s literature review, content analysis, and 
feedback conducted during the Delphi process. This process allowed consensus 
evaluation during the development stage and future evaluation in academia and industry 
to answer research question three.  The scale model (Appendix I) was presented to the 
expert Delph panel before voting as sampled in Appendix J during Phase II. The Delphi 
procedure ensured optimal development of the artifact based on expert option from 
federal and civil cyber defenders during phase II of the process. The expert panel agreed 
that the three primary frameworks in the model was a good base to measure against the 
criteria areas.  The expert panel unanimously agreed, the ITIL framework depicted in 
Appendix I be removed from the prototype, ITIL only represented service management 
processes, not cyber defense (McNaughton, Ray, & Lewis, 2010). A separate stakeholder 
panel further evaluated the CCDF after the prototype was refined through consensus by 
the expert panel.   
Demonstrate and Evaluate the Artifact 
 
    The fourth and fifth design science steps are to demonstrate and evaluate the use of the 
artifact to solve one or more instances of the problem. The demonstration and evaluation 
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of the artifact answered research question two on how effectively the artifact met the 
approved criteria and did the proposed model meet the goal of the research, providing a 
CCDF for CALOs. To address the research question, the effectiveness of the CCDF was 
evaluated first by the expert cyber defenders during phase II of the Delphi process and by 
the second team of CALO stakeholders which included Chief Executive Officers, Chief 
Information Officers (CIO), Military Commanders, Federal Senior Executive Service 
Members (SES), and Senior Military Officers. Stakeholders were comprised of federal 
and civil leadership for effective representation of CALOs. The second 10 person 
stakeholder panel met the same criterion established by Skulmoski et al. (2007) with the 
exception of a required informed consent by all ten panel members. First, knowledge and 
experience with the issue under investigation were required. For the study of 
cybersecurity stakeholders, members of the team had at least ten years of experience as 
information owners or stakeholders of CALO defended networks. Panel members had a 
capacity and willingness to participate in the study. This second requirement was more 
difficult to sustain since senior staff members had demanding schedules. Stakeholders 
were also required to have sufficient time to participate in the Delphi process. Finally, all 
panel members were required to have effective communications skills (Skulmoski et al., 
2007). A Likert scale consensus was required with the same criteria as the first panel of 
expert cyber defenders. The consensus was reached once all panel members agreed with a 
CCDF average score between 4 “Highly Effective” and 5 “Most Effective”, based on a 5 
point Liker scale (D. S. McKay & Ellis, 2014). The second research question was 
answered after the expert panel established the criteria and after the artifact was 
developed by the researcher with the assistance of the cyber defense expert panel. 
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Research question two was further addressed in the fourth and fifth steps of the design 
science methodology as evidenced by the continual evaluative stance throughout the 
developmental research process. Responses to panel comments were in the form of a 
comment response matrix similar to Appendix H. 
     The stakeholder panel addressed the evaluation of the artifact based on the agreed 
upon criteria, preliminary model and feedback from the initial rounds. The evaluation 
was based on a five-point Likert scale: 1 meaning “Least Effective,” 2 meaning “Slightly 
Effective,” 3 meaning “Effective,” 4 meaning “Highly Effective,” and 5 meaning “Most 
Effective.” Peffers et al. (2007) explained that demonstrations might include experiments, 
simulations, case studies, proof, or other appropriate activities. In many cases, 
demonstrations entail several methodologies to adequately capture that the artifact does 
what is claimed (Petter, Khazanchi, & Murphy, 2010). The Delphi process used 
throughout this research provided an evaluative approach from experts and stakeholders 
in the cybersecurity field during the construction of the artifact and the evaluation of the 
CCDF proof of concept (Erffmeyer, Erffmeyer, & Lane, 1986; Okoli & Pawlowski, 
2004). 
     Peffers et al. (2007) explained that the evaluation of the artifact should measure how 
well the artifact supports a solution to the problem. Demonstration and evaluation could 
take many forms such as comparison of the artifact’s functionality with the solution 
objectives, quantitative performance measures such as budgets, items produced, and the 
results of satisfaction surveys, customer feedback, or simulations. Theoretically, an 
evaluation could include any empirical evidence or logical proof. The evaluation of this 
work was fused in the development of the artifact through expert panel member iterations 
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and a separate panel of cybersecurity stakeholders “customer feedback” to evaluate the 
CCDF artifact. Panel member documentation and communications were based primarily 
on previous work (D. McKay, 2012; D. S. McKay & Ellis, 2014).  
     The first demonstration conducted was during the second phase of the first panel of 
experts. The initial demonstration was a 20-minute narrated walkthrough of the proposed 
CCDF prototype based on the agreed criteria. Expert panel members were asked to rate 
the prototype based on the criteria and provide recommendations for improvements. The 
second, and final 25-minute presentation was for stakeholders to evaluate the prototype 
based on the expert panel’s work. Further practical evaluation will be accomplished by 
post-dissertation publication in academia through conferences and other publication 
opportunities.   
Communication of the Artifact 
 
     The sixth and final step in design science is the communications of the artifact. 
Communications include the importance of the problem, the utility, and novelty of the 
artifact, the objectivity of its design, and the effectiveness of researchers and the public 
(Henver et al., 2004; Peffers et al., 2007). The fundamental point of communicating this 
research was to contribute to the IS body of knowledge. The Hawaii International 
Conference on System Science had already accepted preliminary work concerning this 
research at the 2018 HICSS Doctoral Consortium. The researcher presented this work 
amongst 53 international articles, was accepted, and presented at the 2018 HICSS 
Conference in January 2018. Top scholars and mentors have accepted this work as 
significantly promising for future research in the IS field (Dr. Robert Biggs, Dr. Jay 
Nunamaker and Dr. Stacy Petter, HICSS Mentors, personal communications, January 9, 
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2018). Dissertation publication will further provide communication of the work in the 
NSU and global ProQuest database. Finally, the researcher will continue to seek 
opportunities to publish the work at academic and federal government conferences. The 
work was also presented at the Hawaii Armed Forces, Communications and Electronics 
TechNet Conference in Honolulu November 15, 2018. 
     The third research question was answered by analyzing the results of the expert panel 
and stakeholder’s questionnaires concerning research questions one and two. The results 
of the data derived from questions one and provided a path for future research explained 
in chapter 4. 
 
Resources 
     The resources used to perform this work was conducted on a Dell i5 laptop and a Dell 
i7 XPS L702X desktop computer. Both systems used windows 10 operating systems and 
office suite. Access to peer-reviewed research databases was provided via Nova 
Southeastern University Sharklink Portal. Nova’s Sherman Library had the required top 
ten peer-reviewed journals to execute credible dissertation worthy research as indicated 
by Levy and Ellis (2006). The researcher also utilized a subscription to NVivo, a 
qualitative data analysis software produced by QSR International. NVivo was utilized to 
conduct the qualitative content analysis. This tool analyzed rich text-based and 
multimedia information, for deep levels analysis of large volumes of data. Also, 
SurveyMonkey was to collect and analyze the data from panel members (Lowry, D’Arcy, 
Hammer, & Moody, 2016). Access to cyber defense analysts and senior stakeholders 
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were also required to evaluate the artifact. The cyber defense/analysts were experts in 
cybersecurity and defense with more than ten years’ experience or more.  
     Access to DISA, CYBERCOM and other CALO agencies organizational strategy and 
policy were required. Access to SME’s and supporting personnel that conducts cyber 
defense was required to address existing capabilities, requirements and data collection. 
Several trips to Ft. Meade were conducted to collect data on cyber defenders as well.    
     Establishing and sustaining existing collaborative relationships with fellow 
dissertation candidates was essential to this work. Finally, the support of the dissertation 
chair and committee members was paramount in achieving each level of the dissertation 
process. 
 
Summary 
     In chapter 3 we first described design science (DS) and why this methodology was 
appropriate to answer the following research questions: 1. What criteria does the CCDF 
artifact have to meet to be considered a comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework 
for CALOs? 2. In what ways does the CCDF meet the criteria established for a 
comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework for CALOs? 3. What future areas of 
research may be explored in understanding a more comprehensive approach to cyber 
defense for CALOs? Design science supports a problem-solving approach that shifts 
perspective between the design processes and artifacts to address a complex problem. 
     In the approach section, a detailed step-by-step description of how the study was 
conducted included the establishment of the CCDF criteria, artifact development, 
evaluation, and communication of the artifact.  
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     The approach section described how the design science research method was utilized 
based on the problem that was identified. The problem of no standard framework for 
clearly understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense for CALOs was substantiated 
through rigorous research. The motivation for this work was driven by research which 
identified understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense as essential to specific 
organizations requirements (Donaldson, 2015a).  
     The objective for solutions explains how the Delphi process was used to gain 
consensus to address the research questions. The section explained how expert and 
stakeholder panels were recruited based on at least ten years of experience in cyber 
defense and information ownership respectively. The section further explained how 
anonymity was achieved and how communications between the researcher and panel 
members were accomplished.  
     The expert panel facilitated in the development of the criteria to address research 
question 1. The expert panel further facilitated in the development of the CCDF artifact 
to enable understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense which resulted in a 20-
minute presentation. The expert panel also evaluated the agreed upon criteria against the 
CCDF artifact. Finally, the stakeholders’ panel evaluated the criteria against the CCDF 
artifact through a distinctly separate Delphi process.  
     The researcher provided a demonstration of the artifact to expert panel members in the 
form of a presentation of the CCDF, explaining the process of how to use the CCDF to 
understand comprehensive cybersecurity defense. Expert panel members were given 5-
point Liker scales to evaluate the criteria, the CCDF, and how well the criteria met the 
CCDF. The consensus was reached once all panel members agreed with an average score 
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between 4 “Highly Effective” and 5 “Most Effective.” This process was repeated for the 
stakeholder panel from an information owner perspective, providing a distinctly separate 
evaluative point of view of the CCDF.  
     Finally, the resources utilized to conduct this study was presented. Of particular note, 
the NVivo qualitative data analysis software produced by QSR International analyzed 
rich text-based and multimedia information, for deep levels analysis of large volumes of 
data. Also, SurveyMonkey was utilized to collect and analyze the data from panel 
members (Lowry et al., 2016).  
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Chapter 4 
Results 
 
Introduction 
     This chapter is organized sequentially by the research questions. The first section 
answers research question one, presents the results of the content analysis, and the work 
of the first team of cyber defense experts. Additionally, the core seven criteria areas of 
the CCDF prototype are validated during phase one of the Delphi process. The second 
section answers research question two and depicts the development of the CCDF artifact 
based on the literature review, content analysis and feedback from the expert panel. A 
subsection offers phase two of the expert panel in ensuring the developed prototype 
matched the agreed upon criteria based on the phase one results and validates research 
question two.  The third section offers the separate stakeholder panel evaluation results of 
the CCDF prototype by CALO stakeholders and further validates research question 
number two. The subsection provides the results of the stakeholder’s comments and 
advice for future work of the CCDF prototype. Finally, a summary is presented.  
     The essence of design science is development of the artifact. The CCDF artifact was 
developed with the consensus of the expert and stakeholder panels. The researcher 
presented the finished CCDF artifact to the expert panel during development and testing 
and to the stakeholder panel for evaluation. A 25-minute narrated presentation of the 
finished CCDF artifact was presented to the stakeholder panel. The translated 
presentation in Appendix M contains the notes used for the narration for each of the 34 
PowerPoint slides. 
80 
 
 
 
 
     The sections in this chapter are in direct correlation to the research methodology 
explained in chapter 3. The research approach, Delphi iterations, and design science steps 
have been embedded in the research questions as indicated in figure 4.  The process 
ensured rigor, continuous development, and evaluation of the CCDF artifact.  
Answer to Research Question One: Development of the CCDF Criteria 
 
     This section addresses research questions 1: What criteria does the CCDF artifact have 
to meet to be considered a comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework for CALOs? 
To answer the research question, a literature review was conducted in chapter 2 along 
with content analysis. The literature review revealed four general areas to address the 
research problem: the cyber domain, cyber defense in large organizations, cyber domain 
construct challenges, and cybersecurity frameworks.  
Content Analysis 
 
     A content analysis was conducted utilizing the NVivo software, which facilitated key-
word association with more than 200 research articles. This process allowed unstructured 
data to be compiled, compared, and analyzed in an efficient, non-biased manner. Nodes 
were created based on the research problem, literature review, and word frequency. 
Similar terms were combined based on the analysis, which was further validated by the 
expert panel.  
     The literature review articles were loaded into the NVivo software. Based on the 
research problem and key-word search results, the researcher created nine key categories: 
Behavioral and Human factors associated with cyber defense; common lexicon and 
constructs; cyber policy; cyber threat based on operational requirements; defense in depth 
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(virtual and physical factors); cyber roles and responsibilities; interdependency; 
stakeholder buy-in and understanding; and universal applicability (figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Key-Word Search Initial Nine Categories 
Through comparison, the cyber lexicon and policy nodes were combined due to article 
and key-word associations (figure 6). Additionally, CALO operational requirements and 
universal application were also combined (figure 7.).  
 
Figure 6.  CALO Operational Requirements and Universal Application Comparison 
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Figure 7. Cyber Operation-Based Threats and Universal CALO  
The seven remaining categories provided the baseline to present to the expert panel for 
negotiations.  
Operationalizing the Criteria 
 
      The seven criteria had to be operationalized for the Delph experts to understand the 
research goals clearly. The researcher properly contexed the criteria in relation to the 
research questions which resulted in the seven criteria areas identified below: 
1. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must account for virtual as well as physical 
threat factors.   
2. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must account for all interdependencies of 
outside organizations. 
83 
 
 
 
 
3. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must use a common lexicon by internal and 
external organizations. 
4. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must be applicable to all CALOs regardless of 
operation. 
5. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must include behavioral factors of friendly and 
malicious users (trusted insiders and hackers). 
6. Stakeholders must easily understand the comprehensive cybersecurity defense 
framework. 
7. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must identify roles and responsibilities of 
personnel responsible for defending CALOs. 
Cyber Defense Expert Panel Phase 1 Round 1 
 
     The seven criteria areas were presented to the cyber defense expert team for round 1 
rating. The average results for the ten responses are depicted in Appendix N.  The rating 
for criterion 1 yielded an average score of 4.2, criterion 2 was 3.7, Criterion 3 was 4.0, 
criterion 4 was 3.2, criterion 5 was 3.6, criterion 6 was 4.4, and criterion 7 was 4.4. Four 
of the seven criterion areas met the 4.0 or above average rating to be incorporated into the 
CCDF prototype build.  
Criterion 1 feedback – The Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework must 
account for virtual and physical threat factors 
     Criterion 1 average rating was 4.20, with 20% of respondents grading as “Effective,” 
40% of respondents answered “Highly Effective,” and 40% answered “Most Effective.” 
The criterion met CCDF prototype inclusion, and six respondents added comments to this 
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criterion for improvement. Respondent Cyber Alpha argued the criterion as only effective 
as an organization’s ability to adjust to necessary changes within its boundary when 
required and to consider organizations inability to control systems of outside 
organizations, a point noted for CCDF prototype development. Cyber Bravo argued that 
based on the preliminary research information provided of current security practices, 
physical topologies for cyber defense were well supported. However, threats to virtual 
networks were not well supported by the research. The respondent asked, “What are the 
threats impacting virtual networks?”. “Why is securing the physical networks not enough 
to also secure the logical one?”. “What is the demarcation point between physical and 
logical?”. Schreier (2015) defense in depth argued that upper layers in the model 
encompass virtual interdependencies within the lower physical and perimeter layers but 
the author did not go into detail on how virtual encrypted data poses security risks. Cyber 
Bravo’s remarks drove this researcher to thoroughly explain how virtual networks pose 
significant security risks in the defense in depth portion of the CCDF prototype 
presentation. Cyber Bravo’s comments also highlighted that further work was needed to 
ensure all respondents understood the Delphi process is based on the participant’s 
experience, not merely the research conducted.  
     Cyber Foxtrot, highlighted the fact that defense in depth model encompasses virtual 
security as noted in the application and data layers. This was noteworthy as there are 
varying experiences between cyber defenders. Additional comments from Cyber Ice-Man 
spoke specifically to the DoD internet access points (IAP) and how encrypted virtual 
networks are difficult to secure which complimented Cyber Alpha’s comments 
concerning control of outside entities.  
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Criterion 2 feedback – Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must account for all 
interdependencies of outside organizations 
     Criterion 2 average rating was 3.70. 20% of respondents rated this criterion “Slightly 
Effective,” 10% rated “Effective,” 50% “Highly Effective,” and 20% “Most Effective.”  
The criterion did not meet inclusion into the CCDF prototype during this round, and 
seven respondents added comments for improvements. Cyber Bravo commented on the 
preliminary information to validate this criterion, indicating a trend to clearly define 
expectations to ensure all panel members provided ratings based on their expert opinion. 
The brief preliminary research facilitated the basis of building the criterion, but some 
respondents used this information solely to grade criterion areas. Cyber Foxtrot and 
Cyber Ice-Man made general statements validating the importance of inter-dependencies 
and provided examples where it was critical to cybersecurity in their experience but 
graded this area “Effective” and “Most Effective” respectively. This, along with Cyber 
Bravo’s comments was an indication that this criterion needed to be clearly explained to 
the panel. Finally, Cyber India commented that policy played a significant role in inter-
CALO agreements to achieve optimal inter-dependency for cyber defense.  
Criterion 3 feedback – Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must use a common lexicon 
by internal and external organizations 
     Criterion 3 average rating was 4, with 10% of respondents grading “Least Effective,” 
20% of respondents answered “Effective,” 20% “Highly Effective,” and 50% answered 
“Most Effective.” Although the criterion rated at 4, it did not meet CCDF prototype 
inclusion during this round.  Delphi rules for this panel did not allow for any criterion 
rated “Least Effective” or “Slightly Effective” be included in the CCDF prototype. Six 
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respondents added comments for improvement. Cyber Alpha responded that many 
CALOs are isolated in cyber lexicology and argued that civil, federal, and other non-
DOD CALOs should develop a common language. This argument substantiated the 
literature review and the content analysis and was considered during CCDF development. 
Cyber Foxtrot contended cyber lexicon should be driven from within CALOs and graded 
this criterion “Least Effective” drastically diverting from the rest of the panel members, 
resulting in the exclusion of this criterion. Cyber Hotel argued that without a common 
cyber lexicon, translation of risk-based relevant context is not achievable, cyber spending 
is increased, decision making is less reliable, and effects and expectations are misaligned. 
Interestingly, none of the respondents mentioned any mandated organizational or general 
lexicons such as the CNSS depicted in the literature review as heavily driven from NIST, 
encompassing civil and government organizations (Dukes, 2015; Vijayan, 2017). While 
all but one of the respondents agreed to the criticality of a cyber lexicon, none made any 
recommendations towards one. This potentially indicated that most cyber experts were 
not aware of a national cyber lexicon or they simply were not utilizing one. The argument 
drove further consideration in the development of the CCDF prototype.  
Criterion 4 feedback – Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must be applicable to all 
CALOs regardless of operation 
     Criterion 4 average rating was 3.2. 20% of respondents rated this criterion “Least 
Effective,” 10% rated “Slightly Effective,” 20% “Effective,” 30% “Highly Effective,” 
and 20% “Most Effective.” The criterion did not meet inclusion into the CCDF prototype 
during this round, and seven respondents added comments for improvements. The wide 
variation of respondents rating indicated this criterion was not adequately operationalized 
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or understood by panel members and respondents’ comments validated this point. Cyber 
Bravo rated this criterion “Most Effective” and commented it obtains the least amount of 
support but is one of the most critical areas of cyber defense. Cyber Hotel also 
commented on the significance of this criterion. Cyber Bravo further commented that a 
lack of clear standardization makes it extremely difficult to defend the networks. 
Developing a set of procedures that would serve as the basic requirements for every 
defender would be beneficial for the successful defense of networks. Since all defenders 
use a lot of the same equipment, developing guidelines on how to protect systems would 
allow for a wider array of information exchange amongst cyber operators.  
     Cyber Bravo, Cyber Charlie, and Cyber Ice-Man required validation on the criterion. 
Cyber Foxtrot rated this criterion “Least Effective” and recommended a general 
framework with an operational framework to facilitate an operationally adaptable CCDF. 
The researcher responded to Cyber Bravo, Charlie and Ice-Man’s comments to change 
the criterion to read, “The CCDF should be applicable regardless of organizational 
operations.” The change focused more on the CCDF opposed the cyber defense in 
general. Additionally, the researcher responded to Cyber Foxtrot’s comments by 
refocusing the respondent towards the goal of the research to create a better 
understanding of comprehensive cybersecurity, not to solve cybersecurity defense. 
Although, Cyber Foxtrot’s recommendation to map general frameworks such as NIST or 
ISO/IEC 17799/2700 with more operational frameworks such as Lockheed Martin’s 
Cyber Kill Chain was taken into consideration for CCDF development and substantiated 
the literature review and content analysis (Donaldson et al., 2015b) 
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Criterion 5 feedback – Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must include behavioral 
factors of friendly and malicious users (trusted insiders and hackers) 
Criterion 5 average rating was 3.6. 10% of respondents rated this criterion “Least 
Effective,” 10% rated “Slightly Effective,” 10% “Effective,” 50% “Highly Effective,” 
and 20% “Most Effective.” The criterion did not meet inclusion into the CCDF prototype 
during this round, and six respondents added comments for improvements. The 70% of 
respondents rated this criterion Highly Effective or Most Effective with strong supporting 
comments on behavioral aspects of understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense. 
Cyber India responded that this was the most important factor of the seven. Cyber 
Charlie’s response varied widely from the other experts and argued the section was light 
on support. The researcher responded with clarification to base ratings on expert 
experience. Cyber Foxtrot rated this criterion “Slightly Effective” and argued that 
CALOs must change the culture to promote security and build awareness. The researcher 
responded directly to Cyber Foxtrot to clarify the goal of the research to understand cyber 
defense and to change the culture of malicious hackers, or even friendly insiders were not 
the goal of this work.  
Criterion 6 feedback – Stakeholders must easily understand the comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense framework 
     Criterion 6 average rating was 4.4, with 10% of respondents grading as “Effective,” 
40% of respondents answered “Highly Effective,” and 50% answered “Most Effective.” 
The criterion met CCDF prototype inclusion, and five respondents added comments for 
improvement. The criterion was widely accepted for inclusion into the CCDF prototype. 
Respondents comments were primarily complementary to stakeholder understanding of 
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comprehensive cybersecurity defense. Cyber Hotel further provided further insight of 
stakeholders leverage over small and medium-sized organizations. The respondent 
explained that the 3rd party trusts relationships between CALOs and smaller 
organizations. The associated risks drive smaller organizations to align cyber defense 
methodologies with CALOs for mission-dependent services and products. A point for 
future research, complimentary to criterion 2 for interdependencies, and validated by the 
literature review and content analysis. 
Criterion 7 feedback – Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must identify roles and 
responsibilities of personnel responsible for defending CALOs 
     Criterion 7 average rating was 4.4, with 10% of respondents grading as “Effective,” 
40% of respondents answered “Highly Effective,” and 50% answered “Most Effective.” 
The criterion met CCDF prototype inclusion, and six respondents added comments for 
improvement. The criterion was widely accepted for inclusion into the CCDF prototype. 
All responses from panel members were complimentary to the preliminary information 
provided. Cyber Foxtrot argued that identifying roles and responsibilities may not only 
identify gaps in but identify duplicative efforts in cyber defense. Cyber Hotel offered 
clear roles and responsibilities allow appropriate resource planning for current and future 
requirements while ensuring the necessary duties are assigned to the appropriate 
functions. The comments facilitated the development of the CCDF roles portion of the 
CCDF prototype.  
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General Comments 
     Respondents were allowed to correspond with the researcher for any questions or 
clarification of the work. Several respondents provided insightful feedback to the 
researcher, which the researcher distributed to the group during round 2.  Cyber Bravo 
noticed that in the description of the research the title, "Towards a Comprehensive 
Cybersecurity Defense Framework" was provided yet only criterion 6 mentioned the 
framework. This may have resulted in the large scoring gaps found in criterion 2, 4, and 
5. For example, the goal, title, problem statement, and Delphi process clearly stated the 
panel is building a framework to understand cybersecurity defense, but the criterion that 
was being rated did not state “framework” in each of the criterion areas. This problem 
caused several respondents to assume the goal was to solve cyber defense for CALOs 
generally, vice provides a “framework” for understanding cyber defense. Panel input 
proved critical, which improved clarification and ratings during round 2.  
Cyber Defense Expert Panel Phase 1 Round 2 
      The modified criterion was presented to the expert team for round 2 based on general 
respondent feedback. The ratings, shared comments of all the Delph panel members, and 
the researcher’s comments were also presented in the panel spreadsheet (Appendixes O). 
The average results and comparison to round 1 for the ten responses are depicted in 
Appendix P.  The rating for criterion 1 yielded an average score of 4.5, criterion 2 was 
4.1, criterion 3 was 4.4, criterion 4 was 4.2, criterion 5 was 4.0, criterion 6 was 4.7, and 
criterion 7 was 4.4. All seven criteria areas met the 4.0 or above average ratings for the 
CCDF prototype build and finalized phase 1 of the Delph expert panel.  
91 
 
 
 
 
Criterion 1 feedback - The Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF) 
must account for virtual as well as physical threat factors 
     Criterion 1 rating increased from 4.2 to 4.5, with 50% of respondents rating as 
“Highly Effective” and 50% of respondents rating “Most Effective.” The group 
consensus was primarily based on round 1 comments. Cyber Ice-Man rating changed 
from “Effective” to “Most Effective.” Comments from other panel members provided 
added insight for a two-level increase. Cyber Foxtrot highlighted encrypted tunneling and 
the required ability to “break and inspect” encrypted traffic. It was noted that defenders 
lack of ability to defend encrypted traffic caused some lack of awareness to include 
virtual traffic defense. Government defenders are required to be aware of encrypted 
traffic and to identify this to stakeholders.    
Criterion 2 feedback - The CCDF must account for inter-dependencies of outside 
organizations 
     Criterion 2 rating increased from 3.7 to 4.1 and was added to the baseline criterion for 
CCDF development. 10% of respondents rated this criterion “Effective,” 70% rated 
“Highly Effective,” and 20% rated “Most Effective.” Cyber Alpha added supporting 
comments to this criterion advocating for partnerships and collaboration with outside 
organizations to defend interdependencies and the significance of supporting policy and 
documentation for firm agreements between CALO partners. Cyber Bravo rating changed 
from “Slightly Effective” to “Effective” based on group ratings. Cyber Bravo argued 
more specificity in this criterion, adding interdependencies should not necessarily be with 
the organization but the information exchange between organizations. The researcher 
noted this insight into CCDF development. 
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     Cyber Charlie rating changed from “Slightly Effective” to “Highly Effective” based 
on group input and MITRE corporation personal experience on trusted relationships 
between organizations.   
Criterion 3 feedback - The CCDF must use a common lexicon by internal and external 
organization   
     Criterion 3 rating increased from 4 to 4.4 and was added to the baseline criterion for 
CCDF development. 10% of respondents rated this criterion “Effective,” 40% rated 
“Highly Effective,” and 50% rated “Most Effective.” Cyber Foxtrot rating changed from 
“Least Effective” to Effective qualifying this as a CCDF criterion. The rating change was 
based on the CNSS 4009 provided by the researcher and mandated by the federal 
government. All other panel members graded this criterion “Highly Effective” or “Most 
Effective” in round 1 so influence from the group was also a factor. Cyber Hotel 
responded utilization of a common lexicon is not just for the benefit of operations 
internally, but the relative cost to external relationships. In the same way, intelligence not 
shared in the context of doctrine is weakened and arguably no longer intelligence. The 
collection of information for internal consumption wherein different taxonomies imply 
words like stage, breach, intrusion, and malware are not equal to a global instantiation. 
Ideally, even internal lexicons are mapped to global frameworks - as it enables low-cost 
adoptions of externally created value-added products. 
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Criterion 4 feedback - The CCDF should be applicable regardless of organizational 
operations 
     Criterion 4 rating changed from 3.2 to 4.2 and was added to the baseline criterion for 
CCDF development. 20% of respondents rated this criterion “Effective,” 40% rated 
“Highly Effective,” and 40% rated “Most Effective.” This criterion was by far the most 
challenging for group understanding and consensus. During round 1 several panel 
members who had experience on specific frameworks and concepts of cyber defense 
could not grasp an organizationally agnostic cybersecurity framework. Based on panel 
member input the criterion changed from “operation” to “organizational operations” and 
“comprehensive cyber defense” changed to “comprehensive cybersecurity defense 
framework.” Cyber Bravo and Cyber Hotel both noted the term operation leans more 
towards defense and government, adding the term CCDF (comprehensive cybersecurity 
defense framework) to each of the criteria would keep panel members focused on the 
goal towards the development of the CCDF prototype.  
     Cyber Alpha added supporting comments on the criticality of this criterion. Cyber 
Alpha argued, stakeholder requirements drive organizational operations in defining what 
is to be defended and failing to develop a CCDF that would address organizational 
operations requirements across CALOs would disqualify the term “comprehensive” in the 
framework. Cyber Bravo rating changed from “Lease Effective” to “Most Effective” 
once confusion concerning the criterion was fully clarified and understood. Cyber Charlie 
rating changed from “Slightly Effective” to “Highly Effective” and Cyber Delta rating 
changed from “Effective” to “Highly Effective” due to criterion clarification. Cyber 
Foxtrot rating changed from “Lease Effective” to Effective based on comments from 
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Cyber Alpha and clarification of the criterion.  Cyber Ironic rating changed from 
“Effective” to “Highly Effective” and Cyber India rating change “Highly Effective” to 
“Effective” based on aggregate panel member ratings in general.  
Criterion 5 feedback - The CCDF must include behavioral factors of friendly and 
malicious users (trusted insiders and hackers) 
     Criterion 5 rating increased from 3.6 to 4 and was added to the baseline criterion for 
CCDF development. 10% rated this criterion “Effective,” 80% rated “Highly Effective,” 
and 10% rated “Most Effective.” Cyber Charlie rating changed from “Least Effective” to 
“Highly Effective” based on round 1 comments and rating from other panel members. 
Cyber Foxtrot rating changed reluctantly from “Slightly Effective” to “Effective” based 
on panel member comments and ratings. Cyber Foxtrot recognized the advanced 
approaches adversaries take to gain a foothold in CALOs. A fact that would be taken into 
consideration during CCDF development. Action-oriented frameworks such as Lockheed 
Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain tracks enemy behavior throughout the lifecycle of an attack. 
Cyber Ice-Man rating changed from “Effective” to “Highly Effective” based on 
collective group influence. Additionally, Cyber Ice-Man recently saw a 72% decrease of 
insiders falling victim to phishing attacks due to user awareness training in the panel 
member’s CALO. Finally, Cyber India rating changed from “Most Effective” to “Highly 
Effective,” the only panel member with a rating downgrade based on the input and 
comments of fellow panel members.  
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Criterion 6 feedback - Stakeholders must easily understand the CCDF 
     Criterion 6 rating increased from 4.4 to 4.7. 30% rated this criterion “Highly Effective” 
and 70% rated “Most Effective”. The group consensus was primarily based on round 1 
comments. Cyber Bravo and Cyber Ironic ratings changed from “Highly Effective” to 
“Most Effective” based on round 1 panel members comments. Cyber India rating 
changed from “Effective” to “Highly Effective” based on round 1 comments and panel 
member ratings.  
Criterion 7 The CCDF must identify roles and responsibilities of personnel responsible 
for defending CALOs 
     Criterion 7 ratings remained at 4.0 although two panel members rating changed. 60% 
rated this criterion “Highly Effective” and 40% rated “Most Effective”. Cyber Delta 
rating changed from “Effective” to “Highly Effective” due to the round 1 comments and 
criterion clarification. Cyber India rating changed from “Most Effective” to “Highly 
Effective” based on round 1 ratings and comments.  
      
Answer to Research Question Two: Development and Evaluation of the CCDF 
Artifact  
     To capture the seven criteria areas, the prototype design is based on cyber defense 
tasks, what those tasks are intended to do, where the tasks occur in CALOs, and who is 
conducting the tasks. To capture the criterion requirements, the NIST RMF, the 
Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain (LM CKC), and the defense in depth framework were 
mapped to CNSS cyber defender roles. 
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     The NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF) core categories of Identify, Protect, 
Detect, Respond, and Recover identified the tasks. NIST covers general topics for all 
CALOS; baselining policy, asset management, and governance are general practices that 
should be conducted by all CALOs. Protect, Detect and Respond core areas are more 
defensive driven and outline CALO risk factors. The prototype operationalized the NIST 
core tasks by mapping to more actionable frameworks such as Lockheed Martin’s Cyber 
Kill Chain and the Defense in Depth model. 
     NIST RMF fulfills four of the CCDF criterions. It accounts for virtual as well as 
physical threat factors. The identify asset management category looks at physical and 
virtual accountability in the framework, identify management also looks at who has 
access to make changes to virtual and physical devices in the organization, fulfilling 
Criterion 1. NIST RMF also accounts for inter-dependencies of outside organizations. 
Supply chain risk management under the identify core task is an example of how this 
framework looks at outside interdependencies.  
     NIST RMF utilizes the CNSS glossary as a common lexicon for cyber security, 
addressing criterion 3. Additionally, NIST RMF is applicable regardless of organizational 
operations. As stated in the NIST guide, “The framework can be used in various sized 
organizations regardless of size, degree of cybersecurity risk, or cybersecurity 
sophistication – to apply the principles and best practices of risk management to 
improving the security and resilience of critical infrastructure” (Vijayan, 2017, p. 1). The 
Framework provides organization and structure encompassing multiple approaches to 
cybersecurity by assembling standards, guidelines, and practices that are working 
effectively in industry today. Moreover, because it references globally recognized 
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standards for cybersecurity, the framework can also be used by organizations located 
outside the United States and can serve as a model for international cooperation on 
strengthening critical infrastructure and cybersecurity. 
     Lockheed Martin’s CKC addresses “what” defenders will be doing. The CKC  
provides actions defender will take based on the task. The CKC addressed criterion 4 and 
was added to the prototype due to its extensive use in government and industry and its 
ability to detect behaviors of adversarial actions in CALOs. The CKC fulfills criterion 5 
due to the framework’s ability to address the behavior of attackers and friendly users as a 
process in which defenders can see. The CKC depicts a step-by-step process taken by 
adversaries to achieve objectives. Adversaries, conduct reconnaissance on networks to 
determine the type of weapon to use on CALO networks. They then deliver a payload to 
exploit the target. Further in the process, installation of the malware or malicious code is 
conducted on the target, the adversary then commands the host/s. Finally, once all the 
previous six steps are achieved in the CKC, the enemy has action on objectives or owns 
the targeted host/s. 
     Oracle’s defense in depth model depicts the “where” defense will happen in the 
CCDF. The layered approach provided by the defense in depth model accounts for 
criterion 2 or interdependencies as this model, data, application, endpoint, and internal 
network layers provides several defense vectors for the CCDF while, the perimeter, and 
physical layers addresses outside organization defense. Virtual and physical threat factors 
are also addressed in the upper and lower layers of the defense in depth model accounting 
for criterion 2. Finally, the defense in depth model is widely used by industry and 
government addressing criterion 4. 
98 
 
 
 
 
     The Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) provides a common lexicon for 
the CCDF and addresses criterion 3. The CNSS not only clearly defines the roles in the 
CCDF but explains terminology between defenders and stakeholders throughout the 
CALO. Figure 8 displays the CCDF prototype artifact. Appendix M provides a complete 
walkthrough mapping cyber roles, to NIST RMF task, CKC steps, and defense in depth 
layers. The panel of experts were provided a 20-minute walkthrough of the framework. 
Panel members provided feedback for development and improvement during phase 2, 
answering research questions two, “In what ways does the CCDF meet the established 
criterion?”.  
 
 
Figure 8. CCDF Prototype Artifact 
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Cyber Defense Expert Panel Phase 2 Round 1 
     The CCDF prototype presentation was presented to the expert team for round 1 rating. 
The average results for the ten responses are depicted in Appendix Q.  The rating for 
Criterion 1 yielded an average score of 4.4, criterion 2 was 4, criterion 3 was 4.5, 
criterion 4 was 4.5, criterion 5 was 4.3, criterion 6 was 4.6, and criterion 7 was 4.5. The 
CCDF met all seven criterion areas at the 4.0 or above average rating. Panel members 
facilitation in the development of the prototype heavily influenced the high ratings. 
Questions concerning the build of the prototype were allowed before voting to ensure 
members understood the artifact.       
     Cyber Bravo made two recommendations. The respondent first requested that the 
criterion areas be explained through the presentations to allow members to evaluate the 
CCDF process against the criterion areas. Cyber Bravo argued that many of the functions 
of the framework was implied, but this addition to the walkthrough would make the 
CCDF simpler for stakeholders to understand. Cyber Bravo also recommended to make 
the matrixed relationships between CCDF simpler to map the “roles” (CNSS) to the 
“task” (NIST RMF), then to the CKC “what,” and finally to the “where” (defense in 
depth). This made the process simpler and less confusing visually. Before voting the 
researcher mapped the roles to the NIST CCF, then to the LM CKC.  
     During development, Cyber Hotel recommended the researcher sample the usability of 
the framework to further comprehension of the CCDF based on the mapping. The 
researcher added the matrixed spreadsheet to show how the CCDF derives a 
comprehensive approach through the mapping of the three key frameworks and the CNSS 
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roles. Furthermore, the researcher graphically depicted how cyber defense requirements, 
capabilities, and tools are derived from the CCDF in the presentation (Appendix M). 
     Cyber Alpha, Bravo, Echo, and Hotel also recommended based on round 1, that the 
researcher clearly describe how the CCDF accounted for virtual interdependencies which 
drove modifications to the defense in depth, and the NIST RMF narration. Once the 
feedback from all respondents was collected and panel members validated the CCDF 
against the seven criteria areas for comprehensive cybersecurity, the researcher updated 
the presentation for stakeholder evaluation.  The feedback would be incorporated into the 
stakeholders’ evaluation panel. 
Criterion 1 feedback - Does the Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework 
(CCDF) prototype account for virtual as well as physical threat factors 
     Expert defenders rated the CCDF 4.4 for criterion 1. 60% of respondents rated this 
area “Highly Effective” and 40% rated “Most Effective.” Cyber Hotel recommended a 
requirements validation process, specifically around use-cases and capabilities to add 
maturity to the validation mechanism. Additionally, as part of capabilities, an element of 
mapping data sources to each threat to understand what data is required from each 
capability. This assessment was based conceptually on the approach. The incorporation 
of roles including physical responsibilities (admins, engineers, users/operators) was 
inclusive in the CCDF mapping.   
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Criterion 2 feedback - Does the CCDF prototype account for inter-dependencies of 
outside organizations 
      Expert defenders rated the CCDF 4 for criterion 2. 40% of panel members rated this 
area “Effective,” 20% rated “Highly Effective,” and 40% rated “Most Effective.” 
Feedback from several panel members implied this as the most difficult to explain in the 
CCDF. Cyber Bravo and Echo argued interdependencies as an implied task in the CCDF 
but not explicit in the mapping. Cyber Ice-man recommended an added description of the 
internet of things and artificial intelligence may need clarification in “where” defense 
happens in the CCDF, a point for future research. Cyber Foxtrot added risks from 
contracts which fall outside the scope of the research, but the researcher explained the 
CCDF roles would map to specifically “who” is conducting the defending. 
Criterion 3 feedback - Does the CCDF prototype use a common lexicon by internal and 
external organization 
     Expert defenders rated the CCDF 4.6 for criterion 3. 10% rated this area “Effective,” 
20% rated this area “Highly Effective,” and “70% rated “Most Effective.” Cyber Bravo 
explained that use-cases should be derived not only from CALOs incident management 
but from conventional sources to allow for a predictive defense based on broader risk 
factors. Cyber Bravo’s input was added in the stakeholder presentation and as a point of 
future work for CCDF application.   
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Criterion 4 feedback - Is the CCDF prototype applicable regardless of organizational 
operations 
       Expert defenders rated the CCDF 4.5 for criterion 4. 60% of panel members rated 
this area “Highly Effective” and 40% rated “Most Effective.” All panel members agreed 
the true test of the prototype being organizationally agnostic was theoretical without 
future studies of the CCDF against several CALOs. Although, all respondents agreed the 
CCDF met the criterion and would theoretically achieve comprehensive cybersecurity 
defense.     
 Criterion 5 feedback - Does the CCDF prototype include behavioral factors of friendly 
and malicious users (trusted insiders and hackers)  
     Expert defenders rated the CCDF 4.5 for criterion 5.  70% rated this area “Effective” 
and 30% rated “Most Effective.” Panel members argued criterion 5 as primarily 
theoretical until applied practically to CALOs. Although the LM CKC is a proven 
behavioral model, mapping the association to cyber defense methodologies has not been 
proven. Cyber Alpha, Bravo, and Foxtrot argued the CCDF not only evaluates a 
comprehensive approach to cyber defense, but also provides an evaluation of the 
applicability of the associated frameworks.  For the purpose of this research, the criterion 
did meet the objective of understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense. Future 
work applying the CCDF will provide further insight on the effectiveness of cyber 
defense.  
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Criterion 6 feedback - Can stakeholders easily understand the CCDF prototype 
     Expert defenders rated the CCDF 4.6 for criterion 6.  10% rated this area “Effective,” 
20% rated “Highly Effective,” and 70% rated “Most Effective.” All but one of the panel 
members argued that the CCDF was easy to follow. Cyber Bravo commented on how 
complicated cyber defense is and regarded the CCDF as monumental in its simplistic 
approach to understanding comprehensive cyber defense.  
Criterion 7 feedback - Does the CCDF prototype identify roles and responsibilities of 
personnel responsible for defending CALOs 
     Expert defenders rated the CCDF 4.5 for criterion 7.  10% rated this area “Effective,” 
30% rated “Highly Effective,” and 70% rated “Most Effective.” All panel members 
agreed clearly defined standard roles and responsibilities are salient to comprehensive 
cyber defense. Cyber Bravo argued that the roles used in the CCDF may be generic 
enough to account for the major defense disciplines within CALOs but may not be 
specific enough to capture comprehensive cyber defense. Cyber Hotel argued in some 
CALOs roles may propagate across mapped CCDF disciplines. A key point for future 
work was indicated by panel member although, the objective of the CCDF is to identify 
the individual conducting cyber defense, not to dictate to CALOs who is doing the 
defending.  The CCDF as identified in the presentation may point out overlapping 
defense or gaps in defense based on CALO cyber defense requirements, capabilities, and 
tools. In doing so, overlapping roles, cyber defense applications, and equipment or lack 
of these resources may be identified. 
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Answers to Research Question Two and Three: Stakeholder Evaluation and 
Communication of the Artifact 
Stakeholder Panel Evaluation Round 1 
     The Stakeholder evaluation was similar to the evaluation of the CCDF conducted by 
the team of cyber defense experts. Stakeholder code names were also similar to the expert 
panel, although stakeholders were from a distinctly different demographic of information 
owners, CIOs, CEOs, and other cyber executives. The CCDF presentation was modified 
based on the feedback derived from Phase II of the team of experts. Particular care was 
taken to ensure criterion 2, 4, and 5 were explained in the CCDF presentation. The 
criteria mentioned above did not successfully pass the Expert Delph panel first round 
during Phase 1. 
     Stakeholders were reminded that the goal of the panel was to evaluate the CCDF. No 
CCDF modifications would result from the feedback although, panel member 
recommendations would be used for future work. Stakeholders were presented with a 25-
minute presentation of the CCDF and its functionality (Appendix M). Stakeholders were 
then asked to evaluate the framework based on the seven criterion areas. The stakeholder 
evaluation yielded conclusive results that the CCDF met the seven criteria areas in the 
first round. Criterion 1 rated 4.4, criterion 2, rated 4.2, criterion 3 rated 4.3, criterion 4 
rated, 4.4, criterion 5 rated 4.4 criterion 6 rated 4.6 and criterion 7 rated 4.7 (Appendix 
R). Additional comments from the stakeholders (Appendix S) are added along with the 
comments from the expert panel for future research.  
105 
 
 
 
 
Criterion 1 feedback - Does the Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework 
(CCDF) prototype account for virtual as well as physical threat factors 
    Stakeholder average ratings for criterion 1 was 4.4. 10% of respondents rated this 
criterion “Effective,” 40% rated Highly “Effective,” and 50% rated “Most Effective.” 
Cyber Bravo commented that the presentation effectively depicted how 
interdependencies can be developed. Salient to the research, this confirms an 
understanding of the framework mappings. Interdependencies are derived from mapping 
the tasks, to what defenders are doing, to who is defending CALO virtual and physical 
layers. Cyber Delta argued the CCDF would consistently have to be updated technology 
evolves. Complimenting the expert panel comments, Cyber Golf argued the challenges of 
encrypted traffic. This will be a topic for future research as the CCDF is applied 
practically. Although we are not trying to defend encrypted data outside a CALO’s scope 
of control for this work, we must identify the encrypted data at the proper defense layers. 
In doing this, CALOs stakeholders can accept or reject the risks. What we tend to see is 
the avoidance of encrypted traffic altogether because defenders cannot see the data, and 
this places organizations at risks. Additionally, we capture interdependencies in the 
framework to account for encrypted data. Cyber Hotel commented defense in depth and 
the NIST CKC mapping accounted for interdependencies.  
Criterion 2 feedback - Does the CCDF prototype account for interdependencies of 
outside organizations 
     Stakeholder average ratings for criterion 2 was 4.2. 10% rated this criterion 
“Effective,” 60% rated “Highly Effective,” and 30% rated “Most Effective.” Cyber Alpha 
commented practical CCDF use is needed to verify if interdependencies are defended 
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although the goal of the research is to understand that interdependencies are a factor in 
comprehensive cybersecurity defense. Cyber Golf argued that this criterion is hard to 
defend since interdependencies may not fall under stakeholder’s control. Furthermore, 
similar to expert panel comments, contract oversight may be a factor not indicative in the 
CCDF mapping. This was again a comment made during the expert panel. Although 
contract oversight is covered in the identify task of NIST, more practical use in a heavily 
contracted CALO setting may be a potential future research area.  
Criterion 3 feedback – Does the CCDF use a common lexicon by internal and external 
organizations   
     Stakeholder average ratings for criterion 3 was 4.3. 10% rated this criterion 
“Effective,” 50% rated “Highly Effective,” and 40% rated “Most Effective.” Cyber Delta 
warned that consistent validation of CNSS would be required. The CNSS Working Group 
regularly convenes to review and update the CNSS glossary (Dukes, 2015). Cyber Echo 
argued the CNSS as an authoritative lexicon source although, most organizations tend to 
create their own language. CALOs that defend international cyber assets must use a 
common language for comprehensive cyber defense (Manjikian, 2017).  
Criterion 4 feedback - Is the CCDF prototype applicable regardless of organizational 
operations 
     Stakeholder average rating for criterion 4 was 4.4. 10% of respondents rated this 
criterion “Effective,” 40% rated “Highly Effective,” and 50% rated “Most Effective.” 
Cyber Bravo was the only panel member to rate this criterion “Effective” arguing 
application would be the true test. All other participants rating criterion 4 “Highly 
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Effective” or “Most Effective” This would require future work in several different types 
of CALOs. For example, the DOD would be a largely different organizational setting that 
says a more public CALO like Facebook or any large university. Cyber Delta commented 
that utilization of widely accepted frameworks covered all CALO mission space and 
rated this criterion “Most Effective.” 
Criterion 5 feedback - Does the CCDF prototype include behavioral factors of friendly 
and malicious users (trusted insiders and hackers) 
     Stakeholder average rating for criterion 5 was 4.4. 10% of respondents rated this 
criterion “Effective,” 40% rated “Highly Effective,” 50% “Most Effective.” Cyber Alpha 
rated this criterion “Effective” and commented that although individual frameworks 
indirectly addressed trusted insider but questioned the ability of the CCDF to function in 
reverse order towards the roles. For example, how does a CALO detect reconnaissance? 
The researcher addressed this response as a future practical study and contended a CALO 
would not detect reconnaissance. For example, a user can detect latency on his host 
computer as, latency, a web camera turning on, or key-logging. The user would then 
report the anomaly to the system administrator or network defender. The CCDF can also 
help CALOs identify tools users and system administrators can use such as systems logs, 
network analysis tools, or host intrusion detection tools. Users must be engaged in the 
framework to make the CCDF comprehensive. Cyber Charlie rated this CCDF criterion 
“Most Effective” as the CKC helped the panel member’s organization make decisions on 
whether to act or watch enemy behavior. Cyber Charlie added “This framework forces us 
to address more details into where the behavior is happening in defense stages. Great 
tool!” 
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Criterion 6 feedback - Can stakeholders easily understand the CCDF prototype 
     Stakeholder average rating for criterion 6 was 4.6. 10% of respondents rated this 
criterion “Effective,” 20% rated “Highly Effective” and 70% rated “Most Effective.” 
This criterion was arguably the most relevant to panel members, as this portion of the 
study was an evaluation of the CCDF by the stakeholders. Cyber Alpha was the only 
stakeholder to rate this criterion “Effective”. The member added, “The meshing of 
frameworks is easily understood; however, a database that can query based on the who, 
task, what, and where would make it easier for anyone working cyber defense to find a 
requirement, capability, or tool, although a database maybe outside the scope of this 
research.” The researcher added; the spreadsheet depicted in the presentation was 
completed utilizing the Access Database application from Microsoft Office. The 
application can easily group mappings forward and backward, focus on specific roles, 
tasks, CKC, and NIST Core functions. Analyzing the database is certainly an area for 
future work. Cyber Bravo graded this criterion “Most Effective” and added, “Very easy 
to understand and brings clarity to the more complicated frameworks in the CCDF. The 
first practical approach I've seen is confusing frameworks like ISO, NIST 800-30, et al.” 
Cyber Delta commented on the need for stakeholders to have some background in this 
area. This is a topic for a completely different type of study, but stakeholder experience 
in understanding the information systems they own and employing the proper resources 
efficiently in their respective CALOs is a problem.  The Chaos Manifesto speaks 
specifically to CEOs assigning information owners with little experience to major cyber 
projects as a serious problem (Manifesto, 2013).  
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Criterion 7 feedback - Does the CCDF prototype identify roles and responsibilities of 
personnel responsible for defending CALOs 
     Stakeholder average rating for criterion 7 was 4.7 and was the highest criterion rating 
of the CCDF by stakeholders. 30% of respondents rated this criterion “Highly Effective” 
and 70% rated “Most Effective.” Cyber Gold commented, “Roles vary based on 
organization, and everyone should be conducting defense. I like the fact that the initial 
mapping has all the roles mapped to the where, what, and the task. In many of instances, 
we disenfranchise our folks by not engaging them in the defense actions.” Cyber Foxtrot 
added that this criterion seems implied but is not always clear and further added: 
“Excellent job of mapping the people to the tasks.”  All other respondents saw this 
criterion as straight forward and needed for comprehensive cyber defense.  
Answer to Research Question Three: Communications of the Artifact 
     The narrated presentation in Appendix M represents communication of the artifact. 
First to the expert panel and secondly to the panel of stakeholders. This dissertation 
report represents further communications of the artifact to the dissertation chair, 
committee members, and the Nova Southeastern University College of Engineering and 
Computing with the intent to be published through ProQuest.  
Summary   
     Through literature review and content analysis, seven criteria statements for 
understanding comprehensive cybersecurity cyber defense were derived. The seven 
criterion areas were then presented to a panel of 10 expert cyber defenders to validate and 
refine during phase 1. Each criterion was required to meet an average of 4 on a Likert 
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scale to be adopted as a criterion for the development of the CCDF prototype. The expert 
panel completed two rounds before untimely agreeing to incorporate all seven criterion 
areas into the CCDF prototype.  
     Phase 2 of the expert panel required members to facilitate the development of the 
CCDF prototype. During phase 1 panel members were provided a spreadsheet of the most 
prominent frameworks and provided feedback which drove the researcher to refine the 
CCDF. The CCDF was developed by mapping the NIST RMF, Lockheed Martin CKC 
and the defense in depth model. The CNSS guide was utilized as a standard lexicon for 
the CCDF and to define the roles. Expert panel members were then provided with a 20-
minute presentation of the CCDF prototype to evaluate against the agreed-upon criteria. 
The consensus was reached that the CCDF met all seven criteria statements during the 
first round.  Once the final comments and revisions were published, and the CCDF 
prototype was complete, the researcher recruited a second and separate panel of 
cybersecurity stakeholders to evaluate the CCDF.  
     The second Delph panel provided an objective view of the CCDF prototype by 10 
CALO stakeholders. The stakeholder panel provided a consensus that the CCDF 
prototype met the seven criteria statements in the first round. Analyzed comments from 
the expert and stakeholder rounds provided the researcher implications for future research 
and communication of the artifact.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
 
 
Introduction 
     Atoum et al. (2014) contended that current cybersecurity frameworks defending 
against cyber-attacks are fragmented and vary widely in effectiveness. Donaldson et al. 
(2015a) argued there was no common framework for clearly understanding what 
constitutes comprehensive cybersecurity defense. This lack of understanding causes an 
inability of current cybersecurity frameworks to sufficiently capture comprehensive 
organizational security requirements. The primary purpose of this research was to 
understand what comprehensive cybersecurity defense is. To do this, we first identified a 
criterion for comprehensive cybersecurity defense. Through the literature review and 
content analysis, we derived seven criteria statements. The criteria statements were 
validated and refined by a panel of cyber defense experts using the Delphi process to 
build consensus. The criteria list was utilized to develop and prototype the CCDF which 
the team of cyber defense experts tested against the seven criteria. A separate panel of 
stakeholders then evaluated the CCDF, utilizing the Delphi process toward evaluation of 
the CCDF against the criteria.  
     In chapter 5 the conclusion, implication, and recommendations are presented. The 
conclusion addresses the research questions and the seven criteria. The implications 
section addresses the relevance of this research to the information and cybersecurity body 
of knowledge and potential value for CALOs. The recommendation section outlines the 
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potential for practical application of the CCDF in CALOs and various additional areas for 
future research. Finally, the summery is presented.  
 
Conclusion 
     This section relates answers derived for the research questions addressing the 
problem, the associated impact to the information systems security field, and academic 
body of knowledge. The research problem is then placed into context of the existing body 
of knowledge through the literature review. The third subsection will describe the 
methods employed to address the research problem in terms of how the research 
questions were derived and answered.  The fourth subsection depicts the impact the 
answers obtained to the research questions have on future research. Finally, the fifth 
section explains how the answers to the research questions impact the research problem.  
Impact on the Research Problem 
      To address the research problem of no common framework for understanding what 
constitutes comprehensive cybersecurity defense for CALOs, we built a comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense framework (CCDF) artifact. Towards the development of the 
CCDF, we asked three research questions. What criteria does the CCDF artifact have to 
meet to be considered a comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework for CALOs? In 
what ways does the CCDF meet the criteria established for a comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense framework for CALOs? And, what future areas of research may be 
explored in understanding a more comprehensive approach to cybersecurity defense?  
113 
 
 
 
 
     The problem of not understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense and the 
impact this problem has not only on CALOs, but national security is salient to doctoral 
level research inquiry. Tatar et al. (2014) argued that cybersecurity has become one of the 
most serious national security concerns in the United States. Tarter et al. (2014) 
conducted a correlation study which compared the national cybersecurity strategies 
between the US, Turkey, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
Correlation between specific properties of each nation included economic, political, 
informational, and military tenants of national power. The study showed nations digital 
infrastructures as a strategic national asset which largely influenced all remaining tenants 
of national power. Understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense addresses the 
fundamental element of protecting national interests from enemy attacks. Tarter et al. 
(2014) further argued that while specifically in the military domain of national power, 
clearer offensive and defensive lines are drawn between land, air, and naval forces. Yet, 
in the cyber domain, both military and civil organizations struggle with understanding 
‘active defense’. The US has held a position of economic and military strength for 
decades, although the cyber arena provides enemy states and asymmetric advantage 
which places all tenants of US national power at risks.  Healey (2012), contended that 
cyber defense is enormously expensive, involves massive investments of fanatical and 
human resources, technologies, processes, and even basic human behavior to comply 
with proper information security procedures. The developing a framework for 
understanding cybersecurity defense provides a more definitive means of protecting 
CALOs and closes the gaps between the informational and other tenants of national 
power. 
114 
 
 
 
 
Impact on the Body of Knowledge 
     The literature review reveals compelling evidence of the gaps in cybersecurity 
defense. Donaldson et al. (2015b) argued current frameworks and security processes used 
to date are beneficial, but does not address a clear understanding of what comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense is.  Furthermore, current frameworks do not address what 
constitutes comprehensive organizational cybersecurity defense based on CALO strategic 
objectives. Most frameworks address general control and compliance for organizations 
without consideration to the scope, size and operational context of cybersecurity defense 
(Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Atoum et al., 2014; Donaldson et al., 2015a).  
     The literature further revealed cybersecurity frameworks were systemically 
categorized towards certification, specific privacy or risk management guides, and 
regulatory means to conduct organizational practices (Donaldson et al., 2015b).  Atoum 
et al. (2014) contended that current cybersecurity frameworks defending against cyber-
attacks were fragmented and vary widely in effectiveness. Table 1 presented a 
comparative overview of the most widely used frameworks, the pros and cons of each, 
peer-reviewed articles and contributions to the body of knowledge. Table 1 further 
provided the researcher and panel participants an overview the disparate frameworks, and 
referenced why understanding comprehensive cyber defense is critical to defending 
CALOs.  
     The content analysis conducted utilizing the NVivo software facilitated key-word 
association for hundreds of research articles. The software processed unstructured data to 
be compiled, compared, and analyzed in an efficient, non-biased manner. Nodes were 
created based on the research problem, literature review, and word frequency. Similar 
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terms were combined based on the analysis, which was further validated by the expert 
panel.  
     The content analysis provided objective development and a starting point for the 
CCDF criteria based on the literature review (Coakes & Coakes, 2009). The content 
analysis further allowed the researcher to put cyber defense criteria into meaningful 
categories, which were further validated by cyber defense experts. 
Methods Employed to Address the Research Problem 
     Design science was used as the research approach, and developmental research was 
utilized to develop the CCDF artifact. The research was comprised of two panels. The 
first panel of experts refined the criteria for the CCDF based on the literature review and 
content analysis, and secondly to facilitate the development of the CCDF, and ensure the 
prototype met the established criteria. The second panel was comprised of cybersecurity 
stakeholders to evaluate the CCDF developed by the expert panel.  
     The literature review and content analysis supplemented by the cyber defense experts 
answered the first research question, “What Criterion does the CCDF artifact have to 
meet to be considered a comprehensive defensive cybersecurity framework for 
CALOs?”.  
     The seven criteria statements provided a baseline for the CCDF for what needed to be 
considered for comprehensive approach to cyber defense. The implications of defining a 
criteria for the CCDF and appropriately scoping the criteria for CALOs provides 
researchers a new way of looking at and potentially developing information and 
cybersecurity frameworks. As stated previously, traditional frameworks are more 
specified towards compliance, risk management, certification, and controls.   
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     A developmental approach was used to construct the artifact and address the second 
research question, “In what ways does the CCDF meet the criteria established for a 
comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework for CALOs?”. The CCDF met the 
criteria through rigorous expert and stakeholder panel interaction and analyzing the 
discussions between panel members during Phases 1 and 2 as well as the stakeholder 
panel evaluation round.  The panel rounds influenced the build of the CCDF prototype 
and how the prototype addressed the criteria statements. Respondents heavily influenced 
the mapping of prominent frameworks to create the CCDF prototype. Respondents also 
added risk management and threat analysis as driving factors of general applicability for 
the CCDF prototype. The CCDF leverages "what" defenders must do to understand cyber 
defense by mapping core NIST RMF "tasks." Furthermore, we operationalized the CCDF 
by adding the CKC for understanding enemy behaviors as a process. The CCDF also tells 
us where to defend the behavior in the defense in depth model and who is explicitly 
responsible for the defense action utilizing the CNSS (Smith, 2019).  
     To adopt cyber defense methodologies and apply manning and monetary resources to 
any cybersecurity program requires the buy-in of the CALO stakeholders (Asti, 2017; 
Hua & Bapna, 2013; Manifesto, 2013). The motivation behind this work is based partly 
on the challenges of stakeholders to grasp a clear understanding of cybersecurity defense 
and the associated operational risks involved. Stakeholder feedback of the CCDF 
demonstration was positive, and several requests were made to put the CCDF to use in 
stakeholder respective CALOs. The stakeholder evaluation culminates rigorous testing 
and evaluation as part of the design science and developmental research process (Ellis & 
Levy, 2010). 
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          The third research question was, “What future areas of research may be explored in 
understanding a more comprehensive approach to cybersecurity defense?”. The research 
question was answered by analyzing the results of the expert panel and stakeholder’s 
questionnaires concerning research questions one and two. The results of the data derived 
from the first two research questions provided a path for future research.       
     Communications of the artifact is the final step in design science and publication of 
this work in the ProQuest dissertation database will be the first release of the completed 
study.  The researcher was selected to 2018 the Hawaii International Conference on 
System Science doctoral fellowship for preliminary work concerning a comprehensive 
approach to cyber defense. Top scholars and mentors have accepted this work as 
significantly promising for future research in the IS field (Dr. Robert Biggs, Dr. Jay 
Nunamaker and Dr. Stacy Petter, HICSS Mentors, personal communications, January 9, 
2018). The work was also presented at the Hawaii Armed Forces, Communications and 
Electronics TechNet Conference in Honolulu November 15, 2018. Finally, the researcher 
will continue to seek opportunities to publish the work at academic and federal 
government conferences. The impact of this work is promising in the area of new and 
more holistic approaches to cybersecurity frameworks. 
Answers to the Research Questions 
     Based on the literature review, content analysis, and the expert panel, seven criteria 
statements were established below to answer research question one, “What Criterion does 
the CCDF artifact have to meet to be considered a comprehensive defensive 
cybersecurity framework for CALOs?”. 
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1. The Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF) must account for 
virtual as well as physical threat factors (4.5) 
2. The CCDF must account for interdependencies of outside organizations (4.1) 
3. The CCDF must use a common lexicon by internal and external organizations 
(4.4) 
4. The CCDF should be applicable regardless of organizational operations (4.2) 
5. The CCDF must include behavioral factors of friendly and malicious users 
(trusted insiders and hackers) (4) 
6. Stakeholders must easily understand the CCDF (4.7) 
7. The CCDF must identify the roles and responsibilities of personnel responsible 
for defending CALOs (4.4) 
The criteria were heavily scrutinized through two expert panel consensus rounds of cyber 
defenders. Panel members rated the criteria based on a Likert scale rating of 1 to 5, 1 
being “Least Effective” and 5 being “Most Effective”. The final consensus-based scores 
are applied to each criterion above. Criteria rating rules required each statement to meet 
an average of 4 or better to be accepted as a CCDF criterion.  
     Once the criteria were established, the CCDF artifact was developed based on the 
agreed upon criteria, and the help of the expert panel members. Panel members has at 
least ten years of cybersecurity and framework experience. The expert panel members 
then completed an additional phase of the Delphi consensus process to evaluate the 
developed artifact against the criteria. The second phase of the Delphi process concluded 
that the CCDF artifact met the established criteria statements in just one round identified 
below with the associated scores.  
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1. Does the Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF) prototype 
account for virtual as well as physical threat factors? (4.4) 
2. Does the CCDF prototype account for interdependencies of outside 
organizations? (4) 
3. Does the CCDF use a common lexicon by internal and external organization? 
(4.5) 
4. Is the CCDF prototype applicable regardless of organizational operations? (45.) 
5. Does the CCDF prototype include behavioral factors of friendly and malicious 
users (trusted insiders and hackers)? (4.3) 
6. Can stakeholders easily understand the CCDF prototype? (4.6) 
7. Does the CCDF prototype identify roles and responsibilities of personnel 
responsible for defending CALOs? (4.5) 
     The second, and separate ten-person stakeholder panel further scrutinized the criteria 
against the CCDF artifact. Stakeholders were comprised of federal and civil leadership 
for effective representation of CALOs. Stakeholder consensus took only one round to 
validate all seven criteria statement against the CCDF artifact with the scores below. 
1. Does the Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF) prototype 
account for virtual as well as physical threat factors? (4.4) 
2. Does the CCDF prototype account for interdependencies of outside 
organizations? (4) 
3. Does the CCDF use a common lexicon by internal and external organization? 
(4.5) 
4. Is the CCDF prototype applicable regardless of organizational operations? (45.) 
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5. Does the CCDF prototype include behavioral factors of friendly and malicious 
users (trusted insiders and hackers)? (4.3) 
6. Can stakeholders easily understand the CCDF prototype? (4.6) 
7. Does the CCDF prototype identify roles and responsibilities of personnel 
responsible for defending CALOs? (4.5) 
The Impact of the Research Questions 
     The Impact of the research question to the information systems security body of 
knowledge opens up new areas to explore for design science and security frameworks. 
Establishing an answer based on literature review, content analysis and expert 
practitioners on a criteria for understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense opens 
the door for more holistic approaches to research pertaining to cyber defense. Research to 
address the overall cyber defense has been viewed as unobtainable (Donaldson et al., 
2015a). By narrowing this work to explicitly cyber defense for CALOs, we achieve a 
significant milestone in the information security body of knowledge. Future work may 
become available in offensive cyber areas, and defense of medium, and smaller 
organizations based on the CCDF.  
     Developing a CCDF artifact answered the question of how the seven criteria areas 
addressed the problem of the lack of understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense. 
The artifact provided a step-by-step approach that not only addressed the criteria but 
provided a simple method of understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense 
according to two separate panels. Furthermore, the CCDF provided a breakdown of cyber 
defense capabilities based on general CALO use-cases, and provided applicable tools 
based on the identified capabilities. A clearer representation of cybersecurity defense 
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allows stakeholders to adequately apply equipment and personnel resources as well as 
eliminate latent, oversaturated defense mechanisms for a more efficient cybersecurity 
posture.   
     Communication of the artifact by publishing the dissertation may produce new areas 
of research in the offensive cyber realm. The evaluated CCDF has yet to be tested against 
a CALO thus, there are opportunities for more practical research experiments. 
Additionally, the CCDF could be tested in medium and even small organizations for 
feasibility.   
      
Implications of the Research 
     This section covers implications based on the conclusion discussed above in four 
sections. The first subsection explains cybersecurity defense efficiencies of utilizing the 
CCDF. The second section discusses the practical implications of the CCDF, and the 
third section explains the implications of more actionable frameworks. Finally, the fourth 
section explains contributing factors to the information systems security body of 
knowledge.  
Cybersecurity Defense Efficiencies  
     There is a growing need to understand and identify overarching organizational 
requirements for cybersecurity defense in large organizations.  Applying proper 
cybersecurity defense will ensure that the right capabilities are fielded at the right 
locations to safeguard critical assets while minimizing duplication of effort and taking 
advantage of efficiencies.  Exercising cybersecurity defense without an understanding of 
comprehensive foundational requirements instills unsubstantiated defense tactics and 
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does not capture fundamental organizational requirements.  Organizations must be 
synchronized across federal and civil agencies to achieve adequate cybersecurity defense.  
Understanding what constitutes comprehensive cybersecurity defense will ensure 
organizations are better protected and more efficient.   
     The CCDF provides cybersecurity details that allow CALOs to baseline defense 
capabilities according to use-cases or well-known attack vectors. The CCDF matrix then 
allows the CALO to visually see what capabilities are applied to defend organizations 
based on the seven criteria areas. The capabilities can then be matched to the current tools 
utilized by the CALO. A database of the mapped CCDF allows CALOs to see where gaps 
are in the organization and where there is overlap.  
     Implications of personnel allocation and efforts toward CALO cybersecurity defense 
is a benefit of CCDF use. Organizations traditionally are segregated in their defense 
efforts, more particularly CALOs that facilitated global enterprises. It is not uncommon 
for CALOs to have segregated IT departments with different policies and defense 
mechanisms. The stove-pipped organizational and personnel structures with common 
interests that fall under a broader CALO mission creates inefficiencies (Kelic et al., 2013; 
S. Shackelford & Bohm, 2015; Tisdale, 2015). The CCDF criteria illuminate 
interdependencies of internal and external partners through the NIST RMF and the 
defense in depth mapping of "who" is conducting defense. The CCDF allows CALO 
stakeholders to weigh the cost benefits of having an enterprise or segregated approach to 
cybersecurity defense, based on the comprehensive view of the organization. CALOs 
may find they have analysts defending at the perimeter between two field offices across 
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regional network centers and decide it is a waste of resources. This concept works for 
cyber defense capabilities and ultimately tools used by CALOs as well.  
Practical Implications of the CCDF 
     Practical use of the CCDF will allow validation of this work by CALOs. During the 
stakeholders’ panel, three stakeholders requested the researcher pilot the CCDF in their 
respective organizations. The CCDF is "straight forward" as one stakeholder put it and 
easily understood. Traditional frameworks are not intended to provide a process towards 
active cyber defense but to provide guidance on compliance, risk management, threat 
analysis or certification (Donaldson et al., 2015a). The CCDF provides a mapping of 
several popular frameworks innovatively to better understand cyber defense and leverage 
use out of the more general frameworks. Effective use will provide evidence of the 
CCDF's ability to be applicable regardless of CALO operations. The frameworks utilized 
by the CCDF are already in use independently throughout civilian agencies and industry 
across several operational disciples. Single use of general frameworks such as NIST 
RMF, CKC, and defense in depth is not in question. The mapping of these three 
frameworks to achieve an understanding of CALO comprehensive cybersecurity defense 
is. Further implications should leverage the CCDF's ability to capture capabilities and 
tools to defend CALOs actively. 
     Government CALOs are also challenged with budget constraints, leaving Information 
Technology Acquisitions (ITA) scrutinized (Manifesto, 2013). Senior government leaders 
are aggressively attempting to streamline programs, create efficiencies, and forego 
unnecessary costs for cyber defense. Saving the needed resources and ultimately 
balancing those resources with the associated operational security requirements is 
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difficult to manage if stakeholders are not fully cognizant of the comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense requirements (Hua & Bapna, 2013). For example, the Electrical 
Grid Delayed Hacker Insertion was suspected during the 2011 Honolulu major power 
outage costing millions. Security experts noted that Oahu's power grid system did not 
have adequate fail-safe information protection to avert hacker ownership of the power 
grid, which made it not only difficult to identify the culprit, but made them helpless 
during the event, and post investigation (Haggard & Lindsay, 2015). 
The Case for more Actionable Frameworks 
     Traditional cybersecurity frameworks are not intended to provide a process for cyber 
defenders and stakeholders but a means of standardizing security, risk management, or to 
certify CALOs for operating in some functional regions (Donaldson et al., 2015a). For 
example, HIPPA is required for medical privacy, and PCI DSS is required to certify 
CALOs for credit card security (Donaldson et al., 2015a). The CCDF utilizes the benefits 
of general models like NIST RMF, CKC, and defense in depth by leveraging the 
strengths of these independent frameworks towards a better understanding of cyber 
defense and ultimately, actionable cyber defense practices for CALOs. The literature 
review conducted in this dissertation argues that Cybersecurity frameworks are 
fragmented, vary in effectiveness, and a comprehensive approach is needed (Atoum & 
Otoom, 2016; Atoum et al., 2014; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Donaldson et al., 2015a; 
Tatar et al., 2014; Tisdale, 2015). Donaldson (2015b) contended that mapping several 
popular frameworks could provide a more active means of cybersecurity. This work 
should provide a starting point for new, innovative ways to approach security frameworks 
not only as compliance and certification for CALOs during an annual inspection or to 
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meet security certification requirements but as methodologies to build more 
collaborative, active means of defending CALOs.  
Contributions to the Information Systems Security Body of Knowledge 
     This study involved active participants of expert and stakeholder panel members 
utilizing the Delphi process. A significant contributing factor for this type of study 
potentially closes the gap between academia and practitioners. Additionally, Simon 
(1996) argued that the vigorous eruption of information systems and the dynamic changes 
that occur in this discipline leans towards a more problem focused research methodology. 
Henver et al. (2004) argued that the artifact may enable the solution of an unsolved 
problem by either extending the knowledge base or applying existing knowledge in new 
innovative ways. For this study we applied the existing knowledge of cybersecurity 
frameworks and innovatively mapped the frameworks to address the research problem 
based on a criteria for understanding cyber defense. Henver et al. (2004) contended the 
artifact as the center of design science research. The artifact can be in the form of a 
construct, model, method, or an instantiation. For this work, we developed the CCDF 
artifact.  
Recommendations 
     This section explains areas of future research towards understanding comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense for a large organization. This first subsection addresses future areas 
for CALOs and the second subsection provides areas of future research for the CCDF. 
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Future research for CALOs 
     Kiper (2008) describes "a Company, Agency, or Large Organization" as CALO. 
CALOs facilitate thousands or tens of thousands of personnel in its workforce.  
Kiper (2013) contended CALOs conduct hundreds of more business processes in 
comparison to smaller organizations. In addition, CALOs consist of a diverse workforce 
that may include a multitude of job families, various levels of experience and globally 
located offices, factors that make cybersecurity defense more challenging compared to a 
smaller organization (Kiper, 2008, 2013).  
     The real test of dissertation worthy research, contributing to the community body of 
knowledge must answer three questions: It is true? Is it new? Is it interesting? (Gregor & 
Hevner, 2013). This work entailed a CCDF for better understanding of comprehensive 
cyber defense. Utilizing traditional frameworks in a new, innovative way, we established 
seven criteria for capturing comprehensive cybersecurity defense. Future work must test 
the CCDF in a simulated laboratory or an active CALO to glean potential efficiencies of 
delineating cyber defense resources and defending CALOs.  Additionally, a comparative 
study of the CCDF between two separate and divers CALOs may be beneficial.  
     Future work with a CALO that has foreign offices would also be a good test of the 
CCDF. Applicability and the challenges of foreign cybersecurity standards should be an 
area of future work. Although NIST RMF is inclusive of international frameworks such 
as ISO/IEC 17799/2700, an actual experimental study of the CCDF must entail 
international rigors such as the European Safe Harbor Act. Theoretically, the CCDF 
should work in any organizational atmosphere, but additional future work could entail the 
practices of foreign cyber defenders and stakeholders towards the CCDF. Additionally, a 
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comparative study between the CCDF efficiencies of foreign and US-based CALOs 
would be beneficial.  
Future research for the CCDF 
    The CCDF facilitates understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense, but as 
depicted in Appendix M, mapping capabilities to cyber defense tools was an added 
benefit of the framework.  Future work in developing an enterprise-based automated 
database to capture use-cases, requirements, capabilities, and tools would be beneficial 
and simplify the process for stakeholders. We used a spreadsheet for the mapping 
between the CCDF tasks, roles, and CKC processes.  Finally, CCDF facilitated the 
research gap based on clearly defined criteria of cyber defense and provided opportunities 
for future work towards cyber offense, cyber response and other disciplines defined in 
cyberspace such as offensive cyber operations.  
 
Summary 
     This work addressed the problem of no common framework for clearly understanding 
what constitutes a comprehensive cybersecurity defense for CALOs. This lack of 
understanding causes an inability of current cybersecurity frameworks to sufficiently 
capture comprehensive organizational security requirements. The research argued that 
cybersecurity frameworks are fragmented, vary in effectiveness, and a comprehensive 
approach was needed (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Atoum, Otoom, & Abu Ali, 2014; Dhillon 
& Torkzadeh, 2006; Donaldson, Siegel, Williams, & Aslam, 2015a; Tatar, Çalik, Çelik, 
& Karabacak, 2014; Tisdale, 2015). Traditional cybersecurity frameworks created for 
specific functions often generalize cybersecurity. Frameworks such as NIST 800-30 and 
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ISO/IEC 2700 are used to ensure more effective cybersecurity, but optimal cyber defense 
is difficult to achieve without a clear understanding of what comprehensive cybersecurity 
defense is (Vijayan, 2017). Most technical cybersecurity solutions fail to consider cost, 
operational tradeoffs, and the ability of adversaries to adapt to vulnerabilities. 
     The goal of this work was the development of a Comprehensive Cybersecurity 
Defense Framework (CCDF) artifact to address the lack of understanding comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense for companies, agencies or large organizations (CALOs). We 
specifically addressed CALOs in this research as organizations with thousands of 
employees, and in some cases, international dependencies incur unique challenges in 
cybersecurity defense. CALOs incur diverse cybersecurity defensive operational needs 
for several reasons. CALOs rely heavily on outside associated or international agencies, 
which introduces security risks. Additionally, the size of CALO organizations incurs 
trusts and interdependency with similar and smaller organizations, introducing even more 
security risks (Kiper, 2008). Asti (2017) argued that small and medium-sized 
organizations face different challenges than CALOs. Asti (2017) explained that merely 
due to the size and scope of CALOs cybersecurity defense is more critical to 
stakeholders. Kiper (2013) contended CALOs conduct hundreds of more business 
processes in comparison to smaller organizations, which is salient to cybersecurity 
defense criticality. Also, CALOs often manage smaller organizations that may have 
different operational functions. Challenges often arise when CALO statues, regulatory 
guidelines, and operation procedures do not capture comprehensive cybersecurity defense 
requirements for subordinate organizations (Kiper, 2013). Finally, CALOs consist of a 
diverse workforce that may include a multitude of job families, various levels of 
129 
 
 
 
 
experience and globally located offices, factors that make cybersecurity defense more 
challenging compared to a smaller organization (Kiper, 2008, 2013). Three research 
questions were posited to address the problem: 
1. What criteria does the CCDF artifact have to meet to be considered a comprehensive 
defensive cybersecurity framework for CALOs?  
2. In what ways does the CCDF meet the established criteria for a comprehensive 
defensive cybersecurity framework for CALOs?  
3. What future areas of research may be explored in understanding a more comprehensive 
approach to cybersecurity defense? 
     A systemic literature review was conducted to identify the gaps in a comprehensive 
approach to cybersecurity defense for CALOs. Through the literature review, a table of 
prominent frameworks was created for consideration by an expert panel utilizing the 
Delphi Technique. Following the literature review, a content analysis was conducted to 
analyze the existence and frequency of concepts in the research to construct the 
foundational recommended activities and questions to serve as a criteria set for an expert 
panel. The researcher utilized the NVivo analysis tool to conduct critical words to 
research associations.   
     NVivo was utilized to assemble more than 200 research articles. This process allowed 
unstructured data to be compiled, compared, and analyzed in an efficient, non-biased 
manner. Nodes were created based on the research problem, literature review, and word 
frequency. Similar terms were combined based on the analysis, which was further 
validated by the Delphi expert panel. The literature review articles were loaded into the 
NVivo software. Based on the research problem and key-word search results, nine key 
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categories were created.  Behavioral and Human factors associated with cyber defense, 
common lexicon and constructs, cyber policy, cyber threat based on operational 
requirements, defense in depth (virtual and physical factors), cyber roles and 
responsibilities, interdependency, stakeholder buy-off and understanding, and universal 
applicability. Through node comparison, the cyber lexicon and policy nodes were 
combined. Additionally, CALO operational requirements and universal application were 
also combined. The seven remaining categories were then operationalized to present to 
the expert panel for consideration:  
1. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must account for virtual as well as physical 
threat factors.   
2. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must account for all interdependencies of 
outside organizations. 
3. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must use a common lexicon by internal and 
external organizations. 
4. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must apply to all CALOs regardless of 
operation. 
5. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must include behavioral factors of friendly 
and malicious users (trusted insiders and hackers). 
6. Stakeholders must easily understand the comprehensive cybersecurity defense 
framework. 
7. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must identify the roles and responsibilities 
of personnel responsible for defending CALOs. 
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     Utilizing the design science research methodology, an artifact for understanding 
comprehensive cybersecurity was developed. Design science was used as the research 
approach, and developmental research was utilized to develop the CCDF artifact. The 
research was comprised of two panels. The first panel, comprised of experts, completed 
two phases of Delphi rounds. First, to refine the criteria for the CCDF based on the 
literature review and content analysis, and secondly to facilitate the development of the 
CCDF and ensure the prototype met the established criteria. The second panel was 
comprised of cybersecurity stakeholders to evaluate the CCDF developed by the expert 
panel.  
     The expert panel conducted two rounds to develop a criteria list and only one round to 
facilitate the development of the artifact for a comprehensive cybersecurity defense 
model. Based on the information derived from the expert panel during criterion 
development, the researcher developed the artifact through a systems development 
prototyping methodology. A 20-minute narrated presentation explained how to use the 
CCDF to better understand comprehensive cybersecurity defense. The presentation was 
then evaluated by the expert panel during the second phase and was approved in the first 
round for presentation to the stakeholder panel. The revised presentation was 25 minutes. 
Evaluation and consensus that the CCDF prototype met the seven criteria areas were 
concluded in just one round by the Delphi panel of stakeholders. 
     Future research opportunities were presented. One area of future work was to test the 
CCDF in a simulated laboratory or an active CALO to glean potential efficiencies of 
delineating cyber defense resources and defending CALOs.  Conducting a study in a 
foreign country with different cybersecurity policy was presented as a challenging 
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approach to the CCDF. Also automating the CCDF mapping through an SQL database 
was recommended by an expert panelist to study resource efficiencies of the CCDF was 
presented. Finally, a comparative study was also recommended to evaluate the CCDF 
between two separate and divers CALOs.      
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General Informed Consent Form 
NSU Consent to be in a Research Study Entitled 
A Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework for Large Organizations 
 
Who is doing this research study? 
 
College: College of Engineering and Computing   
 
Principal Investigator: Willarvis “Dee” Smith, M.S. Telecommunications, B.S. Workforce 
Education and Development 
 
Faculty Advisor/Dissertation Chair: Dr. Timothy J. Ellis 
 
Co-Investigator(s): None 
 
Site Information: 91-1012 Hoomaalili Street, Ewa Beach HI, 96706 
 
Funding: Unfunded 
 
What is this study about? 
 
The goal of this work is to conduct design research towards development of a Comprehensive 
Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF) to address the lack of understanding comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense in large organization.  This work intends to study understanding what is 
considered comprehensive cybersecurity defense for large organizations and how to meet the 
goals of optimizing the organizational cyber defense environment. Understanding comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense is essential to identify the specific requirements of organizations based on 
mission objectives and to ensure those requirements are meeting cybersecurity needs. Current 
cybersecurity frameworks defending against cyber-attacks are fragmented and vary widely in 
effectiveness. When organizations have a comprehensive oversight, decisions become clearer 
and interdependent stakeholders are aware of what is happening during an attack.   
 
According to research, large organizations lack of understanding comprehensive cybersecurity 
defense not only affects operations but also acquisitions of cyber defense technologies. Large 
organizations often unnecessarily compartmentalize cyber defense along operational funding 
lines, resulting in overlapping defense methodologies. This type of organizational patchwork 
incurs millions and in some cases billions of wasted funding. The operational implications of an 
inadequately defended network in certain federal agencies could affect the safety of military 
members on the battlefield or critical national infrastructures such as power grids, water/sewage, 
and financial institutions. 
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Why are you asking me to be in this research study? 
 
You are being asked to be in this research study because you have at least 10 years of 
experience as an information owner, Chief Information Officer, Senior Executive, General Officer 
or you are an operational stakeholder in your organization of information technology, information 
systems or cyber systems data. This study will include about 10 people.  
 
 
What will I be doing if I agree to be in this research study? 
 
You will be agreeing to participate in a 10-member expert panel. You will be evaluating the CCDF 
prototype. The effort will take about an hour a week for six weeks. All of the work can be done 
from your home or office. It will not be necessary to attend meetings in person. Anonymity of all 
team members will be strictly adhered to and interaction between team members will be 
coordinated through me.   
 
Team members will receive the following for artifact development:  
• A CCDF prototype model based on the criterion developed during the first rounds of team 
interaction.  
• A brief description of the model and instructions on its use. 
• A Questionnaire about the prototype grading the model and instructions on a scale of 1 to 
5 with comments. 
 
     The prototype will be graded on a scale from 1 to 5 (4 or better on a scale of 1 to 5 is required 
for consensus and no single score may be less than 2). Team members may make comments. 
 
    Each team member will complete the questionnaire pertaining to the CCDF prototype and 
return it to the researcher in one week. 
 
     The researcher will review all of the comments and prepare a matrix that includes all of the 
comments by question. Additionally, the researcher will act on the comments and revises the 
prototype.  
 
Round 2 
 
Prior to Round 2 each participant will receive the following:  
• The Matrix that shows by call sign all of the comments each team member made. The 
purpose of this matrix is to show each team member his or her comments were noted 
and action was taken. Members with similar comments will be color-coded.  
• A revised CCDF prototype based on team feedback.  
• Questionnaire about the prototype.  
      
The team members will evaluate the artifact and be allowed to change any previous comments 
based on the feedback from other experts.  Within one week, the team members will return the 
comments and questionnaire.  
 
The researcher will review all comments and complete a new comment matrix and revised 
prototype and instructions.  
 
Additional rounds 
 
Round 3 proceeds in the same way as Round 2. Team members will take the prototype and 
answer the questionnaire rating from 1 to 5. Consensus is reached when all team members rate 
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all the criteria 4 or 5. The process will end after five rounds to respect the time of team members. 
At this point, the process is completed.  
 
Are there possible risks and discomforts to me?  
 
The risks to you are minimal. It is possible that someone other than the principle investigator (PI) 
could see your name and answers compromising your confidentiality. In order to prevent this, the 
researcher will keep the personal information of team member names strictly confidential in 
stand-alone computer. Only the PI will handle correspondence with each team member. If you 
have questions about the research, your research rights, or if you experience an injury because 
of the research please contact Mr. Willarvis "Dee" Smith at (808) 859-0348. You may also contact 
the IRB at the numbers indicated above with questions about your research rights. 
 
What happens if I do not want to be in this research study?  
 
You have the right to leave this research study at any time or refuse to be in it. If you decide to 
leave or you do not want to be in the study anymore, you will not get any penalty or lose any 
services you have a right to get.  If you choose to stop being in the study before it is over, any 
information about you that was collected before the date you leave the study will be kept in the 
research records for 36 months from the end of the study and may be used as a part of the 
research.  
 
What if there is new information learned during the study that may affect my decision to 
remain in the study? 
 
If significant new information relating to the study becomes available, which may relate to whether 
you want to remain in this study, this information will be given to you by the investigators. You 
may be asked to sign a new Informed Consent Form, if the information is given to you after you 
have joined the study. 
 
Are there any benefits for taking part in this research study?  
 
There are no direct benefits from being in this research study. We hope the information learned 
from this study will contribute to the body of knowledge of information security. 
 
Will I be paid or be given compensation for being in the study?  
 
You will not be given any payments or compensation for being in this research study. 
 
Will it cost me anything? 
 
There are no costs to you for being in this research study. 
 
How will you keep my information private? 
 
Information we learn about you in this research study will be handled in a confidential manner, 
within the limits of the law and will be limited to people who have a need to review this 
information. The questionnaire will not ask you for any information that could be linked to you. 
The materials will be kept in a safe place and participant names will be separated from the 
study documentation. The records containing your names will be destroyed (deleted) 36 months 
after the study ends. It is required to maintain study records for three years after the 
study ends. All information obtained in this study is strictly confidential unless disclosure is 
required by law. Dr. Ellis, the IRB or regulatory agencies may also review research records. 
This data will be available to the researcher, the Institutional Review Board and other 
representatives of this institution, and any regulatory and granting agencies (if 
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applicable). If we publish the results of the study in a scientific journal or book, we will 
not identify you. All confidential data will be kept securely on a stand-alone computer.  
 
Whom can I contact if I have questions, concerns, comments, or complaints? 
 
If you have questions now, feel free to ask us.  If you have more questions about the research, 
your research rights, or have a research-related injury, please contact: 
 
Primary contact: 
Willarvis “Dee” Smith, M.S. Telecommunications can be reached at 808-859-0348. 
 
If primary is not available, contact: 
Dr. Timothy J. Ellis can be reached at 954-663-8463 
 
Research Participants Rights 
For questions/concerns regarding your research rights, please contact: 
 
Institutional Review Board 
Nova Southeastern University 
(954) 262-5369 / Toll Free: 1-866-499-0790 
IRB@nova.edu 
 
You may also visit the NSU IRB website at www.nova.edu/irb/information-for-research-
participants for further information regarding your rights as a research participant. 
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Appendix B 
 
Invitation to Participate in Delphi Procedure 
 
Dear _______________________, 
 
     This is a written invitation to participate on an expert panel known as a Delphi team. 
As part of my doctoral dissertation at Nova Southeastern University, I am forming this 
team to gain expert counsel to develop a criterion and create a framework for 
understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense. The goal of this work is to address 
the lack of understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense for large organizations. 
This research first requires experts to agree on a criterion of comprehensive cybersecurity 
defense as well as support the design of a framework that allows a separate panel of 
cybersecurity stakeholders to easily understand a comprehensive approach.  
 
     The effort will take about an hour a week for six weeks. All of the work can be done 
from your home or office. It will not be necessary to attend meetings in person. 
Anonymity of all team members will be strictly adhered to and interaction between team 
members will be coordinated through me.  
 
Prior to beginning the work, you will be provided: 
 
• A one-page description of the research problem 
• A description of the Delphi team process 
• A matrix of major cybersecurity frameworks (limitations, pros, and cons)  
• A preliminary criterion for understanding comprehensive framework based on 
literature review and content analysis 
 
     According to research, large organizations lack of understanding comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense not only affects operations but also acquisitions of cyber defense 
technologies. CALOs often unnecessarily compartmentalize cyber defense along 
operational funding lines, resulting in overlapping defense methodologies. This type of 
organizational patchwork incurs millions and in some cases billions of wasted funding. 
The operational implications of an inadequately defended network in certain federal 
agencies could affect the safety of military members on the battlefield or critical national 
infrastructures such as power grids, water/sewage, and financial institutions. Your 
contribution to this work could lead to future innovations in cybersecurity defense for 
large civil and federal organizations.  
 
Thanks in advance for your support! 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Willarvis “Dee” Smith 
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Appendix C 
 
Research Description for Delphi Team Members 
 
Problem 
 
     There is no common framework for clearly understanding what constitutes 
comprehensive cybersecurity defense for large organizations. This lack of understanding 
causes an inability of current cybersecurity frameworks to sufficiently capture 
comprehensive organizational security requirements. Cybersecurity frameworks are 
fragmented, vary in effectiveness, and a comprehensive approach is needed. 
 
Premise 
 
     Defending organizations from cyber incidents is more challenging than ever, 
particularly for large organizations. Currently, no “comprehensive” cybersecurity 
requirements are imposed on the entire US critical infrastructure. Cybersecurity 
regulations do exist for specific sectors, leaving the status quo a complicated patchwork 
of often ambiguous state and federal regulations overlaying applicable common 
doctrines. The proposed study does not intend to solve obligatory cybersecurity for the 
entire US but more specifically, improve understanding of the multi-varied cybersecurity 
defense requirements for large civil and government organizations. Traditional 
frameworks do not address the interdependency of external organizations, psychological, 
social, and associated risks. A better understanding of what is a comprehensive cyber 
defense is needed. 
     Based on the peer-reviewed research, there are many general frameworks and security 
processes in use to date. Although beneficial, they do not address what constitutes 
comprehensive organizational cybersecurity defense. Most frameworks address general 
control, certification, and compliance for organizations without consideration to the 
scope, size and operational context of cybersecurity defense. With your help, we will 
explore what exactly is “comprehensive” cybersecurity defense and create a model 
simple enough for information owners and stakeholders to grasp associated cybersecurity 
defense objectives.  
 
Goal of this Research 
 
     The goal of this work is to develop a Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense 
Framework (CCDF) artifact to address the lack of understanding comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense for companies, agencies and large organizations (CALOs). 
 
Delphi Informed Consent Statement 
 
     You are invited to participate in a research study to define a criterion and facilitate the 
creation of a CCDF artifact. You have been selected because of your unique experience 
in cybersecurity defense and leadership credentials. There will be no audio or video 
recording for this study and your information (email, phone number and other contact 
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information) will remain private. You have the right to leave this study at any time or 
refuse to participate. If you decide to leave or not to participate, you will not experience 
any penalty. Please respond to this email that you concur/non-concur to be a part of this 
study. 
 
Thank you for support and time. 
 
Sincerely 
 
 
 
Willarvis “Dee” Smith 
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Appendix D 
 
Delphi Team Process 
 
Overview 
 
     Your help is needed to develop a criteria set for understanding comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense and developing a model that allows information stakeholders the 
ability to grasp cybersecurity defense in their organizations. The Delphi technique 
research is focused on the use of expert opinion to obtain the most reliable consensus. 
Consensus will be obtained by a series of questionnaires interspersed with controlled 
opinion feedback. Team members never assemble nor do they know the identity of the 
other members of the group. After receiving the decision-making task, members will 
develop their own solutions to the problem.  
 
     The Delphi Process is divided into rounds. The rounds will first include development 
of the criterion, followed by development of the artifact based on the established criterion 
agreed upon by panel members. Prior to each round team members will receive 
information to begin consensus building. After the information has been evaluated, team 
members will return feedback in the form of a completed questionnaire. Consensus will 
be achieved when an average rating from all team members for each question is 4 or 
better on a scale of 1 to 5 and no single score less than 2. Once consensus is achieved, the 
process is completed.  
 
     Each team member will fill out the questionnaire about the criteria and return it to the 
researcher. Once the criteria for understanding comprehensive cybersecurity consensus is 
obtained, the researcher will develop a model based on the criteria and an additional 
questionnaire will be distributed to team members for consensus of the model (CCDF 
artifact).  
 
Round One 
 
 Prior to round one each team participant will receive the following for criterion 
development: 
• A brief description of the research. 
• Delphi team process 
• Table of major current cybersecurity framework based on peer-reviewed research 
• Draft criteria based on the peer-reviewed research 
• Questionnaire about the criterion with comments. 
• A call sign for each of the team members which may be based on the International 
Maritime Organization (Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, etc.) or voluntarily selected by each 
team member. Call sign will be communicated via email.  
 
          Each team member will complete the questionnaire pertaining to the criterion for 
understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense, add appropriate comments, and 
return it to the researcher in one week. 
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     The researcher will review all of the comments and prepare a matrix that includes all 
of the comments from panel members by question. Additionally, the researcher will act 
on the comments and revise the criterion.  
 
Round 2 
 
Prior to Round 2 each participant will receive the following:  
• The Matrix that shows by call sign all of the comments each team member made. The 
purpose of this matrix is to show each team member that his or her comments were 
noted and action was taken. 
• Draft criteria for understanding cybersecurity defense based on panel member 
feedback. 
• Questionnaire about the criteria. The criteria will be rated 1 to 5, with 1 meaning 
“Least Effective”, 2 meaning “Slightly Effective”, 3 meaning “Effective”, 4 meaning 
“Highly Effective”, and 5 meaning “Most Effective”. 
  
     The team members will evaluate the criteria and be allowed to change any previous 
comments based on the feedback from other experts.  Within one week, the team 
members will return the comments and questionnaire. The researcher will review all 
comments, completes a new comment matrix, and revises the criteria.  
 
Additional rounds 
 
     Round 3 proceeds in the same way as Round 2. Team members will take the criteria 
and answers the questionnaire rating from 1 to 5. Consensus will be reached when all 
team members rate all the criteria 4 or 5. The process will end after five rounds to respect 
the time of team members. At this point, the process is completed.  
 
Artifact Consensus Rounds 
 
     Once team members develop the artifact criterion, development of the artifact (CCDF) 
consensus building will begin. 
 
Round 1 
 
Prior to Round 1, team members will receive the following for artifact development:  
• A CCDF prototype model based on the criterion developed during the first rounds of 
team interaction.  
• A brief description of the model and instructions on its use. 
• A Questionnaire about the prototype grading the model and instructions on a scale of 
1 to 5 with comments. 
 
     The prototype will be graded on a scale from 1 to 5 (4 or better on a scale of 1 to 5 is 
required for consensus and no single score may be less than 2). Team members may 
make comments. 
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    Each team member will complete the questionnaire pertaining to the CCDF prototype 
and return it to the researcher in one week. 
 
     The researcher will review all of the comments and prepare a matrix that includes all 
of the comments by question. Additionally, the researcher will act on the comments and 
revises the prototype.  
 
Round 2 
 
Prior to Round 2 each participant will receive the following:  
• The Matrix that shows by call sign all of the comments each team member made. The 
purpose of this matrix is to show each team member his or her comments were noted 
and action was taken. Members with similar comments will be color-coded.  
• A revised CCDF prototype based on team feedback.  
• Questionnaire about the prototype.  
 
     The team members will evaluate the artifact and be allowed to change any previous 
comments based on the feedback from other experts.  Within one week, the team 
members will return the comments and questionnaire.  
 
  The researcher will reviews all comments and complete a new comment matrix and 
revised prototype and instructions.  
 
Additional rounds 
 
     Round 3 proceeds in the same way as Round 2. Team members will take the prototype 
and answer the questionnaire rating from 1 to 5. Consensus is reached when all team 
members rate all the criteria 4 or 5. The process will end after five rounds to respect the 
time of team members. At this point, the process is completed.  
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Appendix E 
 
Criteria for Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Round 1 
 
1. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must account for virtual as well as physical 
threat factors.   
2. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must account for all interdependencies of 
outside organizations. 
3. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must use a common lexicon by internal and 
external organizations. 
4. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must be applicable to all CALOs regardless of 
operation. 
5. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must include behavioral factors of friendly and 
malicious users (trusted insiders and hackers). 
6. Stakeholders must easily understand the comprehensive cybersecurity defense 
framework. 
7. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must identify roles and responsibilities of 
personnel responsible for defending CALOs. 
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Appendix F  
 
Content Analysis Sample 
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Appendix G 
 
Delphi Panel Scoring and Comment Matrix Sample 
 
 
LE SE E HE E
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
6.Stakeholders must easily 
understand 
comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense.
7. The CCDF must identify 
roles and responsibilities 
of personnel responsible 
for defending CALOs.
4. Comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense 
must be applicable to all 
CALOs regardless of 
operation.
5. Comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense 
must include behavioral 
factors of friendly and 
malicious users (trusted 
insiders and hackers).
2. Comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense 
must account for all 
interdependencies of 
outside organizations.
3. Comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense 
must use a common 
lexicon by internal and 
external organizations.
First round 
Avg.
1. Comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense 
must account for virtual 
as well as physical rick 
factors.
Criteria Respondent Round 1 Rating
Respondent Comments
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Appendix H 
 
Delphi Panel Scoring and Comment Response Matrix Sample 
 
 
 
LE SE E HE E
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
6.Stakeholders must easily 
understand 
comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense.
7. The CCDF must identify 
roles and responsibilities 
of personnel responsible 
for defending CALOs.
4. Comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense 
must be applicable to all 
CALOs regardless of 
operation.
5. Comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense 
must include behavioral 
factors of friendly and 
malicious users (trusted 
insiders and hackers).
2. Comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense 
must account for all 
interdependencies of 
outside organizations.
3. Comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense 
must use a common 
lexicon by internal and 
external organizations.
First round 
Avg.
1. Comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense 
must account for virtual 
as well as physical rick 
factors.
Respondent Comments
Criteria Respondent Round 1 Rating
Facilitator Comments
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Appendix I 
 
Proposed CCDF Artifact Based on the Criteria 
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Appendix J 
 
Feedback on the CCDF Prototype Matrix Sample (see the matrix for 
following rounds 2, 3 et al.) 
 
 
LE SE E HE E LE SE E HE E
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Juliette
6.Stakeholders must easily 
understand 
comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense.
7. The CCDF must identify 
roles and responsibilities 
of personnel responsible 
for defending CALOs.
4. Comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense 
must be applicable to all 
CALOs regardless of 
operation.
5. Comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense 
must include behavioral 
factors of friendly and 
malicious users (trusted 
insiders and hackers).
2. Comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense 
must account for all 
interdependencies of 
outside organizations.
3. Comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense 
must use a common 
lexicon by internal and 
external organizations.
 Avg.
Remarks
1. Comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense 
must account for virtual 
as well as physical rick 
factors.
Respondent 
Comments
Round 1 RatingCriteria Respondent Round 1 Rating
Facilitator 
Comments
149 
 
 
 
 
Appendix K 
 
Copyright Approval for ISO/IEC 17799 Diagram 
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Appendix L 
Copyright Approval for Defense in Depth Model 
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Appendix M  
 
CCDF Artifact Demonstration 
 
 
Slide 1 
 
 
Hello panel members! 
I’m Dee Smith and I am pleased to introduce you all to phase 2 of our work in 
building a more comprehensive approach to cyber defense and understanding of 
what comprehensive cyber defense is. 
  
Before we even get started let me say how please I am to be working with all of 
you from across the federal government, academia, and industry. This is truly a 
diverse, very qualified and committed group of professional. 
  
I truly thank all of you for your efforts and I’m excited to be a part of this team. 
Now, without further delay…Let’s get into it. 
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Slide 2 
 
 
We are first going to briefly go over the problem. You all have seen this in the 
preliminary information I provided you in Phase 1 but its always a good idea to 
keep everyone focused on what we are trying to achieve. There is a lot of 
brainpower in our group and we could solve a lot of the variables in cyber 
defense. Unfortunately, we don’t have a lot of time and I’d really like to graduate 
this year so I’m going to make sure we stay focused. 
  
Next, we’ll go over the goal of the research, again discussed and provided in the 
preliminary documents.  
  
Then we will get into the research questions, one of which we just finished by 
establishing a criteria for our framework. 
  
We’ll go over the seven criteria areas and the ratings achieved in phase 1 
  
I’ll talk briefly about the many frameworks currently in existence which is part of 
the problem we have a convoluted approach to getting at comprehensive cyber 
defense. If you remember I provided a matrix of frameworks that discuss the 
many frameworks in existence. You can refer to that spreadsheet anytime. 
  
I’ll get into the prototype and provide a walkthrough of how it is used as well. 
  
Finally, you can always shoot me a message if you have questions about this 
presentation or the work we are doing in general. 
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And lastly it will be time to vote on the prototype. The same rules apply as in 
Phase one to move our work the next phase of stakeholders panel. 
 
 
Slide 3 
 
 
He is the problem again.  
  
Remember we are not trying to solve overall cyber defense, just cyber defense in 
large organizations also known as CALOs 
  
When we think of CALOs, it’s important to remember that many are global 
organizations with different functions like productions, logistics, advertising, 
public affairs etcetera. 
  
Many of them have segregated enclaves, operate in foreign countries, and rarely 
communicate. This make comprehensive defense challenged but vital. 
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Slide 4 
 
For the goal, we should remember to stay focused on “understanding” 
comprehensive cybersecurity defense. 
Our framework will help not only stakeholders but defenders better understand 
what, who, where and how they should defend organizations. I say better 
because there will be improvements to our work after my dissertation. As a 
matter of fact, I’d be willing to work with experts and scholars to continue this 
work 
 
Slide 5
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We have completed research question number one during phase 1 of our Delphi 
rounds. For phase 2, we will be focused specifically on determining in what ways 
does the CCDF prototype meet the criteria based on your expert opinion. We 
should remember that research says that current frameworks are segmented and 
does not meet the needs of CALOs comprehensive cyber defense. I will also ask 
how can the framework be improved but please remember our timeline. 
 
Slide 6 
 
 
 
Here are the seven approved criteria areas: 
The Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF) must account 
for virtual as well as physical threat factors.  
The CCDF must account for inter-dependencies of outside organizations.  
The CCDF must use a common lexicon by internal and external organizations.  
The CCDF should be applicable regardless of organizational operations.  
The CCDF must include behavioral factors of friendly and malicious users 
(trusted insiders and hackers).  
Stakeholders must easily understand the CCDF.  
The CCDF must identify roles and responsibilities of personnel responsible for 
defending CALOs. (4.4) 
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Slide 7 
 
 
Slide 8 
 
 
Myself and a team of experts in the DOD looked at a lot of security frameworks. I 
have conducted research on the many frameworks over the past two years and 
for cyber defense we should ask the following questions: How should it be 
conducted? What should defenders be doing? Where is defense happening? 
And, who is doing the defending? 
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Through these simple questions, we get specifically at not only addressing our 
cretiera, but answering questions about cyber defense requirements, capabilities, 
and tools we use to defend cyber. These are areas that stakeholders can easily 
understand an operationalizes cyber. Now our goal is not to answer the 
requirements, capabilities and tools questions but I make that point because our 
criteria includes stakeholder’s understanding and operational flexibility that are 
both key to making cyber defense comprehensive.   
 
Slide 9 
 
 
We are going to use three major and well known frameworks for our prototype:  
NIST Cybersecurity Framework, Lockheed Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain and Oracle’s 
Defense in Depth Model. The CNSS glossary is a federal government guide used 
by CYBERCOM and the Department of Homeland Security covering Civil and 
Government defense. A CALO can use any lexicon and there are many but the 
CNSS is the most widely used in the US for cyber. Some universities, Nova case 
in point subtribes to CNSS as this university is a CNSS academic center of 
excellence.  
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Slide 10 
 
 
NIST RMF is generally a risk management framework driven by Presidential 
order 13636. Development included more than 3000 individuals from government 
and industry. NIST RMF also includes several certification and compliance 
frameworks (required for government compliance, highly recommended by 
industry).  
 
Slide 11 
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The framework core and categories are identified.  
As you can see, NIST covers general topics for all CALOS; baselining policy, 
asset management and governance are general practices that should be 
conducted by all CALOs. Protect, Detect and Respond core areas are more 
defensive driven yet, the application of these core areas are risk driven in NIST. 
What our framework will do is operationalize these core areas by mapping them 
to more actionable frameworks.  
  
-NIST CFC gets at four of our seven criteria areas: 
  
1. The Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF) must account 
for virtual as well as physical threat factors. 
The Identify asset management category looks at physical and virtual 
accountability in the framework, Protecting identify management looks at who 
has access to make changes to virtual and physical devices in the organization 
2. The CCDF must account for inter-dependencies of outside organizations. 
Supply chain risk management looks at outside interdependencies. For example 
the Huawei Chinese company is a good example of bad organization 
understanding of inter-dependencies which included the DOD. I could tell you 
details but I’d have to kill you after 
3. The CCDF must use a common lexicon by internal and external organizations. 
As stated before NIST is a mandated framework that includes civil and 
government organizations and drives the CNSS glossary, which is reference in 
the NIST guidance serval times. 
4. The CCDF should be applicable regardless of organizational operations. 
As stated in the NIST guide “The framework can be used in various sized 
organizations regardless of size, degree of cybersecurity risk, or cybersecurity 
sophistication – to apply the principles and best practices of risk management to 
improving the security and resilience of critical infrastructure. The Framework 
provides organization and structure to today’s multiple approaches to 
cybersecurity by assembling standards, guidelines, and practices that are 
working effectively in industry today. Moreover, because it references globally 
recognized standards for cybersecurity, the Framework can also be used by 
organizations located outside the United States and can serve as a model for 
international cooperation on strengthening critical infrastructure cybersecurity.” 
* NOTE * NIST also accounts for user-awareness and training which is part of 
criterion #5 “The CCDF must include behavioral factors of friendly and malicious 
users (trusted insiders and hackers).” 
  
“The Framework is not a one-size-fits-all approach to managing cybersecurity 
risk for critical infrastructure. Organizations will continue to have unique risks – 
different threats, different vulnerabilities, different risk tolerances – and how they 
implement the practices in the Framework will vary.” (Charllette, 2013) 
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Our framework will target the core NIST disciplines into an approach to 
Comprehensive cyber defense for organizations 
 
Slide 12 
 
 
 
 
Lockheed Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain is one of those more actionable frameworks. 
  
The CKC looks at behaviors of attackers. And I use term hackers loosely as 
some friendly insiders participate in malicious hacks through remote access tools 
(RAT), social engineering, phishing etc.  
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Slide 13 
 
 
The CKS addressed criterion 4 and 5  
  
***NOTE*** Read, each of the CKC steps 
 
4. The CCDF should be applicable regardless of organizational operations. 
Since the framework focuses on TTP behaviors of actions towards CALOs, this 
general approach can be used on all organizations. 
Research claims that most defenders and analyst are currently using the cyber 
kill chain. Again, DOD, DHS and all US intel agencies live by this framework. 
5. The CCDF must include behavioral factors of friendly and malicious users 
(trusted insiders and hackers). 
The actual reason the CKC was created was to better understand advance 
persistent threats (APT) but the framework detects friendly anomalies such as 
scripts, etc. from insider friendly users.  
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Slide 14 
 
 
Now let’s look at where we defend, were going to use the defense in depth model 
to do that.  
One of the fundamental philosophies of security is the defense in depth model; 
overlapping systems designed to provide security even if one of them fails. An 
example is a firewall coupled with an intrusion-detection system (IDS). Defense 
in depth provides security because there's no single point of failure and no single 
assumed vector for attacks. Also known as the Castle Approach, security controls 
are placed throughout an information technology (IT) system. The idea behind 
the defense in depth approach is to defend a system against any particular attack 
using several physical and virtual independent methods. This tactic was 
conceived by the National Security Agency (NSA) as a comprehensive approach 
to information and electronic security. Defense in depth does not address 
operational levels found in the ISO framework as well as social and behavioral 
aspects of cybersecurity.   
  
Now let’s take a closer look at the Defense in depth model. The top layer also 
known as the data layer is where we conduct data security, Content security, 
Message level security and information rights management. The application layer 
is where federation or identify management, triple A and coding practices are 
defended. At endpoint or host layer, we have the operating systems, desktop 
protection, and patching. The internal network and perimeter layer share the 
same items but they are distinctly different layers: transport layer security, 
firewalls, network address translation, denial of service, messaging parsing and 
validation both sit at the internal network and perimeter layer but those resources 
are used differently in their respective layers since they are at different defense 
levels. Your internal network may contain local area network, VLANS, internal 
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firewalls, and access switches with provide connection to core services such as 
email and file servers while the perimeter layer contains Aggregate equipment 
that allows or denies external traffic from sources outside your organization. A 
good example would be external or gateway routers, gateway firewalls, and other 
devices that may connect with an outside service provider. Enterprise network 
defense is primarily conducted at this layer. The distinction between the internal 
and perimeter layers are very important as they identify the internal network and 
outside interdependencies. This is one of our CALO criteria’s. The physical layer 
is not traditionally an IS function as fences, walls, guards, locks, and facility 
access control fall under facility management and physical security. Although, this 
should be considered part of “comprehensive” cybersecurity defense. A comm 
closet, generator, or any device connected to CALO cyber resources are part of 
CALO risk management and prone to cyber threats.  
 
Slide 15 
 
The Committee on National Security Systems is a United States 
intergovernmental organization that sets policy for the security of the US security 
systems. 
  
he CNSS holds discussions of policy issues, sets national policy, directions, 
operational procedures, and guidance for the information systems operated by 
the U.S. Government, its contractors or agents that either contain classified 
information, involve intelligence activities, involve cryptographic activities related 
to national security. 
  
The bottom line: the CNSS provides a baseline language for various parts of 
CALO roles, functions, and cyber language so everyone on the same page. 
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Slide 16 
 
We’ll first start with the core concepts contained in the NIST CCF as the tasks we 
are trying to accomplish to defend our CALO. Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond 
and Recover.  
 
Slide 17 
 
 
We then add the what we will be defending in the Cyber Kill Chain. 
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Slide 18 
 
 
We then map what we are defending to specific layers in our organization. This 
explains “where” we are conducting defense. 
 
Slide 19 
 
 
 Finally, we add the roles of who will be responsible for defending organizations 
at each particular layer. It’s important to note that several roles do and should 
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overlap as security is everyone role but not everyone will have access or 
privileges to conduct certain defense measure.  
  
As you can see, we should achieve criterion #6 by creating a framework that is 
relatively simple for stakeholders and defenders alike to understand.  
  
Hopefully, I will convince you all that this framework exceeds or criterion in this 
walkthrough of the prototype. 
  
Although, I welcome your comments and suggestions. 
 
Slide 20 
 
As we build out our framework, I’ll sample the overall framework by explaining 
the Detect task, but all the core disciplines map concurrently in the same manner 
to collect comprehensive cyber defense requirements. We will then validate 
those requirements based on use cases, apply capabilities to those validated 
requirements and ultimately tools to those capabilities.  
  
So, first we apply a role in our framework. For this walkthrough, we will apply the 
most viable in cyber defense, Users, administrators and analysts. Mission 
owners and engineers of course have roles as well but limiting this demonstration 
to these three will keep this demonstration simple and provide all experts enough 
information to assess the framework.  
  
First we map that users, administrators and analysts conduct the task of 
detection.  
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Slide 21 
 
As we build into the framework, users, administrators and analysts detect 
reconnaissance. 
 
Slide 22 
 
Building out even further, users, administrators, and analysts detect 
reconnaissance at the physical, perimeter, internal network, and endpoint layers.  
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Slide 23 
 
 
A fully messed framework collects requirements across the board, hence it’s 
comprehensive. The detect task is repeated for each phase in the cyber kill chain 
to each layer in the defense in depth model.  
 
This process is then repeated. Each role is matched to each NIST task, then to 
each cyber kill chain level and each defense in depth layer.  
 
BUT. We have to scale this back to get explicit CCDF requirements for each 
particular CALO. We’ll get to that in a few minutes.  
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Slide 24 
 
Here is a spreadsheet of the general requirements derived in the matrix. This 
notional spreadsheet, only shows the users, administrators and analysts’ roles 
but I think you get the point.  
 
If you notice, the spreadsheet is fully populated and not validated yet so some of 
the tasks would appear sporadic at first glance.  
 
For example, users would not detect reconnaissance at the perimeter layer of an 
organization but network administrators would. 
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Slide 25 
 
Use cases are pulled from trouble management systems and/or reporting 
methods based on CALOs daily operations.  They are basically the roles we do 
every day. 
 
By gleaning the use-cases with the generic requirements of the framework more 
explicit requirements are derived based on CALOs operational needs. This 
provides a better understanding of comprehensive requirements. It also points 
out where critical requirements are being met and were requirements overlap 
based on roles and whether or not you have capabilities to meet defensive 
measures.  
  
Please remember these are notional and CALO based. Although some 
administrators may not have a requirement to detect weaponization at the 
applications layer, users may. The key point is CALOs and see where they are in 
defending and if they need to address a gap if no role is assigned to a defense 
requirement or address an overlap that wastes resources.   
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Slide 26 
 
As I explained in the previous slide, based on CALO validated requirements 
exclude erroneous requirements.  
 
Slide 27 
 
Now that we have validated requirements, we add the capabilities to those 
requirements.  
  
We now see what we need to carry out in each defense tactic. We also see what 
we don’t need. This is where a lot of overspending in CALOs can be addressed. 
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Slide 28 
 
Now that we have the required capabilities derived from validated requirements 
and use cases, we can begin to see what specific tools we are using or not using 
to defend our CALO. 
 
Slide 29 
 
I didn’t include the tools name since defenders get nervous about classification 
although this information again is notional, I don’t want to put any specific tools 
on blast to highlight any CALO that using them but some common off-the-shelf 
tools like putty, Wireshark, Netcool are a few. Even command line interface can 
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be considered a tool. The key to this framework is you can visually see defense 
in action to clearly understand what tasks are happening, who is doing those 
task, and where are the tasks happening in the network based on friendly or 
adversarial behaviors. This approach is a far cry from simple policy or 
compliance. 
  
By mapping out the CCDF you optimize not only defense but procurement and 
acquisition of cyber defense personnel and equipment resources. You can 
visually see that you may have no one detecting weponization at the perimeter 
and/or you may have the person but it the wrong discipline, or you may have the 
right person with the wrong tool.  
  
This framework was very well received at the Hawaii international Conference on 
System Sciences, getting me a doctoral consortium fellowship. It was also well 
received at the Defense Information Systems Agency, Department of Homeland 
Defense and Cyber Command. The question is…what do you think….. 
  
Thank you, team…Now it’s time to vote! 
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Expert Panel Phase 1 Round 1 Results 
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Appendix O 
 
Expert Panel Phase 1 and Phase 2 Rating and Comment Matrix 
 
 
LE SE E HE E LE SE E HE E
Cyber Alpha X
Although this method is effective, it is only 
effective as the organizations ability to make 
necessary changes within its boundary when 
required. A noted concern is that 
organizations can not control systems 
outside of their control or purview.
True, and they can control 
ports/protocols that are allowed 
access through their own 
boundaries. 
   
X
 
No Change. ADDITIONAL 
COMMENTS:  This is/was 
one of my greatest 
arguments and concerns as a 
Net Defender, how do we 
protect info in the cyber 
domain? I understood that 
we could contain most 
physical threats in a timely 
fashion, but virtual was new 
and presented its own set of 
unique challenges. In the 
end, it's really about 
risk/reward.
Cyber Bravo X
Your argument of current security practices 
based on physical topology is well supported 
based on current cybersecurity 
architectures. However, your argument of 
the threats to virtual networks is not well 
supported. What are the threats impacting 
virtual networks? Why is securing the 
physical network not enough to also secure 
the logical one. You may need to better 
define physical and virtual in the context of 
cybersecurity defense. What is the 
demarcation point between physical and 
logical? This could also help support your 
argument on defense in depth.
I'm finding that the experts are 
using my short research narratives 
to rate the 7 criteria areas for 
understanding CCSD. I'm asking 
network defenders for their expert 
opinion regardless of the research. 
You should rate the seven criteria 
areas based on your expert 
experience not the optional and 
very brief preliminary research. 
You can add your reasoning based 
on your expert opinion. Sorry that 
wasn't clear. My proposal has 60 
pages of research that I would 
rather not bore the experts with. 
X
Moved from Effective (E) to 
Most Effective (ME). Based on 
comments and criteria 
clarification.
Cyber Charlie X  X No change.
Cyber Delta X  X No change.
Cyber Echo X X No change.
Cyber Foxtrot X
A step further is to perform application layer 
inspection of the traffic to ensure it's 
legitimacy.
TRUE
X
No change. Cyber Ice-Man's 
comment about encryption 
made me think about the 
ability to break and inspect 
content (e.g. TLS 1.3). 
The recent FireEye article IRT 
DNS Hijacking siad the 
attackers used Let's Encrypt 
Certificates to reduce the 
risk of detection. 
A final thought on this is 
coud based solutions. The 
low barriers to spin up 
systems in AWS or Azure 
make's it hard to keep track 
of systems and data. 
Cyber Ice-Man X
As effective as the level of encryption and 
dedication that is leveraged at each IAP and 
internal connections.
True, and we are not just talking 
DoD, consider the larger global 
topologies that are tied into the 
DoD. The VPNs that are 
unacounted for because they are 
encrypted. Comprehensive 
Cybersecurity should account for 
the virtual traffic that is part of 
the larger phsyical infastructure. 
That's one point behind this 
criteria. 
X
Changed from Effective (E) 
to Most Effective (ME). 
Working in commercial 
industry has opened my eyes 
WRT how interconnected all 
vendors are. In the DoD only 
so many circuits are 
dedicated in FOUO. VPN is a 
constant management 
challenge. 
Cyber Ironic 
(formerly Cyber 
Golf)
X X
No change.
Cyber Hotel X
Appropriate risk management requires a 
complete understanding of the operational 
terrain, which continues to evolve with 
service-provided infrastructure as well as 
technological advancements in compute, 
data handling, and transmission.
TRUE
X
No change.
Cyber India X
Internal policies are neither virtual or 
physical elements and must be also 
considered.
True! And that is certainly implied 
in this criteria.
X
No Change. I will maintain 
my vote given that some 
people who indicate less 
than 4 did not provided good 
arguments
Remarks First round 
Avg.
Second round 
Avg.
1. The Comprehensive 
Cybersecurity Defense 
Framework (CCDF) must 
account for virtual as well 
as physical threat factors.
4.2 4.5
Criteria Respondent Round 1 Rating
Respondent Comments
Facilitator Comments Updated Rating
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Cyber Alpha
 
X
Inter-dependencies are critical towards the 
successful defense of networks. Moreover, 
organizations must take proactive stances 
and partner with one another in order to 
better secure networks. Also, how we 
protect global systems must be defined and 
how we defend those systems must evolve 
with the current and future threats. 
Additionally, we must become more 
proactive in how we guard these systems 
and ensure that countermeasures are in 
place to prohibit access to our systems
TRUE
X
No Change. ADDITIONAL 
COMMENTS:  Partnership 
and collaboration with 
outside organizations is 
instrumental towards 
successful cyber defense. 
However, understanding the 
requirements of my 
organization and our 
customers was key in 
developing strategic 
alliances. Also, when 
developing these 
partnerships, we met 
periodically with other 
defenders to develop 
standard operating 
procedures to ensure that 
we all were operating 
according to an agreed upon 
standard to protect our 
asset.  
Cyber Bravo X
Not sure that you were able to clearly 
support your argument. The key take away 
is that inter-dependencies with outside 
organizations increases risk to the network 
because not all outside organizations 
execute cybersecurity to the same standard. 
Establishing a common cybersecurity 
standard across the varying organizations 
could improve the overall security posture. 
Hence the need for comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense.
Please rate ths area based on your 
expert experience not the optional 
and very brief preliminary 
research. Sorry that wasn't clear. 
Consider trusts and partnerships 
with service providers and outside 
organizations that are 
interconnected. Are there risks 
associated with 
interdependencies? Are those 
risks salient enough to warrant 
this area as a criteria for 
understanding comprehensive 
cybersecurity. My lit review says it 
is. 
X
Moved from Slightly 
Effective (SE) to Effectuve 
(E). I think this criteria could 
be a little more specific.  It is 
not so much the 
interdependencies with 
outside organizations as it is 
the information exchange 
requirements between 
organizations that must be 
accounted for.  From this 
perspective you can better 
articulate the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability 
requirements providing a 
more comprehensive 
approach to your 
cybersecurity defense 
framework. 
Cyber Charlie X
This section is somewhat amphibious. How 
do you define inter-dependencies? What are 
the factors that contribute to this inter-
dependency work? As a brief description as 
to what the literature say and how you plan 
to facilitate it.
Please rate ths area based on your 
expert experience not the optional 
and very brief preliminary 
research. Sorry that wasn't clear. 
Consider trusts and partnerships 
with service providers and outside 
organizations that are 
interconnected. Are there risks 
associated with these 
interdependencies? Are those 
risks salient enough to warrant 
this area as a criteria for 
understanding comprehensive 
cybersecurity. My lit review says it 
is. 
X
Change Slightly Effecitve 
(SE) to Highly Effective. 
Based on discussion and 
review of comments.
Cyber Delta X X No change.
Cyber Echo X
It's critical to understand not just the 
external interdependencies, but the internal 
interdependencies as well.
I agree!
X
No change.
Cyber Foxtrot X
This reminds me of the 2013 Target breach. 
The initial attack was against Target's 
refrigeration vendor not massive Target 
organization. It exploited that relationship to 
get a foothold and ultimately own 40 million 
Target credit cards.
Thanks for this insight!
X
Changed from Effective (E) 
to Highly Effective (HE). I 
bumped it up because I 
revisited the Mitre ATT&CK 
and it listed trusted 
relationships as under initial 
access. 
https://attack.mitre.org/tech
niques/T1199/ 
Cyber Ice-Man X
It’s relative to know the interdependencies 
and the level of protection 
interdependencies employ to adequately 
protect data.
TRUE
X
No change. See my 
comments on 1. 
Cyber Ironic 
(formerly Cyber 
Golf)
X X
No change.
Cyber Hotel X X No change.
Cyber India X
Certainly, it is required. At the country level 
is easy to implement because it depends on 
the agreement of two parties, nevertheless, 
inter-companies agreements are more 
complicated and costly because it is a big 
investment for two parties, and to gather a 
big number of participants involves 
leadership.
I agree!
X
No change. I maintain my 
decision which is similar to 
the average.
2. The CCDF must account 
for inter-dependencies of 
outside organizations.
3.7 4.1
182 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cyber Alpha  X
How we communicate in the cyber domain 
is crucial for successful defense. A common 
language amongst cyber defenders should 
be developed for proper defense of our 
networks. Additionally, we should partner 
with other civil, federal, and other non-DoD 
entities to develop common operating 
procedures whereby we are communicating 
in effective manners versus non-effective. 
From my experience, much of the time we 
spend with other cyber operators is 
centered upon ensuring that we are saying 
the say thing in a way that we accomplish 
our objectives.
I agree! Thanks for the insight.
X
No Change.
Cyber Bravo X
Agreed, a common lexicon is essential to 
understanding comprehensive cybersecurity 
defense
Thanks!
X
No Change.
Cyber Charlie  X X No change.
Cyber Delta X X No change.
Cyber Echo X X No change.
Cyber Foxtrot X
The context behind cyber lexicon should 
internally driven within an organization or 
vertical.
True, you have to be on the same 
page internally but consider the 
challenges dealing with 
interdependent organizations 
when communicating 
cybersecurity and acting on 
incidents without a common 
language amongsts trusted 
agencies. In addition, creating a 
standard lexicon (such as CNSS) 
provides better collaboration 
among CALOs during an attack. 
Finally, please consider the rating 
and comments of your partner 
experts on this panel. Thanks! 
X
Changed from Least 
Effective (LE) to Effective 
(E). I moved it up one after 
reading CNSS 4009. It's good 
to have but then the S hits 
the F, there will be no 
ambiguity in language or 
lexicon when actions need to 
be taken. DHS dropped its 
first emergency cyber 
directive and there was 
pretty clear. 
Cyber Ice-Man X Yes X No change.
Cyber Ironic 
(formerly Cyber 
Golf)
X X
Changed from Effective (E) 
to Highly Effective (HE).  
Cyber Hotel X
The establishment of a shared 
lexicon/vocabulary enables the accurate 
translation of risk based on relevant context. 
Without commonly defined language, the 
cost for action increases, the effects may not 
align with expectations, and decision making 
overall is less reliable.
I agree!   
X
No change. Additoinal 
comments to Cyber Foxtrot: 
The utilization of a common 
lexicon is not just for the 
benefit of operations 
internally, but the relative 
cost to relating externally. In 
the same way intelligence 
not shared in the context of 
doctrine is weakened and 
arguably no longer 
intelligence, so to is the 
collection of information for 
internal consumption 
wherein different 
taxonomies imply words like 
stage, breach, intrusion, and 
malware are not equal to a 
global instantatiation. 
Ideally, even internal lexicons 
are mapped to global 
frameworks - as it enables 
low-cost adoptions of 
externally created value-add 
products.
Cyber India X
A common lexicon is very important. I agree 
that the easiest way to achieve this goal is to 
collect the understanding and languages of 
SMEs and scale it up to academia and 
regulations. In a down-top approach, the 
minority will have to learn the terms. In a 
top-down approach, the majority will have 
to learn the terms and not always is willing 
to.
The Committee on National 
Security Systems (CNSS) Working 
Group utilized authoritative 
sources to resolve US national 
differences between constructs 
used by the DoD, Intelligence 
Community (IC), and Civil Agencies 
(e.g. NIST), enabling all three to 
use the same glossary. The CNSS 
glossary allows consistent 
terminology in documentation, 
policy, and processes across the 
aforementioned communities. The 
glossary began in 2010 with 29 
references and has grown to 150 
in the current 2017 version 
(Dukes, 2015).
X
Changed from Effective (E) 
to Highly Effective (HE). I 
change my opinion to 4 
because I see that is a good 
average, specifically for 
those who answered with 
comments.
3. The CCDF must use a 
common lexicon by 
internal and external 
organizations.
4 4.4
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Cyber Alpha
  
X
I think this is one of the most critical areas 
that obtains the least amount of support or 
attention. Over the span of my career, I 
noticed that each organizations seemed to 
operating according to their parent 
organization's guidelines (i.e., Air Combat 
Command, Air Force Communications 
Agency, etc). A lack of clear standardization 
makes it extremely difficult to defend the 
networks. As the research indicates above, 
this is not only a problem in governmental 
agencies, but also civilian organizations. 
Developing a set of procedures that would 
serve as the basic requirements for every 
defender would be beneficial for the 
successful defense of networks. Since we all 
use a lot of the same equipment, developing 
guidelines on how to protect these systems 
will allow for a wider array of information 
exchange amongst cyber operators.
I agree! Thanks for the thorough 
insight. This part of my research 
was derived during the content 
analysis. I found that many of the 
general cybersecurity models said 
pretty much the same thing for 
various organizations but were 
difficult for stakeholders to 
impliment and understand . Yes, 
there are specialized CALO 
cybersecurity frameworks based 
on the operations (Health, finance, 
etc.) but these specified 
cybersecurity models failed to  
outline general security practes 
inherit in all enclaves (physical 
architechtur, awareness, etc.). This 
is why I proposed to understand 
comprehensive cybersecurity 
organizations should apply some 
fundamental security practes 
across the board. I made changes 
to the criteria statment in the 
remarks section
X
No change. ADDITIONAL 
COMMENTS:  From my 
experience, every 
stakeholder possessed 
unique requirements. As 
such, we understood that risk 
management was crucial in 
our roles as net defenders. 
For example, the person 
logging in at the gym did not 
require an indepth 
understanding of how to 
login to the network  and 
how to protect physical 
assets. However, individuals 
that were assigned to my 
organization had to not only 
understand the person at the 
gym requirements, they had 
to know how to protect the 
boundary of the entire 
installation and our outside 
stakeholders. To sovle this 
dilema, we had resources 
that enabled us to scale our 
tasks according to our 
customers and their unique 
requirements.
Cyber Bravo X
The initial statement says that 
"cybersecurity defense must apply to all 
CALOs regardless of operation". If this is true 
then operational applicability is not relevant 
to understanding comprehensive 
cybersecurity.
I can try to make this statement 
clearer but the basis of needing a 
comprehensive framework for 
defending CALOs is driven from 
the stovepipped variations of 
defending CALOS which happened 
over time and causes a lot of 
segregated protective measures. 
Based on your expert opinion, do 
you believe that organizations 
that use the same IP, transport, 
end user equipment shouldn't 
share a common understanding of 
what comprehensive defense is?  I 
made changes to the criteria 
statment in the remarks section. 
X
Change from Lease Effective 
(LE) to Most Effective (ME). 
Agreed, a framework should 
be universal and would apply 
to all organizations.
Cyber Charlie X
The question in this section is confusing. You 
speak about cybersecurity defense, but refer 
to operational applicability. You may want 
to change the 'operational applicability' to 
'cybersecurity defense applicability'.
Great suggestion, I will change the 
language. A few other experts 
agree this is a bit confusing.  I 
made changes to the criteria 
statment in the remarks section. 
X
Changed from Slightly (SE) 
Effective to Highly Effective 
(HE). "Comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense should 
be applicable reguarles of 
organizational operations"
Cyber Delta
X
I believe operational applicability guides 
where resources are directed to based on 
prioritized assets, but a comprehensive 
framework provides the baseline to ensure 
overall efforts aren't overlooked.
I made changes to the criteria 
statment in the remarks section. 
X
Changed Effective (E) to 
Highly Effective (HE). Due to 
clarification 
Cyber Echo X
I made changes to the criteria 
statment in the remarks section X
No change.
Cyber Foxtrot X
This section reminds of the quote "All 
models are wrong; some models are useful". 
There isn't a panacea framework, a 
generic/baseline/vanilla framework could be 
used to start, and other more operation 
specific frameworks could be sprinkled on as 
applicable.
Thanks for the insight. This work is 
the build a comprehensive 
cybersecurity defense framework 
but it starts with building a 
criteria. Operational applicability is 
the reason we have so many 
variations of frameworks. The 
question is, can we build a better 
means of understanding 
comprehensive cyber defense 
reguardless of operation. Looking 
at the many various framworks 
developed over time and the 
research it appears we can. Based 
on the criteria, we build a more 
amiable means to getting closer to 
a comprehensive approach.   I 
made changes to the criteria 
statment in the remarks section
X
Changed from Least 
Effective (LE) to Effective 
(E). I moved it up one after 
reading the comment about 
risk. My issue with risk is that 
is often miscalculated. USCC 
has the JRAM but in simple 
terms Risk = threat x vuln x 
impact. The risk value is only 
as accurate as its input. If the 
operational or revenue 
generating organizations 
don't provide impact, you 
won't get Risk right. 
Cyber Ice-Man X
Not all operations are equally sensitive, 
awareness of this allows for leveraging 
resources.
That’s true! I made changes to the 
criteria statment in the remarks 
section
X
No change.
Cyber Ironic 
(formerly Cyber 
Golf)
X
 I made changes to the criteria 
statment in the remarks section X
Changed from Effective (E) 
to Highly Effective (HE). 
Cyber Hotel  X
The identification of risk to an organization 
is directly or indirectly a measure of assuring 
delivery of it's core mission/business 
functions or stakeholder requirements. 
Operational applicability is the mechanism 
within which these functions are executed 
and requirements met, and their 
applicability would be necessary in 
understanding what the comprehensive 
security requirements are for a given CALO.
I agree!  I made changes to the 
criteria statment in the remarks 
section
 X
No change.
Cyber India
X
 I made changes to the criteria 
statment in the remarks section
X
Changed from Highly 
Effective (HE) to Effective 
(E). I change my decision to 3 
based on the average of 
answers and the comments 
made.
4. The CCDF should be 
applicable regardless of 
organizational operations.
3.2 4.2
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Cyber Alpha
 
X
The insider threat is often not thought of 
until something drastic happens (i.e. Edward 
Snowden). However, the insider threat does 
not only happen in the cyber domain, but 
also in the physical domain. Moreover, 
personality profiles are limited in scope 
when trying to ascertain what personality 
types would be susceptible to insider 
threats. Understanding various personalities 
is only one component of understanding 
which personality would succumb to various 
pressures resulting in an insider threat. Also, 
other mechanisms must be in place to 
prevent individuals from having the ability 
to be an agent of insider threat. Most 
literature is often vague as it relates to this 
subject matter and future research on this 
subject matter should take place
Thanks for the insight.  
X
No change. 
Cyber Bravo X
Agreed, human behavior plays a significant 
role in cybersecurity defense.
TRUE
X  
No change. More specifically 
a CCDF must account for all 
types of threats internal and 
external.
Cyber Charlie
X
This section is rather light on support. You 
have a single study to suggest relationship 
and another two to show the impact of old 
frameworks. You need at least a couple of 
studies to support the 'behavioral' factors.
Please  base your response on 
your personal experience. Also, 
see my previous comments and 
those of fellow experts. Thanks! X
Changed from Least 
Effective (LE) to Highly 
Effective (HE). Changed 
based on discussion and 
review of others' comments.
Cyber Delta X X No change.
Cyber Echo X X No change.
Cyber Foxtrot X
MITRE ATT&CK covers initial attack vectors 
but in order to change behavior, you need a 
culture that promotes security AND build 
awareness.
Thanks for the insight!
X  
Changed from Slightly (SE) 
Effective to Effective (E). I 
moved it up but this 
statement is still very 
squishy. As a society we have 
gotten better with 
recognizing these threats but 
the adversary has also gotten 
better. 
Cyber Ice-Man X
User ease of use hasn’t typically been a 
common DoD concern. User awareness DOES 
assist with empowering users to champion 
cyber security on a routine basis.
Thanks for the insight!
X
Changed from Effective (E) 
to Highly Effective (HE). I 
recently participated in a 
targeted phishing test and 
the results after user 
awareness in top ranks for 
Business email compromise 
proved an increase in 72% in 
users not falling victim  
Cyber Ironic 
(formerly Cyber 
Golf)
X X
No change.
Cyber Hotel X X No change.
Cyber India
X
I think this is the most important factor. 
There are people that will never try to attack 
and other that will try in every case.
Thanks for the insight! Its 
extermetly important to 
understand what the behaviors 
are to properly defend against 
them. 
X
Changed from Most 
Effective (ME) to Highly 
Effective (HE). I change my 
vote to 4 based on the other 
opinions and because the 
average is closer to 4 than to 
my initial opinion.
5. The CCDF must include 
behavioral factors of 
friendly and malicious 
users (trusted insiders and 
hackers).
3.6 4
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Cyber Alpha X
No further comments as you clearly 
articulated that in order to benefit from a 
united cyber force, all parties must work 
together. Moreover, stakeholders are 
integral in the development of processes 
that will assist in adequately defending their 
networks as well as funding future 
endeavors.
Thanks
X
No change. 
Cyber Bravo X
Agreed, understanding is essential in 
supporting a comprehensive cyber defense 
capability.
Thanks
X
Moved from Highly 
Effective (ME) to Most 
Effective (ME). Yes, the 
CCDF must be easily 
understandable to senior 
leaders to facilitate decisions 
making and risk acceptance.
Cyber Charlie X X No change.
Cyber Delta X X No change.
Cyber Echo X X No change.
Cyber Foxtrot X
This needs to be driven from the top. The 
White House Cyber Czar would author the 
policy that drive the strategy across 
organizations.
I agree!
X
No change.
Cyber Ice-Man X X No change.
Cyber Ironic 
(formerly Cyber 
Golf)
X X
Changed from Highly 
Effective (HE) to Most 
Effective (ME).  
Cyber Hotel X
CALOs and small to medium sized 
organizations play a role in the posture of 
the defense of each other (re: inter-
dependency). 2018 saw a continuation and 
escalation of the trend wherein trusted 3rd 
parties exploited trust relationships to gain 
access to their targets (APT10 reporting as 
per US & Japan CERT). Smaller and medium 
sized organizatiosn are most likely 
motivated differently then larger 
organizations/agencies/CC/S/As (reputation, 
ability to operate) but if they are relied on 
by larger organizations must understand 
their posture to avoid the worst case risks as 
service providers. 1. Their infrastructure is 
compromised and leveraged to gain 
unauthorized access to their customer 
environments. 2. Their infrastructure is 
compromised and no longer able to provide 
mission-dependent services/products to 
their customers.
I agree, thanks for the thourough 
insight!
X
No change.
Cyber India X A common understanding is always good. 
Nevertheless, it is a pre-requisite for inter-
dependencies.
True, a framework will include all 
the criteria areas
X
Changed from Effective (E) 
to Highly Effective (HE). I 
change my initial opinion to 4 
given that is closer to the 
average.
6. Stakeholders must 
easily understand the 
CCDF.
4.4 4.7
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Cyber Alpha X X No change. 
Cyber Bravo X
Agreed, identifying roles and responsibilities 
aids in understanding cyber defense.
Thanks
X
No change. 
Cyber Charlie X X No change.
Cyber Delta X
I believe the framework will dictate the 
various responsibilities ("what" needs to be 
done) and management will allocate the 
"who".
Thanks but we havn't built the 
framework yet. Once we establish 
the criteria we will build a 
prototype. How important to 
comprehensive cybersecuirity 
defense to you view 
roles/responsibilities as?...
X
Changed Effective (E) to 
Highly Effective (HE). Due to 
clarification 
Cyber Echo X X No change.
Cyber Foxtrot X
This is not only important in identifying gaps 
but it can also identify duplicative efforts 
that may not provide additional value.
TRUE
X  
No change.
Cyber Ice-Man X X No change.
Cyber Ironic 
(formerly Cyber 
Golf) X
X
No change.
Cyber Hotel X
Clear roles & responsibilities allow for 
appropriate resource planning for current 
and future requirements, while ensuring the 
necessary duties are assigned to the 
appropriate functions.
TRUE
X
No change.
Cyber India
X
It is very important to define who is doing 
what. That is for sure.
TRUE
X
Changed from Most 
Effective (ME) to Highly 
Effective (HE). I will change 
my vote to 4 because it is 
closer to the average 
evaluation from those who 
wrote an explanation.
7. The CCDF must identify 
roles and responsibilities 
of personnel responsible 
for defending CALOs.
4.4 4.4
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Expert Panel Phase 2 Round 1 Comment Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LE SE E HE E
Cyber Alpha X
Although you did not specifically mention 
virtual, the proposed framework could be 
adjusted (based on user requirements) to 
handle such requests.
I updated the Defense in Dept slide 
to explain this better for the 
stakeholders. Thanks for the input.
Cyber Bravo X
The threats are not only covered by the 
framework but also covered by the use-
cases. 
True!! 
Cyber Charlie X
Cyber Delta X
Cyber Echo X
Cyber Foxtrot X
It's a little confusing because there are many 
variables to account for.
In a large organizations there are 
many variables. That's the 
problem. The framework attempts 
to collect all the variables, identify 
the waste and the  defense gaps in 
an organized manner. To date, this 
has not been done in CALOs. 
Cyber Ice-Man X
Cyber Ironic 
(formerly Cyber 
Golf)
X
Cyber Hotel X
Recommend including as part of the 
Requirements Validation Process, specifically 
around use-cases and capabilities, leveraging 
an existing Framework to add maturity to 
the validation mechanism. Additionally, as 
part of capabilities, there should be an 
element of mapping data sources to each 
threat to understand what data is required 
from each capability to act appropriately. 
This assessment is based conceptually on 
the approach. The incorporation of roles 
including physical responsibilities (admins, 
engineers, users/operators) becomes 
inclusive of the notion. That said, the 
capabilities and use-cases as examples don't 
clearly indicate if there is a thorough set of 
each to accommodate.
Very prudent to future work. Our 
goal for this work is the simply 
identify if the framework captures 
the criteria identified. I look 
forward to future research to find 
out the answers to your questions 
in applying this methodology to 
an actual CALO (required for 
validating the framework). The 
mapping is notional. 
Cyber India X
By integrating NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework and Oracle´s Defense in Depth 
Model it covers a broad range of threats. 
Thanks!!
Averages
4.4
How can the CCDF prototype be 
improved? Remarks
1. Does the Comprehensive 
Cybersecurity Defense Framework 
(CCDF)  prototype account for 
virtual as well as physical threat 
factors.
Round 1 RatingRate how well the CCDF prototype 
meets each below criteria area Respondent
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Cyber Alpha X
Cyber Bravo X
You would have to deliberately add a step to 
either the validation process to account for 
interdependencies or you would have to add 
another mission dependency framework to 
map the existing 4 criteria to. This is not 
explicitly accounted for.  However it can be 
inferred based on the framework.
I better explained the 
interdependency narration but 
you are correct. It is inferred. 
Thanks for the input. 
Cyber Charlie X
Multiple framework are interrelated to 
account for interdependencies across the 
board. 
Thanks!!
Cyber Delta X
Cyber Echo X
 Although understood, the inter-
dependencies are not explicitly called out. 
Doing so might reduce varying 
interpretation.
Good point. I explained in in the 
revised narrative for the 
stakeholders. 
Cyber Foxtrot X
Contracts and relationships should explicitly 
be identified to avoid confusion during crisis.
Contract are not part of cyber 
defense but it is identified in the 
NIST "Identify" core task. 
Contracts are out of scope for this 
work but very important to 
identifying limitations in the work 
force. This may be identified once 
the framework is applied in an 
actual CALO. Let's look into this 
for future work. 
Cyber Ice-Man X
Taking into perspective, industry; we are not 
closed off to IoT and require our system 
tools to have an AI approach.  When or will 
Federal Govt be of need is uncertain but I 
suspect it should be considered as an 
interdependency
Good point. It may be a good idea 
to apply the framework in a 
similar CALO for future research. 
Cyber Ironic 
(formerly Cyber 
Golf)
X
Cyber Hotel
X
Would recommend revisiting the NIST 
component to ensure there is an element 
within Identify that covers 3rd party service 
consumption (so that they would also be 
covered under risk 
assessment/management). Not explicitly, 
but there is opportunity as highlighted 
within the framework to do so.
This is similar to the contracting 
question addressed by Cyber 
Foxtrot. Very good point and NIST 
most certainly does address 3 
party service under risk 
management. Not explicit in the 
general framework but NIST 
explains this in detail under the 
"identify" core task. 
Cyber India X
I think that this is the weakest point of the 
proposed framework.
I re-accomplished this in the 
defense in depth narrative. Thanks 
for the input. 
4
2. Does the CCDF prototype 
account for inter-dependencies of 
outside organizations.
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Cyber Alpha X
Speaking the same language is key. 
Additionally, understanding roles and 
responsibilities is invaluable in the cyber 
domain.
True!! 
Cyber Bravo X
Use-cases would have to be derived from a 
common source across all organizations in 
order to retain a common lexicon. You may 
want to consider utilizing a common source 
of use-cases and not solely rely upon the 
event tracked and discovered by that 
organization.
Good on both points. The lexicon 
must first be understood by all 
sub-organization in the CALO. That 
said, the CNSS is standard for 
most government organizations 
(required) and used widely by 
commercial organization that deal 
in cyber. For example, DHS is the 
government agency responsible 
for the .com community use by 
most commercial companies, so 
those companies understand 
CNSS. Educational institutions 
may also be certified as an 
academic center of excellent under 
CNSS. Nova case in point. 
Cyber Charlie
X
CNSS is a standard lexicon for DOD 
and most commercial CALOs for 
cyber. 
Cyber Delta
X
While there may be some 
variation in certain organizations, 
the FW provides a baseline 
standard for identifying actions 
and events.
Cyber Echo X
Cyber Foxtrot X
This works as long as the reference are 
identified (e.g. NCSSI 4009)
They are explicitly identified in the 
framework. That is the reference 
depicted in the demonstration 
that defines not only the roles the  
cyber language used by the CALO. 
CNSSI is widely used by both 
government and industry.
Cyber Ice-Man X
Cyber Ironic 
(formerly Cyber 
Golf)
X
Cyber Hotel X
The inclusion of established frameworks 
inherits this, but there is a risk when 
contextualizing NIST "tasks" around threat 
that the full meaning may not translate 
initially well (specifically, the items within) 
each NIST framework category.
That's why we need a standard 
lexicon. CNSS.
Cyber India X
Yes, the framework is integrated by other 
well-known frameworks in the CALOs sector.
Thanks for the input!
4.6
3. Does the CCDF prototype use a 
common lexicon by internal and 
external organizations.
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Cyber Alpha X
I rated HE in this category, because this is a 
theoretical product. Moreover, it is difficult 
to state that this product would be 
applicable to every organization as there 
many unknowns.
Good point. This is only for CALOs 
and future research is the test for 
the unknowns. 
Cyber Bravo X
This framework is suitable to ensure that 
any organization would be able to 
understand where and how to apply 
defensive capabilities based on their mission 
needs.
Thanks for the input!
Cyber Charlie X
Cyber Delta X
Cyber Echo X
Cyber Foxtrot X  
It's scalable framework but it need to be 
implemented at the right size organization.
The framework is only for large 
organizations as identified in the 
problem statement: CALO are 
large companies, agencies and 
organizations. Such as the DOD, 
SAIC, DHS, NSA, Target, Walmart, 
etc. 
Cyber Ice-Man X
With Federal government, yes Most of the frameworks identified 
in the CCDF are widely used by 
industry. NIST, the CKC, Defense in 
Depth were created by industry 
and government. 
Cyber Ironic 
(formerly Cyber 
Golf)
X
Cyber Hotel X
Cyber India
X
Probably the "inter-dependencies of outside 
organizations" are required to say that 
highly inter-dependent organizations will 
benefit from the proposed framework. Yes. 
Specially the tables indicate specific task and 
responsibilities that may be applied 
regardless of organizational operations.
I added this information to the 
defense in depth slide narrative. 
4.5
4. Is the CCDF prototype applicable 
regardless of organizational 
operations.
Cyber Alpha X
Although, this prototype does briefly engage 
the topic of trusted insiders and hackers, it 
does not have enough info on these areas. 
Would suggest adding a few lines on 
behavioral factors since that is the highlight 
of this area. 
I'll add more info to the 
stakeholders in the narrative. 
Cyber Bravo X
The process of an attack is generally the 
same regardless if it is an insider or a hacker.  
This process is well captured by the Cyber 
Kill Chain.
 True! I've added that comment to 
the narrative as well. Thanks!
Cyber Charlie X
Cyber Delta X
Cyber Echo
X  
As in #2, although understood, the 
prototype might benefit from explicitly 
calling out internal and external threats.
I added this information to the 
defense in depth slide narrative. 
Cyber Foxtrot X  
Indicators of compromise of all adversaries 
are mapped to detect from NIST CSF, across 
the cyber Defense Layers BUT I don't clearly 
see the distinction between inside/outside 
threats. So, yes it includes behavioral factors 
to identify inside threats.
I added this information to the 
defense in depth slide narrative. 
Cyber Ice-Man X
Awareness and training were covered, if 
logging was expanded upon with reference 
to DLP solution (technology) yes fully
This is more specific to detailed 
functions of the general 
framework. For future research 
applicability will be explored. 
Cyber Ironic 
(formerly Cyber 
Golf)
X
Cyber Hotel
X
Not explicitly, but there is evidence this is 
covered within the use-cases driving 
capabilities for each "requirement".
True. And may be tested in future 
research. 
Cyber India
X
Yes. The main contribution is by 
incorporating the Oracle's Defense in Depth 
Model
Thanks!!
4.3
5. Does the CCDF prototype 
include behavioral factors of 
friendly and malicious users 
(trusted insiders and hackers).
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Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo X
While the concept of cyber defense is 
complicated and the guidance currently in 
existence is monumental there has not been 
a better more simplistic approach to 
understanding the complexities than this 
framework.
Thanks!!
Cyber Charlie X
Cyber Delta X
Cyber Echo X
Cyber Foxtrot X
Cyber Ice-Man X
Mapped very clearly, the logic is easy to 
follow
Thanks!!
Cyber Ironic 
(formerly Cyber 
Golf)
X
Cyber Hotel X
The concept is clear, but the walk through of 
the requirements because of the multiple 
dimensions can distract from the messaging, 
leading to issues with buy-in.
Well see in the stakeholders panel. 
This is a hard one to predict. The 
intent was for you to put yourself 
in the stakeholders shoes for this 
criteria. 
Cyber India X It is self-explanatory in the tables and the general framework.
Thanks!!
4.66. Can stakeholders easily 
understand the CCDF prototype.
Cyber Alpha X Awesome flow. I thought it was very intuitive.
Thanks!!
Cyber Bravo X
While the roles used in this framework may 
be generic enough to account for the major 
roles within your typical organization it may 
be worth noting that during the application 
of this framework to a specific organization 
the roles can be modified to better align 
with that mission. 
 True, we'll have to see for future 
research.
Cyber Charlie X
Cyber Delta X
Cyber Echo X
Cyber Foxtrot X
It's pretty clear but organizations may not 
have defined roles with the same titles. Easy 
fix. 
If they use this framework. They 
will have to standardize the 
names. If the descriptions do not 
match what's in CNSS….they may 
not be doing those defense 
actions. 
Cyber Ice-Man X
Without exception the roles were mapped 
and defined.
Thanks!!
Cyber Ironic 
(formerly Cyber 
Golf)
X
Cyber Hotel X
"I would recommend in the next stakeholder 
group a discussion occur around answering 
the following: 1. What if a role only applies 
to a task (detect against all threats) for one 
requirement, is a full matrix the best 
approach? 2. How do you account for roles 
that have responsibilities that could very 
easily be a capability (i.e., vigilant 
User/Operator self-reporting ? 3. How do 
these roles interact with one another, and is 
it the CCDF's role to quantify the inter-
dependencies of these interactions?" Roles 
are defined well and appropriately for this 
effort, but I'm not certain I agree fully with 
the application of responsibility as currently 
applied.
This is an application question for 
future research the  roles for CNSS 
are widely used and agreed upon 
by government and industry for 
cyber. 
Cyber India X
The roles are clear, specially by integrating 
the CNSS's Cyber Lexicon
Thanks!!
4.5
7. Does the CCDF prototype 
identify roles and responsibilities 
of personnel responsible for 
defending CALOs.
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LE SE E HE
M
E LE SE E HE
M
E
Cyber Alpha X
Cyber Bravo X
Presentation effectively shows how inter-
dependencies can be developed!
Thanks!
Cyber Charlie  X
Cyber Delta
  X
It is currently good but will have to 
consistently be updated due to the nature 
of its purpose.
Yes, futuer work will require 
futher updates. Thanks for the 
input
Cyber Echo X
Cyber Foxtrot   X
Cyber Golf X  
 
You do explain the pysical and virtual 
factors are covered in the framework, 
although its difficult to defend 
virtual/encrypted data that falls outside an 
organizational scope of control.
Good Copy, alhtough, we are not 
trying to defend VPNs or 
encrypted data outside CALO 
scope of control, simply trying to 
identify them at the proper 
defense layers. In doing this 
CALOs stakeholders can accept 
or reject the risks. What we tend 
to see is avoidance of virtual and 
encypted traffic altogther, simply 
because defenders cant see the 
data. This places organizations at 
risks. Additionally, we capture 
interdependencies in the 
framework as well. 
Cyber Hotel
X
You cover this in the D.I.D and the NIST 
RMF under identify. This is why the 
mapping overlaps. I liked the way you used 
only the core areas in NIST which is weak 
at explaining where the risk is but simply 
states to identify the risk. The key factor is 
you use each of the three frameworks for 
what they were intended to do. 
Thanks!
Cyber India X
Cyber Kilo X
Remarks First round 
Avg.
1. Does the Comprehensive 
Cybersecurity Defense 
Framework (CCDF)  prototype 
account for virtual as well as 
physical threat factors.
4.4
Rate how well the CCDF prototype 
meets each below criteria area Respondent
Round 1 Rating Respondent Comments
Facilitator Comments
Updated Rating
Cyber Alpha X
I see its implied but the true test is putting 
the CCDF into practical terms. You epxlain 
this very well in the presentation but it's 
really hard for me to understand since I've 
havn't practically perfromed cyber defense 
in a long time. 
Yes, practical us will be part of 
futuer research. 
Cyber Bravo  X
Cyber Charlie  X
Cyber Delta  X No improvement necessary Thanks!
Cyber Echo  X
Cyber Foxtrot X
Cyber Golf  X
Hard to obtain interdependcies since outside 
organizations do not fall under stakeholder 
controls. Maybe add contract oversight and 
agreements/policy to the mapping
That falls under the identify task in 
the NIST RMF but this comment 
was part of the expert panel as 
well. A separate study with a 
heavy contract workforce and 
dedendency will certainly be an 
area for futuer work. 
Cyber Hotel  X
Cyber India X
Cyber Kilo X
2. Does the CCDF prototype 
account for inter-dependencies 
of outside organizations.
4.2
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Cyber Alpha X
Cyber Bravo X
Cyber Charlie X
Cyber Delta  X
Consistent validation as new terms evolve 
and can be misinterpreted.
The CNSS is reviewed continually
Cyber Echo X
CNSS is an athoritative source but most 
organizations tend to end up creating their 
own language. That said, this brings to light 
the question. Are my cyber defenders 
across the globe using a universal 
language. 
The key is to institutionalize the 
language. The more CALOs that 
use the same language, the 
better collaboration between 
those CALOs and cyber 
defenders. 
Cyber Foxtrot X
Cyber Golf X
Cyber Hotel  X
Cyber India X
Cyber Kilo X
3. Does the CCDF prototype use 
a common lexicon by internal 
and external organizations.
4.3
Cyber Alpha X
Cyber Bravo X
Cyber Charlie  X
Cyber Delta  X
It appears to be since it is based on a 
common framework for organizations that 
operate in this mission space.
Exactly, why we chose those 
specific frameworks.
Cyber Echo  X
Cyber Foxtrot X
Cyber Golf  X
Cyber Hotel X
Cyber India X
Cyber Kilo X
4. Is the CCDF prototype 
applicable regardless of 
organizational operations.
4.4
Cyber Alpha X
The individual frameworks indirectly 
address trusted insiders; however, can the 
framework map in a reverse manner 
toward the who. For example, how does a 
CALO detect reconnaissance at the 
endpoint by a user (trusted insider)?
That's much further into the 
practical sense of the CCDF and 
for future research but, a CALO 
wouldn't detect reconnassiance 
but a user could detect 
reconnasiance. For example, a 
user can detect latency on his 
system, a web camera turning 
on, or key-logging. The CCDF can 
also help CALOs identify tools 
user and sys ads can use such as 
systems logs. Again, if you dont 
engage users, you will only have 
defence performed by part of 
your orgainzation. 
Cyber Bravo X
Cyber Charlie
 
X
We use the CKC to help my orgnaization 
make decisions on wheater to act, or watch 
enemy behavior. This framework forces us 
to address more details into where the 
behavior is happening in defense stages. 
Great tool!
Cyber Delta  X
Cyber Echo X
Cyber Foxtrot X
Cyber Golf X
Cyber Hotel X
Cyber India X
Cyber Kilo X
5. Does the CCDF prototype 
include behavioral factors of 
friendly and malicious users 
(trusted insiders and hackers).
4.4
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Cyber Alpha X
The meshing of frameworks is easily 
understood; however, a database that can 
query based on the who, task, what, and 
where would make it easier for anyone 
working cyber defense to find a 
requirement, capability, or tool, although a 
database maybe outside the scope of this 
research
It is, as a matter of fact. I have 
been workign with the DISA DCO 
team to build out the tools, 
capabilites and requirements for 
DISA proper using an SQL 
database. 
Cyber Bravo
X
Very easy to understand and brings clarity 
to the more complicated frameworks in the 
CCDF. The first practial approach I've seen to  
confusing frameworks like ISO, NIST 800-30 
ect. 
Thanks!
Cyber Charlie X I'd love to try this out in my command! Looking forware to it
Cyber Delta  X
Yes, if they have some background in this 
area. 
It is implied that CIOs and other 
cyber stakeholders know what 
they are in charge of and/or own  
but duely noted. Some 
stakeholders of cyber may be 
have oversight but not know 
enough to fully understand the 
CCDF
Cyber Echo X
Cyber Foxtrot X  
Cyber Golf X
Cyber Hotel X
Cyber India X
Cyber Kilo X A lot to take in but yes, I get it! Thanks!
6. Can stakeholders easily 
understand the CCDF prototype.
4.6
Cyber Alpha X
Cyber Bravo X
Cyber Charlie  X
Cyber Delta X
Cyber Echo X
Cyber Foxtrot X
Cyber Golf X
Roles vary based on organization and 
everone should be conducting defense. I like 
the fact that the initial mapping has all the 
roles mapped to the where, what and the 
task. In a lot of instances, we disenfranchise 
our folks by not engaging them in the 
defense actions. 
Great point and this is the intent 
of the framework!
Cyber Hotel  X
Cyber India X
Cyber Kilo  X  
7. Does the CCDF prototype 
identify roles and responsibilities 
of personnel responsible for 
defending CALOs.
4.7
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